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Abstract 
 
About 70 of the 150 developing countries have embarked on reforming of the power sector since 
the early 1990s. The drivers of this reform movement are disenchantment with the poor 
performance of state-owned power utilities, the need for new investments and modernization to 
meet the rapid growth in demand, and fiscal pressure, along with the desire to protect and help 
the poor(Gratwick and Eberhard 2008). However, various technical and economic evaluations of 
power sector reform indicate that they are still facing difficulties even after the reform. These 
power problems in developing countries especially affect the industrial production in the 
developing countries who aim to economic growth. In some developing countries, another huge 
amount of money is provided for the re-design of the roadmap and technical assistance for 
restoration from multilateral institutions. 
Although the power sector reform has been introduced in order to escape from the existing 
problems and challenges of the power sector, still those problems have persisted for a long time 
throughout the developing countries. Some researchers, in a skeptical perspective, strongly 
criticize the reform itself in developing countries and insist that the reform should be backward 
(Eberhard and Gratwick 2007). In many cases from the literature reviews, the main question and 
issues in reform have not been ‘whether’ but ‘how’ to do it. In this point, we still need to answer 
this question by a more critical assessment from empirical experiences; can unfavorable initial 
condition of developing countries truly be overcome by good design and implementation of the 
reform? Also, recent study mainly focuses on how to solve the problems as a feedback for the 
reform. Despite the importance of design and execution of reform in the initial stage is generally 
agreed by researchers and reform participants, its mechanism is not yet clearly clarified. Hence, 
the following questions can be posed; how do the reform design and execution in initial stage 
contribute to the result of the reform? 
To answer for these two research questions above, following three objectives are established: 
1. Identify unfavorable initial conditions that developing countries typically face in their 
power sector reforms. 
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2. Clarify unfavorable initial conditions in which shortcomings in policy design and 
implementation are critically important in that lead to failure in the following process.  
3. Suggest important aspects to avoid the shortcomings in design and implementation of the 
initial stage. 
In order to select case study area, an eligible country list was first prepared that satisfied the 
following conditions: (a) developing country that have already initiated the power sector reform, 
(b) the country has a long enough history that allows us to understand the whole process, (c) the 
country has a similar size of economy and power capacity, which indicate market demand and 
economy of scale of power. As a result, Chile and the Philippines were selected, which can show 
how the implementation and design in initial stage brought out different initial results. 
After cases are selected, case study using causality analysis was conducted based on the result of 
literature review, in-depth interviews. Obtained data were firstly classified into three phases: 
initial condition, initial implementation and initial result. Using identified factors, causality 
diagram was derived. Throughout drawing the causality diagram, subsequently, some 
fundamental findings from the proposed causality diagram were suggested. To decide an analytic 
dimension in causality diagram, initial implementation and initial results corresponding to an 
initial condition is set as a domain. This domain setting can be verified by the stakeholders’ 
analysis results that derive four main stakeholders in initial stage. Moreover, all links of factors 
in causality diagram were also investigated by applying weight to determine critical factors. 
In Chile case, the initial condition of Chilean power sector reform could be characterized with 
absence of clear regulation governance, vertically integrated monopoly by state-owned power 
company and its fiscal constraints. On top of that, less political supports for the national human 
resources, Chile's unique political condition under the dictatorship, general social comprehensive 
reform before the power sector reform in security service and education are initial condition that 
can be differentiated from the other developing countries. Among these initial conditions, the 
unfavorable regulatory governance was improved by establishing independent regulatory body 
and capacity building by utilizing local human resources who are qualified in economics and 
engineering and by funding form the domestic business group. Besides, Chilean regulatory body 
in initial stage had to build their capacity by themselves because they did not have any reference 
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cases and supports from outside. Through the internal capacity building process, consequently, 
they could have high institutional capacity enough to regulate the tariff with simple and logical 
economic rules. Fiscal constraints of state-owned power company were improved by promoting 
private investment on generation capacity, since they successfully fostered investor’s confidence 
in the power market through the initial implementation. That credible environment could be 
developed by many incentives for the investors. First of all, the market signal was accurate with 
marginal pricing model, which was empowered by electricity law. Moreover, the investors was 
able to be protected by the jurisdiction and explicit regulatory framework imbedded in legislation. 
We also cannot deny the influence of the abundant domestic capital market on the initial success 
in attracting new investment on generation capacity which was resulted from the general and 
comprehensive reform in social security and education prior to the power sector reform. With 
regards to the political interference, Chilean unique political environment ironically had positive 
influence on the power sector reform, promoting quick decision making under the dictatorship. 
Regulatory body also could maintain their independency under the military government. Lastly, 
fulfilling competition in the market were failed to meet the expectation that the reform would 
bring more efficiency throughout competition in the market. Vertical integration maintained in 
the power market due to an inadequate allocation of property right and loopholes in law 
enactment that allow cross-ownership between generation and distribution caused limited 
competition in the market.  
In the Philippines case, the initial condition of the power sector reform could be characterized as 
frequent changes in energy governance, weak regulatory body, insufficient funds for capacity 
building, IPP contracts and its burden to state-owned power company, and vertically integrated 
monopoly by conglomerate. Absence of well-organized political party and family oriented 
political activities is also a unique feature of the initial condition that influences on the power 
sector reform. Other external factors such as Asian financial crisis, supports from ADB and 
USAID were also reflected on the causality analysis. Philippines had concerns on techno-
economic design of regulation, when the independent regulatory body was created, because the 
regulatory responsibility had been unclear before the power sector reform. Due to the inability of 
funding on capacity building, ADB provided technical assistance but this caused high 
dependence on external consultants without building internal competency. Regulatory body’s 
organizational features for example, salary policy also failed to attract qualified personnel 
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because of relatively lower salary than other sector’s utility regulatory body. Moreover the 
regulatory body’s independence and autonomy was threatened by political appointee of the chair 
and high dependency on government supports. These strong political influence is also one of the 
characteristics of the Philippines that hamper the quick decision making process.  Especially in 
the initial stage, there was severe delay in decision making on whether to initiate the reform or 
not, prior to the reform. Before the official enforcement of the reform, the political interest 
groups could had information about the future industry and easily involve in rent seeking 
behavior. Delay intensified the coalition of the interests group, thus delays in decision making 
iterated. In terms of the investment expansion on generation, the Philippines failed to increase 
the private investment by privatizing state-owned generation assets. Due to the risky contract 
with the IPPs made NPC too much focus on generation’s privatization, rather than transmission 
assets. Moreover, with high transmission loss problems, private investors hesitated to invest on 
generation. External shocks such as Asian Financial Crisis and Enron in 1997 also influenced on 
the financial feasibility of Distribution Company who is the main purchaser of the generation and 
deteriorated the investment climate. Consequently, as the number of the private participants in 
wholesale power market, competition in the market was also not fully accomplished. On top of 
that, the Philippines mandated the law that allowed cross-ownership between distribution and 
generation in a certain percent but the permitted ratio of Distribution Company’s purchasing 
electricity from bilateral contracts with affiliated generation company over the total requirements 
was raised up to 50% by lobbying and political reasons.  
Based on the result of each case study, comparative study was conducted by each domain, 
focusing on whether unfavorable initial condition was overcome by what implementation in 
initial stage. First, regarding to the capacity of the regulatory body, the most contradicting 
execution in the initial stage of power sector reform in the two cases is the resource of capacity 
strengthening process. Impact of political factors on the regulation cannot be overlooked too. 
Political interference on the regulatory body in the Philippines impeded the independence and 
transparency of the regulation. Second, with regard to the political interference, the pace of 
progress and decision making especially at the initiation was different within two cases. Besides, 
we could clarify the influence of political interference and conclude that political factor is the 
most difficult to avoid. Third, about the investment expansion, a notable comparison is the 
difference in other operational sector’s influence on investment. In short, in the Philippines, they 
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focused on privatization on generation more to settle the liability by selling NPC’s generation 
assets to private. In that process, NPC’s transmission assets’ privatization was slowed down and 
the technical loss of the transmission line was not improved. Thus, this unbalanced privatization, 
too much focusing on generation caused side effect that investment on generation is reversely 
decreased, because the unstable line network was felt like another risk for the investment. 
Moreover, financial inability and low credit of Distribution Company (Meralco), who is a main 
customer of the generation, also highly influenced on the investment in generation. Fourth, 
vertically integrated monopoly structure by the conglomerate was a prevailing feature of the 
power sector in both cases. They mandated laws that included clauses mentioning about 
establishment of competitive power market and its operation. However, the legislated law 
provisions had shortcomings and difficulties in controlling abuse of market power because of 
some loopholes in law allowed the existing conglomerates to keep their market power. In initial 
stage, the conglomerates’ market power as a dominant industry player did not show much 
changes by establishing the competitive market.  
Through case studies and their comparative analysis, this study showed the roles of policy design 
and implementation in the initial stage of power sector reform in developing counties. Main 
findings can be summarized as follows:  
1. Common unfavorable initial conditions that developing countries faced in their power 
sector reforms are identified: 1) Limited capacity of the regulatory bodies, 2) Lack of 
investments to infrastructure and business, 3) Conglomerates dominate the country’s 
business, 4) Political intervention 
2. Reform design and implementation critically influence on some of the unfavorable initial 
conditions that developing countries often face in their power sector reforms.  
– Careful design and implementation can overcome unfavorable initial conditions 
for capacity building in regulatory body and provide incentives for investment in 
business and infrastructure, while shortcomings in policy design and 
implementation lead to inappropriate initial results. 
3. In power sector reforms in developing countries, policy design and implementation need 
to be done considering the following aspects: 
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– Since power sector reform can be done in step by step, goals in the initial stage 
are not necessarily full competition in power market in developing countries, 
where political interventions are difficult to avoid.  
– Capacity of regulatory body: Aids in knowledge and money are necessary, but 
should be carefully designed so that the given resources strengthen domestic 
capacity in developing countries.  
– Establishing investment environment: Legal and judicial backups carefully 
designed considering the whole power provision are effective to overcome lack of 
investments. We emphasize these are especially important in power sector since 
connection among generation, transmission and distribution matters in the sector. 
– Even when it leaves rooms for benefiting conglomerate or political intervention, 
successful initial results can be achieved if the decision making is done in a 
speedy manner.  
– It is difficult to avoid political interference and to ensure competition in market by 
policy design and implementation. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview of the issue 
Advancement of a country could be measured in terms of per capita consumption of electricity. 
Many previous researches have demonstrated a strong correlation between economic growth and 
electricity consumption in different countries, though the assumption on the direction of the 
causal relation is compatible depending on the researchers (Kraft 1978, Murry and Nan 1996, 
Wolde-Rufael 2004). Especially in developing countries, securing power sector has more 
significant meanings for two reasons. First, capacity of power generation and well-organized 
power system is one of the most critical endowments for the developing countries in a growing 
economy. Second, electrification in rural area and improvement of access and affordability to 
electricity services for poor households is another significant issue in developing countries. 
Many developing countries underwent difficulties such as imbalance of power demand and 
supply, periodic blackouts, and poor operational performance under a long period of state-owned 
electric power company without competition and incentives to improve performances (Newbery 
2006; Jamasb 2006). All these irrationalities were the motivation and reason for the reform 
(Wamukonya 2003). Since these kinds of problems especially gave serious threat by depriving 
the country of a driving force to economic growth, movement towards restructuring and breaking 
up existing market structure absolutely matters in developing countries (R. W. Bacon and J. 
Besant-Jones, 2013; Basnet-Jones, 2007).   
Starting from the early 1990s, a set of institutional reforms – including unbundling, privatization 
of ownership, and the introduction of competition into the generation sector – began to be 
promoted as a global solution to the problems of the electricity industry (IEA 2001; Littlechild 
2001; Patterson 1999; Joskow 1999; Bacon 1995). The power sector reforms based on the 
‘standard textbook model’ became a global trend during the 1990s (Hunt 2002). Reform became 
a ‘normal prescription’ of the multilateral donor agencies, such as IMF and the World Bank, and 
the reform agenda has been pursued vigorously for more than two decades since 1990s. The 
textbook model was first applied in the Chilean power sector in 1982 and also became the 
reference model for reform in other energy sectors. Since 1982, when Chile began radical 
program of restructuring and privatization, more than half of the world’s developing countries 
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have introduced reforms in the power sector (Kessides 2012). ESMAP (1999) reported that 73 
countries among 115 developing countries in the world had already introduced reform process in 
any level, based on a questionnaire survey with World Bank staff with experience in the energy 
sector. As shown in Figure 1 below, countries that introduced higher level of reform steps are 
scored 6 points and remarked with dark blue in the world map. The opposite means less reform 
process and colored with light blue.  
 
Figure 1 Level of power sector reform of developing countries 
Source: ESMAP (1999), “Global Energy Sector Refom in Developing Countries: A Scorecard.”  
The textbook model for reforms involved the following reform sequence and steps: i) 
corporatization of state-owned enterprise, ii) law for electricity sector liberalization, iii) 
establishment of an independent regulator, iv) unbundling  of the main segments, v) incentive 
regulation of electricity networks, vi) establishment of a wholesale electricity market, vii) 
privatization and viii) introduction of independent power producers (IPPs). The model brought 
about a fundamental paradigm shift in terms of electricity sector market structures, the role of the 
state, and the regulation of the sector (Joskow, 1998; Newbery, 2002; Jamasb et al., 2015). 
Nearly 30 years since the first power sector reform in Chile, the reforms have proven much more 
difficult than first anticipated and most remain work in progress. The experience with power 
sector reform, however, has frequently included chronic underinvestment in power supply, price 
hikes, unreliable service, and reduced access, particularly for the poor (ESMAP 1999, Hall 1999; 
Jamasb 2015; Jamasb, Nepal, and Timilsina 2015) 
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1.2 Review of the literature 
Since the power sector reform started in developing countries about two-and-a-half decades ago, 
many existing studies have been dealing with the power sector reform from various perspectives. 
Previous researchers have mainly approached the power sector reform using the methodology of 
cross-country econometric study or country case study. In the econometric model study, several 
influencing factors for the successful reform, such as regulation, the state of economic 
development and energy governance were examined. These models have advantages that they 
can capture the important factors in general, but have relative weakness to deal with the multiple 
factors because of the difficulties in data collection and measurement. On the other hand, the 
country-specific context and details are able to be suggested by the case study. In this section 1.2, 
previous studies are broadly discussed in order to provide the relative positioning of the research 
topic. 
1.2.1 Review of assessment on the result of the power sector reform 
Literature reviews that evaluate the result of the reform in developing countries have commonly 
been conducted through intensive and detailed case studies. Though it is hard to generalize from 
a few of cases and also each case country should be understood depending on their own reform 
context, some similarities in achievements and limitations of the power sector reform are found. 
Main achievements 
Some studies report that technical improvements, such as decrease in total distribution and 
transmission loss, an increase of the length of the transmission network and installed capacity. 
Those literatures showed that improvement in sector operation had been accomplished through 
the power sector reform in their cases. In the successful case of Chile and Brazil, social effect 
such as increase of labor productivity was reported as shown in Table 1 below. 
Table 1 Country case studies and their outcomes from the power sector reform 
Country Studies Main achievements 
Chile Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra 
(2003),  Nagayama (2007),  
Pollitt (2004) 
- Increased labor productivity  
- Reduced total energy losses  
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- Decreased wait time for repair service 
- Increased installed capacity  
- Increased length of transmission network 
- Investment expansion 
- Average node prices declined 
Argentina Rudnick and Solezzi (2001), 
Fischer, Gutierrez, and Serra 
(2003), Pollitt(2008) 
Toba (2007) 
- Reduced non-availability of thermal plants 
- Increased Installed capacity 
- Reduced distribution losses 
- Decreased spot price of electricity 
Peru Perez-Reyes and  Tovar (2009), 
Anaya( 2010) 
Pombo and Taborda (2006) 
- Reduced Distribution losses 
- Reduced Interruption time 
Brazil Mota (2003) 
Jamasb, Nepal, and Timilsina 
(2015) 
- Increased labor productivity of distribution and supply 
- Improved  competition in the sector,  
- Provided incentives for investors by auction process in 
transmission 
- Distribution companies procure electricity at 
competitive price 
India Bhatia and Gulati (2004) - Decrease of distribution losses 
The 
Philippines 
Toba (2007) - The reform with private sector participation increased 
social welfare. 
Limitations and Challenges 
However, various technical and economic evaluations of power sector reform indicate that they 
are still facing difficulties even after the reform. Recent reviews indicate that not much progress 
has been made in many parts of the world (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001; World Bank, 2003), 
although most of the countries have initiated reform of their power sector. In some developing 
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countries, another huge amount of money is provided for the re-design of the roadmap and 
technical assistance for restoration from multilateral institutions. Some case studies that focus on 
the same countries sometimes suggest different assessment on the reform results depending on 
the author and viewpoints. They commonly report challenging situations such as 
underinvestment in power supply, poor performance of the sector, price hikes, and unreliable 
service for the consumers (Table 2).  
Table 2 Case studies and their Limitations and challenges from the power sector reform  
Country Studies Limitations and challenges 
Chile Joskow (2008) - Post-reform market involved less restructuring 
- Concentration of the market power in a few players 
- Very limited instruments from the government side. 
The 
Philippines 
Roxas and Santiago 
(2010), Ma. Rowena M. 
Cham (2007) 
Fe Villamejor-Mendoza 
(2008) 
- Post-reform market involved with less restructuring and less 
competition 
- More regulation than some of the subsequent reform cases 
- Tariff increase/ Price hike 
- Concentration of the market power in few players 
India Yang (2006) - Technically and financially less efficient system 
- Weaker economic and political institutions. 
- Technical losses above 35% of  power generation,  
- Power theft on-going, state-level corruption, subsidized tariffs 
Vietnam Tuan(2012) - More regulation than some of the subsequent reform cases. 
Thailand Jamasb, Nepal, and 
Timilsina (2015) 
- Political turmoil affecting reform implementation,  
- Regulatory  institutions remain weak and not independent,  
- State enterprises are favored,  
- Promoting market competition difficult 
Brazil Jamasb, Nepal, and 
Timilsina (2015) 
- Excessive reliance on hydro can lead to energy crisis in the 
face of rising demand as in 2001-2002,  
- Issues associated with security of supply and diversity in 
generation,  
- Attracting private investments a necessary condition for the 
growth of the sector 
 
1.2.2 Review of determinants for the successful power sector reform 
In econometric model study, several influencing factors such as regulation, state of economic 
development and energy governance are examined. The literature focusing on cross-country 
economic estimation on the effects of power sector reform is limited to the relationship between 
price and power sector reform. In this kind of study, the effect of power sector reform on 
electricity price has been the main topic to discuss.  
2-18 
 
Steiner (2001) shows a relation between reform and industrial electricity price using 19 OECD 
countries data in the period of 1986–1996. Zhang et al(2005) say that the power sector reforms 
generally resulted in a decline in the industrial price and an increase in the price differential 
between industrial customers and residential customers, indicating that industrial customers 
beneﬁt more from the reform.  
Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) developed an econometric model using 19 OECD countries for period 
of 1987~1999, and indicated that expanded retail access and a large share of private ownership is 
likely to lower the industrial price, whereas unbundling of generation and introduction of a 
wholesale power market result in higher prices. 
There is also model specification studies conducted in terms of multifaceted nature of the 
situational reforms implemented and the diversity of electricity sectors across countries. There 
are also severe data and measurement problems (Kessides 2012). Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) 
indicate that country policy and institutional factors are positively correlated with reform and 
country risk is negatively correlated with reform. They give an example of comparison among 
region to show regional effects on the power sector reform, saying that Latin American and 
Caribbean countries are more likely to reform while countries in the Middle East and Africa are 
more likely to take fewer reform steps. 
Henisz et al.(2004) focus on the relationship between a country’s power sector reform and 
international background situation using 205 countries and territories data. They indicate that the 
domestic adoption of market-oriented reforms is strongly inﬂuenced by international pressures of 
coercion and emulation. The forceful effect of multilateral lending is increasing over time, a 
ﬁnding that is consistent with anecdotal evidence that multilateral organizations have broadened 
the scope of the “conditionality” terms specifying market-oriented reforms imposed on 
borrowing countries. 
Mendoza and Pardo (2010) proposed that restructuring did not bring about environmental 
beneﬁts related to a decrease in CO2 emissions because this depends on the existence of 
committed policies, and dedicated institutional and regulatory frameworks. 
Cambini and Rondi (2010) indicate that investment rate is higher under incentive regulation than 
under rate of return regulation. Gugler et al.(2011) clarified the relationship between electricity 
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price and investments. They indicated that higher electricity end-user prices in a country 
subsequently lead to higher investments in the capital stock, for example, in generation, 
distribution and transmission assets.  
According to Cambini and Rondi (2010), there is a trade-off between vertical economies and 
competition. Ownership unbundling and forced access to the incumbent transmission grid 
increase competition but come at the cost of lost vertical economies. Nagayama (2007) identified 
that independent regulator together with unbundling reduces electricity prices using 83 countries 
data from 1985 to 2005.  Nagayama (2009) also indicated that higher electricity prices are one of 
the main reasons for governments to adopt liberalization models, a conclusion also noted by 
Joskow in the context of the US. The liberalization process in the electricity industry does not 
necessarily decrease electricity prices. Instead, there is a propensity for the prices to increase in 
every market model. Nagayama (2011) proposed reform variables such as the entry of 
independent power producers (IPPs), unbundling of generation and transmission, the 
establishment of regulatory agencies, and the introduction of a wholesale spot market are the 
driving forces of increasing generation capacity, as well as reducing transmission and 
distribution loss in the respective regions. Different electricity industry reform policies/measures 
have different impacts on geographically and economically diverse countries too. A country's 
state of economic development has a different impact on policy effects of reforms. Coexistent 
with independent regulatory agencies, reform policy becomes more powerful in realizing sector 
performances. The summary of the influencing factors are presented in Table 3 below. 
Table 3 Summary of influencing factors for the successful power sector reform 
Factors Author Summary 
Regional 
effect 
Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) 
Country risk is negatively correlated with reform. 
Regional effects matter. For instance, Latin American 
and Caribbean countries are more likely to reform 
while countries in the Middle East and Africa are 
more likely to take fewer reform steps. 
Regulation 
Cambini Rondi(2010), 
Nagayama(2007, 2011) 
Incentive regulation  
Existence of independent regulator  
State of 
economic 
development 
Bacon and Besant-Jones(2001) system size, income per capita  
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Power 
resource 
Roxas(2005a) 
Negative natural endowments(fuel sources, 
geography, geomorphology, meteorology) affect the 
reform. 
Administration 
Cham (2007),  
 Bacon and Besant-Jones(2001) 
: Good governance and sound management 
External factor 
Henisz et al.(2004), 
Roxas(2005a) 
: International pressures of coercion and emulation 
: Asian Financial Crisis 
 
1.2.3 Review of the reform process 
Whatever the evaluation of the reform may be, many researchers agree that the power sector 
reform should be regarded as a ‘work of progresses rather than a ‘short event’, because a certain 
situation is bound to have a close relationship with the other event in the context. Therefore, 
recent countries who introduce the power sector reform more have a tendency to establish a step 
by step reform agenda on the modest way, deliberating a proper pace of the reform process. 
Previous studies about reform process were derived from policy process research presented by 
Dawson and Robinson (1963), Dye (1966) and Sharkansky (1970). They suggested models that 
explain the serial policy processes including external environment, political system, and its 
recurrent feedbacks. On the contrary, recent studies have developed the reform process 
considering different viewpoints.  
Table 4 Terminology about reform phase used in literature 
Terminology used in literature Source Meaning 
Initial  Condition, Prior 
Condition 
ADB(2013) Conditions and performance 
prior to the reform programs 
Ex-ante JICA guideline, ADB(2009), EU(2014) 
Post-action condition ADB(2009) 
The situation after the policy 
or program was selected. 
Initial stage  of implementation ADB(2009) 
Interim stage 
ADB(2009) 
EU(2014) 
Post-program condition ADB(2009) 
Sustaining reform ADB(2009) 
Initial Reform EU(2014) 
Sustained reform ADB(2009) 
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Rodrik (2003) defines the policy reform process in an aspect of institution since he focused on 
lending based policy reform led by multilateral institutions and international development banks. 
Abonyi(2005) distinguishes reform process into five stages; initiating, managing issues, 
endorsing, implementing and sustaining. USAID(2007) defines reform process as four steps that 
include diagnosing, design, implement and evaluate. ADB(2009), EU(2014), and JICA(2009), 
who have been actually involved in power sector reform generally distinguish the reform process 
as ex-ante, mid-term and ex-post, following the definition of the project cycle.  
As shown in the previous research, the definition of the reform process and terminologies used in 
those literatures are different depending on the organization and authors. Table 4 above shows 
the various terminologies that used in working papers and articles published. Terminologies such 
as initial condition, prior condition, and ex-ante are indicating the same phase of the reform. In 
ADB’s working paper, they defined the initial condition as an economic condition and 
performance prior to the reform program.  Terminologies indicating a situation after the policy or 
program are also different depending on the organization and authors. Though there are diverse 
terminologies, but the meaning of the words indicates the almost same phase of the power sector 
reform or policy reform. Abonyi (2005) says that some common phenomena could be found 
between the initial stage and the post-initial stage of the power sector reform. That includes 
legislation and regulations, or institutionalized changes. Abonyi (2005) also presented some 
distinct characteristics of the post-initial stage, which include sustained capacity development of 
service providers through government, political changes, and improved legislative enabling 
environment.  
Importance of the initial stage 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) suggested two scenarios that provide examples of the manner in 
which policy objective and its output interact as the implementation process moves through the 
stages of the process (Figure 2). One is gradual erosion scenario that proposes relatively negative 
result after the time has been passed. In this scenario, typical start-up problems in initial stage are 
sustained for a long time. The other is a comparably successful scenario that assumes high 
conformity of policy objectives and the results, and the duration of initial start-up problems is 
shorter than the erosion model. This shows that inappropriate implementation in initial stage 
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influences on the result of the reform. Consequently, it is critically needed to minimize the initial 
start-up problems throughout proper design and implementation in the initial stage.  
 
Figure 2 Two types of Policy process scenario   
Source: Sabatier (1980)  
 
Depending on the result of the initial stage, the serial stage could have a different result. Besant-
Jones (2006) also mentioned that the initial stage is critical to the success of power market 
reform and the most vulnerable period for treatment of the reform process in many developing 
countries. While some systemic and institutional issues may be improved in the process later, 
undertaking reforms in the wrong design and implementation of the initial stage require a huge 
amount of expense of time and money to recover. In the case of the Philippines, they had earlier 
support from ADB for the Power Sector Restructuring Program implemented in 1998~2002, 
however, the later Restoration Program implemented in 2005~2007 was not achieved to a 
significant extent. ADB (2012) evaluation report says that overall assessment on that restoration 
program is less than successful because of the earlier interventions. Thus, the initial 
implementation of the power sector reform should be carefully studied for the successful reform. 
1.3 Study Setting 
1.3.1 Research question and objective 
As literature reviews suggested, power sector reform has been introduced in order to escape from 
the existing problems and challenges of the power sector, but still those problems have persisted 
for a long time throughout the developing countries. Some researchers, in a skeptical perspective, 
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strongly criticize the reform itself in developing countries and insist that the reform should be 
backward (Eberhard 2005). In many cases from the literature reviews, the main question and 
issues in reform have not been ‘whether’, but ‘how’ to do. In this point, we still need to ask 
ourselves to answer this question by a more critical assessment from empirical experiences. Also, 
recent study mainly focuses on how to solve the problems as a feedback for the reform. Despite 
the importance of design and execution of reform in the initial stage is generally agreed by 
researchers and reform participants, its mechanism is not yet clearly clarified. Hence, the 
following two questions are posed to guide this research:  
a) Can unfavorable initial condition of developing countries truly be overcome by 
good design and implementation of the reform?  
b) How do the reform design and execution in the initial stage contribute to the initial 
result of the reform? 
To answer these questions, this research aims to: 
a) Identify unfavorable initial conditions that developing countries typically face in 
their power sector reforms. 
b) Clarify unfavorable initial conditions in which shortcomings in policy design and 
implementation are critically important in leading to failure in the following 
process.  
c) Suggest important aspects to avoid the shortcomings in design and implementation 
of the initial stage. 
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1.3.2 Initial Condition, Initial Implementation, and Initial Result 
Time scope and definition 
In this research, the time scope of the analysis is ‘initial stage’, which is defined by the author as 
shown in Figure 3. The initial condition means the status quo which describes the condition and 
performance prior to the reform. However, identifying and diagnosing issues about initial 
condition could be included in the initial stage. Therefore, in my study setting, initial stage starts 
with identifying issues and problems of initial condition. The initial implementation is actions 
done by various stakeholders of power sector and it can be categorized into various actions 
which include industry restructuring, the formation of new institutional roles, attracting private 
capital in the sector, and operating power market. Detailed actions are described in former 
section 1.1, which explains main steps and sequence of the power sector reform. When the initial 
stage ends, there could have evaluation on the output from the initial stage. ADB(2013) describes 
the transition period from initial stage to the post-initial stage that systemic or institutionalized 
changes such as legislation, amendments on law and regulation, re-design of the road map and/or 
introduction of additional policy changes happen between the initial stage and the post-initial 
stage. 
  
Figure 3 Definition of the ‘Initial stage’ and the time scope of the analysis 
Source: ADB (2013)  
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1.3.3 Features in Initial condition of the power sector in developing countries 
To identify the initial condition of the power sector reform in developing countries, internal and 
external factors will be considered. Each factor’s dimension and common features are presented 
in Table 5 below. Internal factors are mainly country specific aspects such as power sector 
structure, policy regulation, physical organization, operational performances and so on. External 
factors are mostly about macroeconomic situations, such as oil shock, financial crisis worldwide, 
inflation. International forces by multilateral structural adjustment, commitment from lending 
policies by multilateral financial institution are also investigated.  
Table 5 Characteristics of the initial condition of the power sector reform 
  Dimension Common Features in Initial condition of the power sector in developing countries 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 S
p
ec
if
ic
 I
n
te
rn
al
 F
ac
to
rs
 
Sector structure State owned, Highly bundled, Vertically integrated 
Government 
priorities for 
sector 
National industrialization, Universal access to electricity, Counter-cyclical 
employment 
Technology indigenization, Improved standards of living, National prestige, nation-
building 
Policy and 
regulation 
National energy ministry 
Provincial electricity authorities 
Revenue and 
tariffs 
Tariffs set by ministry, Direct subsidies from state budget 
Cross-subsidies from industry, Metering and collections constraints 
Financial and 
investment 
conditions 
Utility finances tied to national budget 
Self-financing limited by revenue generation, tariff arrangements 
Physical 
organization 
Extent of grid integration determined by geography of load and generation 
Urban-centered with grid expansion pattern outward from primary and secondary 
cities 
Operational 
performance 
Operational performance tied to utility financial conditions, national technical 
capacity, physical 
and geographical endowment, national economic conditions, and management 
practices 
Consumption 
and access 
Per capita consumption and access show a straight-line function of per capita GDP 
Fuel mix and 
sources 
Fuel mix a function of domestic resources, bundling of energy sector, energy 
security concerns, finances  
Most countries moved away from oil generation in response to 1970s oil price 
shocks 
Environment Access to clean fuels and technology limited by finances, resources, subsidies for 
domestic fuels 
Emergent environmental movements 
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Catalytic macroeconomic events in worldwide 
International investment climate 
Multilateral structural adjustment/commitment lending policies 
Source: Williams and Ghanadan (2006) 
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1.4 Selection of Cases 
In order to select case study area, an eligible country list was first prepared that satisfied the 
following conditions: (a) developing country that have already initiated the power sector reform, 
(b) the country has a long enough history that allows us to understand the whole process, (c) the 
country has a similar size of economy and power capacity, which indicate market demand and 
economy of scale of power.  
 
Figure 4 Grouping of countries in the same level of reform process 
Source: ESMAP report (1999) and recent data adjustment by author 
 
Based on the ESMAP report (1999), which conducted survey research to develop a reform 
indicator in 115 countries, and its updated recent data, countries in the same level of reform 
process are grouped into the same category. As you see in the Figure 4 above, Chile and the 
Philippines belong to the same group, a high level of reform country scoring 6 points.  
To find out the countries have a similar size of economy and power capacity, thresholds values 
are used for categorization. Besant-Jones (2006) presented this empirical threshold values on 
‘income level’ and ‘system size’: the threshold values of 1,000 MW and US$900, which shows 
the influence of scale economies on market reform. Country income level has a relatively 
stronger influence on the roles of the public and private sectors and on access and affordability to 
electricity services. It can also have a stronger influence on the regulation of power markets on 
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the basis that institutional capacity increases with income level, whereas power system size has a 
relatively stronger influence on market structure.  
Following the thresholds values suggested by Besant-Jones (2006), developing countries in 
eligible list were categorized into four groups respectively. Figure 5 shows the result of 
categorization. It is identified that Chile, the Philippines, and Thailand have similar size of per 
capita income and power system size. Based on these results, among the countries that had 
already reached a similar level of reform, Chile, and the Philippines were selected as case study 
areas because it satisfied all the conditions. 
 
Figure 5 Group categorization by system size and income thresholds values 
Source: Besant-Jones 2006, Reforming power market in developing countries: What have we 
learned? 
 
Selected cases, Chile and the Philippines, are often agreed by the researchers in that have shown 
different result of the reform. Chile case is referred as one of the successful case with long 
history especially regarding to remarkable increase in investment on new generation plants 
(Schmidt-Hebbel 2007; Read and Rudnick 2000).  On the other hand, the Philippines case has 
shown a different evaluation on the result of the reform from Chile case. The Philippines is one 
of the most ambitious country in the region that initiated the reform process (ADB interview 
2014), but   struggling in challenging situation (Roxas 2010, Sharma et al 2004) 
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1.5 Research Methodology 
The objectives of this research have been described in section 1.3. To systemically and logically 
achieve those objectives, framework of analysis is designed carefully. Key conceptual flows and 
process of the analysis in this research are described and justified in this chapter. To fulfill the 
objective of the research, proper data collection process was first selected and then data were 
collected. After obtaining the data, data processing for the analysis was conducted.  Causality 
analysis was completed with processed data and the conceptualized causal relationship among 
factors was clarified by categorized issues that were put emphasis in this study.  
To accomplish the goal of the research objectives, comparative case study methodology was 
adopted. The process includes case study on each case and comparative study for the two cases; 
Chile and the Philippines in this research. Case study part is an in-depth examination, undertaken 
over time, of a single case –such as a policy, design, regional features, implementation process 
and stakeholders. Comparative case study section covers two cases in a way that produces more 
generalizable knowledge about causal questions –how and why particular power sector reform 
program work or fail to work. Adoption of this methodology is feasible and appropriate in that 
comparative case studies are undertaken over time and emphasize comparison within and across 
contexts (Goodrick 2014). Derived information from the comparative case study would be 
valuable in tailoring the next power sector reform to support the achievement of intended 
outcomes in developing countries. 
1.5.1 Case study 
To be able to do this well, the specific features of each case will be described in depth. This case 
study has meaning in that understanding of each case is important in establishing the foundation 
for the analytic framework that will be used in the comparative study.   
1) Finding factors from the sources 
As shown in the previous section, data were collected by the literature reviews and in-depth 
interviews. Based on the collective information, the factors were identified in two cases. Here, 
both qualitative and quantitative data were incorporated. Given the focus on generating a good 
understanding of the cases and case context, methods such as fieldwork visits, observation, 
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interviews and document analysis dominated among the various data collection methods 
employed.  
Qualitative data 
From the in-depth interview results, transcriptions were made and critical statements from 
interviewees were extracted from it. Extracted words were given a suitable title. These entitled 
factors and literature reviews were used for conducting causality analysis. An example of 
interview data processing is shown in Figure 6 below.   
 
Figure 6 Example of data processing and its application into causality analysis  
 
Then, as shown in Table 6, all grounded reason for judging the initial condition and the results of 
the initial stage were considered following prospects appeared in a ‘Guideline for power sector 
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assessment’ published by ADB. By answering for the criteria suggested in this guideline, 
evaluation on the initial condition and the result of the initial stage was conducted.  
Table 6 Qualitative Criteria for evaluating the results of the reform 
Dimension Criteria Checkpoint 
Institution 
factors 
Policy 
- Does newly introduced policy necessitate the adequate framework? 
- Was policy making conducted under the transparent and favorable 
process?   
Law 
- Do laws comply with the legal framework? 
- Could laws promote the sector efficiency and stability?  
Regulation 
- Does regulatory body have autonomy? 
- Are the regulation procedures consistent and transparent? 
Organization 
factors 
Planning 
- Was planning conducted well with an understanding of objectives of 
planning and forecast of future demand for power? 
- Estimated power demand was appropriate?  
Financial 
management 
- Financial management capacity of the sector is sufficient? 
- Are sector participants financially viable? 
Human 
resources 
- Is the hiring process transparent and consistent? 
- Are staff members qualified and perform well? 
- The number of staff is sufficient to handle ongoing activities? 
- Are staffs educated to the levels required? 
Operation 
factors 
Generation 
- Power generation assets are kept maintained? 
- New investment for power generation is achieved without bias 
information? 
Transmission 
- Transmission maintenance is reliable? 
- Investment for the transmission line is attracted by private? 
Distribution 
- Substation and distribution line are maintained for the reliable power 
supply? 
Supply and 
customer 
- Is customer service competent? 
- Electricity tariff is increased or not? 
Source: ADB 2009 Guidance note: electricity sector risk assessment 
Quantitative data 
Furthermore, for the quantitative assessments, some performance indicators with regards to 
efficiency of the power sector, investment rate, power price and the market share were used 
(Table 7). Whether the initial condition and the result of the initial stage are appropriate or not 
was determined by the comprehensive judging criteria including organizational and operational 
elements of the power sector. 
Table 7 Quantitative Criteria for evaluating the results of the reform 
Dimension Referred Indicators 
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Operation 
factors 
Market 
Structure 
- Ownership structure: % market share 
- HHI (Herfindal-Hirschman Index)  
Generation 
- Generation capacity 
- Increase in investment of generation assets 
Transmission 
- Total length of transmission line 
- Transmission loss rate 
Distribution - Distribution loss rate 
Supply and 
customer 
- Electricity rate 
- Electrification rate(rural area) 
2) Classification of the factors by phase  
In my research, the identification of the power sector reform stage does matter. As shown in 
Figure 7, the reform stage cannot be classified only by the time serial distinction, because the 
reform involves politics requiring collective choices in an environment characterized by 
conflicting perceptions and interests, with no simple unifying incentive scheme for resolving 
such differences (Rodrik 2003, ADB 2013). Therefore, those changes, which are accompanied 
by stakeholders’ choices, would be utilized as a transition boundary to distinguish the phase in 
my research. In macro-level, by understanding the significance of the historical context, 
political-ideological climate, political-institutional culture, and economic and social makeup of 
the power sector, this study investigates the ‘initial condition’ of the country. With starting initial 
implementation of the power sector reform, rules are changed and incentives are introduced. In 
this stage, therefore, I identify the governing rules and mechanism of the reform, conto 
predictable organizational cultures and social norms. Meso- and micro-level tools help with 
analysis of the distributional impacts of policy reform, identifying winners and losers, and 
explaining the dynamics of poverty in local settings. 
3) Links and Causality diagram 
Based on the results from the previous classification, causal relationship among the initial 
condition, initial implementation and the initial result of the reform will be clarified in this 
section throughout the causality analysis. Drawing the causality diagram, subsequently, some 
fundamental findings from the proposed causality diagram will be suggested and further 
discussion will be followed.  The whole causality diagram that shows the overall picture of the 
causal relationship among the initial condition, initial implementation and the result of the initial 
stage of the power sector reforms. 
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4) Categorization of the factors by domain  
To set the domain for the causality analysis, stakeholders’ analysis was firstly conducted. In this 
section, different stakeholder’s impact on the initial stage of the reform will be assessed. 
Following the result of stakeholders’ analysis, what to be focused on in the next causal analysis 
will be decided. In order to specify the decision-making process of the initial stage of the reform, 
the main stakeholders were identified based on the previous research, as shown in Table 8, the 
government, regulatory body, politicians, development bank donors, existing industry 
participants and potential market investors are the main actors to be considered.  
Table 8 Stakeholders’ Analysis (source: Clemente 2009) 
Stakeholder Stakeholder’s Interests 
Stakeholder’s 
Influence  in 
initial stage 
 
Consumers: 
- Public 
- Industries 
- Households 
  
Reliable and affordable electricity supply 
Quality services 
B-Medium 
Government and Other Gov’t. 
Agencies 
Provide basic services 
Collect taxes from the participants 
Attract foreign investments 
Economic growth and stability  
A-High 
(①)  
Regulatory Body Regulation on power market 
Tariff setting 
A-High 
Donor Agencies Interest on loan 
Influence policies to their favor (e.g. 
institution of reforms, such as privatization) 
Provide consultancy services 
A-High 
Existing Industry Participants / 
Electric Utilities(monopoly)  
 - Distribution Utilities 
 - Generation Companies 
 - Electricity Suppliers 
Profit optimization 
Recovery of investments 
Business stability 
 
A-High (②)  
Potential Investors  Market expansion and profit A-High (③)  
Politicians Popularity  
Political stability 
A-High 
(④)  
Financial Institutions Profit out of interest from loans granted to 
industry participants 
A-High  
Media/Journalists To promote their publications or TV 
networks 
Gain recognition for career advancement 
C-Low 
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First, government has the most critical impact in initial stage of the reform. The government 
commitment is assumed to be the guarantor that planned reforms will be implemented and 
sustained, providing a level of stability of expectations and reducing risk and uncertainty for 
stakeholders such as potential investors. Changing government commitment to reforms is a key 
proximate cause of risk in reform. Second, many reform cases in developing countries, it firstly 
involved introducing new regulations and laws intended to change the institutional foundations 
of the sector. Regulatory body has a high influence in ensuring the new rules to be effectively 
implemented to bring desired changes over long time. Third, the power sector reform involves 
political decisions, a problem in collective choice. It involves as players not only the government 
but also the political party, different levels of government (especially in Philippines case, the 
remote island region), and labor union. Some of these players may themselves include differing 
perspectives. This may be able to able to delay, block, or even reverse the action of the reform. 
Last, media people and electricity consumers relatively have less impact in initial stage of the 
reform. Electricity consumers also have less impact in initial, because they are still insufficient to 
exist as an active actor in the power market.  
Table 8 summarizes the analysis of the stakeholders’ interests and the level of influence that they 
have in the decision-making process. Based on this result, the viewpoint of the causality analysis 
was derived. First, power sector’s restructuring including unbundling of existing state-owned 
power company, establishment of new regulatory body and legislation is considered. Second, 
power market third, the participation of private investors, last, the political impacts and power 
game between government and political power will be mainly focused and to be compared. With 
regard to these aspects, the initial condition, initial implementation and the initial result will be 
identified in both Chile and the Philippines case and compared each other in the following 
chapters 
1.5.2 Comparative Study 
After complete the case studies on both cases, comparative study will be conducted. This 
comparative study involves the analysis and synthesis of the similarities, differences and patterns 
across the two cases (Goodrick 2014). Based on the result of the causality analysis by domains 
that were categorized, the initial condition will be firstly compared. Then how those initial 
conditions were changed and what implementation made the different result are compared. 
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1.6  Structure of Dissertation 
This dissertation has six chapters and is organized as follows (Figure 6). 
Chapter 1 is an introduction to the whole dissertation. It also presents the overall picture of the 
targeted issue and an ultimate vision of this research. Chapter 1 explores the research area that 
has relatively less covered and has limitations in the previous research. The narrowing down 
process to reach research questions will be presented in this chapter. Then, it gives an outline of 
research questions and objective along with its methodology and the thesis structure.  
Chapter 2 is allocated for a case study preparation. This chapter introduces the kind of data used 
for the case study and data processing method. Summary about in-depth interview is also 
presented here. 
Chapter 3 and 4 are allocated for case study. Each case study will be conducted following a same 
process. Brief background knowledge about power sector reform, including history and sector 
structure in each case country is firstly summarized. Then identification of causality analysis 
among initial condition, implementation, and the results of the initial stage will be presented. It 
provides the identification of causal factors in the initial stage of power sector reform and 
clarifying of the causal relationship among factors.  
Chapter 5 is allocated for a comparative study between two case countries based on the result of 
chapter 3 and 4. Using identified factors, which include initial condition, influencing factors in 
the initial stage and the result of the initial stage, their impact of influence on the result of the 
initial stage will be compared. This chapter investigates what factors had made different results 
in two case countries and how the initial implementation contributed to the result of the reform in 
initial stage. A policy implication will be derived through the comparison of Chile and the 
Philippines case.   
Chapter 6 summarizes the research outcomes and contribution of those outcomes. It also 
discusses future work needed for the improvements of this research. 
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Figure 6 Structure of the research 
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2 Case Preparation 
Firstly, to accomplish the research objective; to identify the relationship among ‘initial 
condition’, ‘influencing factors’, and the ‘result of the initial stage’ of power sector reform in 
Chile and the Philippines throughout causality analysis, in-depth interview was conducted. 
Throughout the in-depth interview, precious oral data was obtained from interviewees such as 
former Minister of Energy and regulatory body’s main founder, economists and professors in 
academic field. From the interview results, a transcription was made and critical statements from 
interviewees were extracted from it. Extracted words were given a suitable title and categorized 
into several factors. These entitled factors were used for conducting causality analysis.  
In-depth Interview 
The primary data collection method for this study was achieved through face-to-face in-depth 
interviews. Individual interview approach has an advantage in terms of allowing the researcher 
have the opportunity to use semi-structured question guide (St John 2007), and such guide avoids 
the potential of the researcher limiting discussion to a set of pre-determined questions based 
upon researcher bias. According to Morgan (1997), interviewer bias occurs in situations where 
the emphasis is placed on the researcher’s perceptions of the issues being investigated, instead 
the focus being on the participants’ perceptions of the issues. 
For the Chile case, the interviews took place at Washington D.C. and Santiago. Interviews for 
the Philippines case mainly took place at ADB headquarter office in Manila, university of 
Manila and Asian Institute of Management. Depending on the interviewees’ preferences, 
interviews were conducted either at their office or at neutral settings such as coffee shops. 
Interviews typically lasted from 60 minutes to 90minutes each, and upon agreement, some of the 
interviews were recorded and then transcribed during the analysis stage. In addition, follow-up 
discussions and information exchanges were conducted through e-mail for areas that required 
further confirmation and clarification before finalizing the analysis.  
Interviewees’ profile 
Demographics of interview participants for this research are presented in Table 9 and 10. These 
tables show the nationality and profession of the interviewees.  
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Table 9 Interviewees’ statistic by nationality 
Chile Philippines 
Nationality Number Nationality Number 
Argentine 2 Pilipino 2 
Chilean 7 Korean 2 
Japanese 3 Australian 1 
Philipino 2   
Korean 2   
Total 12 Total  5 
 
It is to be noted that real experts and knowledgeable interviewees were found through snowball 
sampling. Interviews with professional in the real field of the power sector reform and related 
person, former prime ministers were the precious opportunities to check the important aspects of 
Chilean power sector reform. They truly served as valuable resources, since their viewpoints 
helped balance the viewpoints of economist, policy maker, academic researcher, and engineer 
workers.  
Table 10 Interviewees’ statistic by profession 
Chile Philippines 
Profession Number Profession Number 
Economist 2 Economist 2 
Energy specialist 1 Energy specialist 2 
Former engineer 1 Professor 1 
Former executive secretary of regulatory body 1   
Former Minister of Energy 1   
International trading company 1   
JICA Officer 1   
Professor 2   
Regional Specialist 2   
Total 12  5 
Data Processing 
Data processing method have been already mentioned in Section 1.5. Transcription of the 
interviews verbatim greatly assisted with the analysis of the interviews as the exact statements 
made by the participants were available (Sim, 1998). Audio recording the interviews also reduce 
the danger of the ‘data’ being forced based on the researcher’s bias (Charmaz, 2014) and reliance 
on the memory. Therefore, the recorded interview contents were transcribed into documents and 
analyzed.   
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Next two chapters will identify the causal relationship among initial condition, influencing 
factors in the initial stage and the result of the initial stage of the power sector reform. It was 
accomplished by causality analysis on two case countries, Chile and the Philippines. These 
chapters also cover brief introduction on reform history of each case, collecting data method 
through in-depth interviews.  
  
3-40 
 
3    Chile Case 
3.1 Summary of the power sector reform  
Historical context  
Chile is a pioneer country of the power sector reform and usually identified as a country that first 
started power reforms (Kessides 2012). Their reform process started with establishing regulatory 
body (the CNE; Comisión Nacional de Energía) in 1978. Electricity Law was enacted in 1982 
and privatization of state-owned enterprises followed by. Since this research focuses on the 
initial stage, from the establishment of regulatory body in 1978 to the year of 2004, when the 
amendment on the Electricity Law was mandated, would be regarded as the initial stage in this 
research. The definition of the initial stage has been already done in the previous section 1.5. 
Table 11 below summarizes the history of power sector reform in Chile. 
Table 11 Chile’s power sector reform history 
Year Event Description 
1929 The great depression: rapid 
economic downturn 
frustrated the middle and 
working classes 
The price of copper fell from 17.47 cents per pound in 1929 to 
5.6 cents per pound in 1932. Nitrate production halved from 
1930-1931 
1930-1973  Chile’s politics became increasingly divided but more 
inclusive. 
1932-1938 President Alessandri  
1938-1958 Trade protectionism  
1939 Establishment of 
CORFO(Corporación de 
Fomento) 
CORFO created a national steel industry, electrical plants, and 
transportation and communication systems. 
This industrialization required a variety of restrictions, 
controls, and regulations. Because of these import restrictions, 
domestic industries survived and grew. 
1950-1960 Hyperinflation  
1970 Election of Allende Unstable society 
Increased state intervention 
 Nationalization of the 
copper mine  
 
Initiation of the power sector reform 
1978 Creation of the National 
Energy Commission(CNE) 
Designed the basic institutional, legal and policy framework 
that changed the energy sector during 80’s. 
1980 Change of tariff calculation 
criteria 
The criterion to determine tariffs based on minimum return on 
investment of 10% is changed to marginal cost pricing. 
1981 Unbundling of distribution The distribution business was separated into 9 companies. 
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from Endesa (major utility) 
 Unbundling of Chilectra 
(major distribution 
company) 
The company was transformed into a holding composed of 
Chilgener(G), Chilectra Metropolitana(D) and Chilectra V 
Region(D) 
1982 Electricity Power Service 
Law(DFL 1) was enacted 
Legal framework for the restructuring process. 
 Endesa registered as a per-
share society 
The stock market, especially through institutional buyers 
(AFP: International investment funds, etc.) would play a key 
role in the privatization process. 
 Separation of some of 
Endesa’s generation 
facilities 
Three generation units were separated from Endesa, but 
remained as subsidiaries 
1982-83 Economic recession Delayed the privatization process 
1985 Separation of two of 
Endesa’s generation 
subsidiaries 
The subsidiaries remained as state-owned companies under 
CORFO(State development agency) 
 Creation of CEDE in SIC 
region 
All major generators became subject to central cost-based 
dispatch. Application of marginal cost wholesale pricing 
regulation 
1985-87 Privatization of Chilectra The shares were sold to its employees and in the stock market 
1986 Introduction of retail supply 
competition 
Limited to consumers with a demand over 2MW 
The state absorbs US$500 million of Endesa’s external debts. 
1987-90 Privatization of Endesa Shares were initially sold or exchanged for compensation to 
selected groups(workers, public officers, armed forces, etc) 
and later floated in the stock market 
1988 Creation of Enersis Created from the transformation of the Companía Chilena de 
Electricidad S.A.. 
Later became a major actor in Chile and Latin America 
1990 Privatization process 
practically completed 
 
 Enersis single largest 
shareholder of Endesa 
Enersis has interests in generation, Transmission and 
distribution 
1993 Separation of Endesa’s 
transmission business 
Created a separate company(Translec) and transferred the 
ownership to its shareholders 
1997 Privatization of Edelyasen With the sale of this small utility, privatization reaches 100% 
1999 Endesa-Spain single largest 
shareholder of Enersis and 
Endesa-Chile 
Endesa-Spain owns 63.9% of Enersis, which owns 60% of 
Endesa-Chile.  
1998-1999   
2004 Amendments of the 
Electricity Law 
The Ley Corta was to modernize the mechanism used to solve 
regulatory disputes that arise between the companies and 
regulator of among companies. 
Source: The historical context of Chile case from the early 1920s to the late 1990s was highly influenced 
on the summary report by APEC (2000).  
Power sector Structure 
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Before the restructuring, ownership was mixed with dominant state companies in generation, 
transmission and distribution through vertically integrated utilities. Regulation and long-term 
planning for future were undertaken by the government and state-owned company. In operation, 
Endesa and Chilectra were main actors in the system. Endesa was a state-owned electricity 
company responsible for not only constructing and operating most of the system, but also of 
prospecting hydrological resources and developing a long-term electricity plan (APEC 2000). 
Chilectra was the major distribution company supplied by Endesa and its own generation 
facilities.  
 
Figure 3 Chile’s Power sector structure before and after the reform  
Source: Vagliasindi and Besant-Jones (2013) 
 
After the reform, the structure was unbundled from the vertically integrated structure dominated 
by state-owned company, Endesa. The structure of the power sector became less concentrated, 
particularly in the transmission segment. The ownership of the assets had changed hands with 
more players involved, as indicated in Figure 10. Authority for energy policy and regulation also 
changed after the power sector reform. The CNE became a key organization for policy making 
and regulation works, which had been in charge of the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Interior 
and Endesa before the reform. 
The restructuring of the sector was conducted in two stages (Perry and Leipziger 1999). The first 
between 1974 and 1979, was intended to adjust prices to allow the public utilities to achieve self-
financing and to prepare the groundwork for private sector participation. The second stage 
between 1979 and 1990, dealt with the restructuring and privatization of the sector in addition to 
the main institutional changes. Generation and transmission were in principle, separated from 
distribution. 
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The two existing utilities, Endesa and Chilectra, were decentralized and regionalized. Endesa, the 
largest company was divided into 14 companies. Six of the fourteen were generation companies. 
Privatization started in 1986, after the introduction in 1982 of the regulatory framework. Three 
main mechanisms were used to privatize the power industry; public auction, packages on the 
stock market, auction of share packages.  Endesa and its transmission system, the largest one in 
the country, were privatized as a package because the transmission pricing rules had not yet been 
fully defined. This erroneous decision had been continuing to haunt Chile’s regulators. 
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3.2 Finding Factors from the sources 
Based on the literature reviews and the in-depth interview shown in Chapter 2, factors from each 
source or evidence were identified. These identified factors were also classified into three phases, 
following the definition that was set for this research in the previous section 1.3, which is initial 
condition, initial implementation, and initial result. The identified factors are shown in Table 12 
below.   
Table 12 Factors from source and classification by phase and domain 
# source BOX Phase Domain 
1 Soto(1999), APEC (2000) 
Absence of clear regulation governance: 
Regulation by state-owned power company and 
government. 
I.C A 
2 
Soto(1999), Interview with 
Skoknick(2015) 
Experienced operation workers involved in 
regulatory work 
I.I A 
3 APEC (2000) Establishment of independent regulatory body I.I A 
4 Interview with Skoknick (2015) 
Practical base for the regulation was done by 
former engineers in Endesa 
I.I A 
5 Interview with Skoknick (2015) 
No supports from outside and no reference of 
price setting regulation 
I.I A 
6 Interview with Philippi(2015) 
Very high capacity  from small members  of 
regulatory body(CNE) with Simple and logical 
regulation  
I.R A 
7 Reinhardt(2012) Sent students to Chicago  I.C A 
8 
Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 
(2002) 
No political support Chicago boys 
I.C A 
9 Reinhardt(2012) Ideological support from US I.C A, B 
10 
Silva 1991, Kurtz 1999, Silva 
(1991) 
Not appointed elite: Chilean Chicago boys 
moderate influence before the reform 
implemented 
I.C A 
11 
Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 
(2002) 
Financial support from business 
organization(CICYP) and media groups 
I.I A 
12 
Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 
(2002) 
Establishment of Research 
Institute(CESEC) :Served as a forum to 
disseminate economic ideas 
I.I A 
14 
Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 
2002, Interview with Esteban 
Skoknic(2015) 
Accepted idea by Pinochet regime and 
appointed to positions  
I.I A,B 
15 
Rudnick, O’Ryan, and Bravo 
(2001) 
Provide economical theoretical base 
I.I A 
16 
Philippi(Interview,2015), 
Anonymity(Interview,2015) 
Provide overall philosophy that gave coherence 
I.I A 
17 
Reinhardt (2012), Solimano(2012), 
Anonymity (Interview,2015) 
Dictatorship under Pinochet 
I.C B 
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18 Bitran et al. (1999),  Long tradition of judicial independence I.C B 
19 Bitran et al. (1999),  Electoral system with party fragmentation I.C B 
20 Bitran et al. (1999),  Enacting law with the degree of specificity I.C B 
21 
Read & Rudnick(2000), 
Bitran(1999) 
Explicit regulatory framework imbedded in 
legislation 
I.I C 
22 Bitran et al. (1999) Judiciary as arbiter I.I C 
23 
Solimano (2012), Heller and 
McCubbins (1996), Spiller and 
Guasch (1999)  
Minimized political interference 
I.R B 
24 Anonymity interview(2015) 
Weak power of labor union: Few conflict on 
treatment of utility employees  
I.I B,C 
25 Interview with Skoknick(2015) Formation of Technocrats  I.I A 
26 
Vagliasindi and Besant-Jones 
(2013) 
Detailed regulations for tariff setting, settling 
disputes 
I.I A 
27 Anonymity interview(2015) Clear separation of unbundling process I.R C 
28 Schamis (2002), Silva(1991) General reforms: 7 modernization I.C C 
29 
Bruno Philippi(Interview 2015), 
Schamis (2002) 
Pension fund system created abundant domestic 
financial market 
I.C C 
31 Lalor and Garcia (1996) Electricity Law permitted cross-ownership I.I C 
32 Bitran et al. (1999) 
Empowered electricity law into decision 
making 
I.I C 
33 Bruno Philippi, Schamis(2002) 
Capital market enough to sustain the 
investment: whereas overseas investment was 
restricted 
I.I C 
34 Bitran (1999) 
Strong protection of private investors by 
jurisdiction 
I.I C 
35 
Schweppe et al. (1988), Vagliasindi 
and Besant-Jones (2013) 
Market design with system marginal pricing 
I.I C 
36 
Schweppe et al. (1988), Vagliasindi 
and Besant-Jones (2013), Interview 
with Philippi(2015) 
Provide incentives for the entrance of new 
capacity 
I.I C 
37 
Rudnick, O’Ryan, and Bravo 2001 
Bitran (1999) 
Increased investor’s confidence 
I.I C 
38 
Read and Rudnick(2000)  
UNCTD (2009) 
Expansion of investment on Generation 
I.R C 
39 Fernando Lefort (2004) 
Tradition of Conglomerate in Chilean 
economy. Existence of vertically integrated 
conglomerate. 
I.C D 
40 Lefort and Walker(1999)  Protectionism on Conglomerates I.C D 
41 Larrain and Schaeffer (2010) Water Code Act of 1981 I.I D 
42 
Larrain and Schaeffer (2010) 
interview with Fischer 
Maintained Water right of Endesa 
I.I D 
43 
Newbery, 1999 interview with 
Fischer 
Most of the really attractive projects of water 
things were in the hands of Endesa 
I.I D 
44 Basanes et al(1999) Barrier to the new entrance I.I D 
45 Lalor and Garcia (1996) Limited competition in power market/Vertical I.R D 
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integrated monopoly 
46 Raul O’Ryan(2003) 
Privatization of Discos, and Transmission as a 
package 
I.I C 
*Phase- I.C: Initial Condition, I.I: Initial Implementation, I.R: Initial Result 
*Domain-A: Regulatory capacity,  B: Political interference, C: Investment expansion, D: Power market 
 
3.3 Link of the factors 
Here, I will investigate each link in detail. Whole links are summarized in Table 13. 
Table 13 Links of causality diagram on Chile case  
From Box To Box 
1 
Absence of clear regulation governance: 
Regulation by state-owned power company 
and government. 
2 
Experienced operation workers involved in 
regulatory work 3 Establishment of independent regulatory body 
5 
No supports from outside and no reference of 
price setting regulation 
2 
Experienced operation workers involved in 
regulatory work 
4 
Practical base for the regulation was done by 
former engineers in Endesa 
4 
Practical base for the regulation was done by 
former engineers in Endesa 
6 
Very high capacity  from small members  of 
regulatory body(CNE) with Simple and logical 
regulation 
5 
No supports from outside and no reference of 
price setting regulation 
15 Provide economical theoretical base 
16 
Provide overall philosophy that gave 
coherence 
9 Ideological support from US 7 Sent students to Chicago 
8 No political support Chicago boys 10 
Not appointed elite: Chilean Chicago boys 
moderate influence before the reform 
implemented 
10 
Not appointed elite: Chilean Chicago boys 
moderate influence before the reform 
implemented 
14 
Accepted idea by Pinochet regime and 
appointed to positions 
25 Formation of Technocrats 15 Provide economical theoretical base 
15 Provide economical theoretical base 
16 Provide overall philosophy that gave coherence 
21 
Explicit regulatory framework imbedded in 
legislation 
23 Minimized political interference 
20 Enacting law with the degree of specificity 21 
Explicit regulatory framework imbedded in 
legislation 
18 Long tradition of judicial independence 22 Judiciary as arbiter 
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17 Dictatorship under Pinochet 
23 Minimized political interference 
19 Electoral system with party fragmentation 
21 
Explicit regulatory framework imbedded in 
legislation 
22 Judiciary as arbiter 
14 
Accepted idea by Pinochet regime and 
appointed to positions 
25 Formation of Technocrats 
23 Minimized political interference 
27 Clear separation of unbundling process 
24 
Weak power of labor union: Few conflict on 
treatment of utility employees 
28 General reforms: 7 modernization 29 
Pension fund system created abundant domestic 
financial market 
29 
Pension fund system created abundant 
domestic financial market 
33 
Capital market enough to sustain the 
investment 
21 
Explicit regulatory framework imbedded in 
legislation 
35 Market design with system marginal pricing 
35 Market design with system marginal pricing 36 
Provide incentives for the entrance of new 
capacity 
24 
Weak power of labor union: Few conflict on 
treatment of utility employees 
37 Increased investor’s confidence 
34 
Strong protection of private investors by 
jurisdiction 
33 
Capital market enough to sustain the 
investment 
38 Expansion of investment on Generation 
36 
Provide incentives for the entrance of new 
capacity 
37 Increased investor’s confidence 
39 
Tradition of Conglomerate in Chilean 
economy. Existence of vertically integrated 
conglomerate. 
40 Protectionism on Conglomerates 
41 Water Code Act of 1981 42 Maintained Water right of Endesa 
42 Maintained Water right of Endesa 43 
Most of the really attractive projects of water 
things were in the hands of Endesa 
43 
Most of the really attractive projects of water 
things were in the hands of Endesa 
44 Barrier to the new entrance 
31 Electricity Law permitted cross-ownership 
45 
Limited competition in power market /Vertical 
integrated monopoly 
39 
Tradition of Conglomerate in Chilean 
economy. Existence of vertically integrated 
conglomerate. 
44 Barrier to the new entrance 
 
(#1→#2) Before the reform was introduced in the power sector, there was no independent 
regulatory body concerning energy issues in Chile. Instead of it, the Ministry of Economy and 
the state electric company (Endesa) collectively exercised regulation and policy making on 
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power sector as regulatory agencies (APEC 2000). Consequently, the regulation was under an 
informal oversight and the objectives of the regulation imposed by state-owned company were 
unclear. Absence of independent regulatory agency made the regulation work as a function of 
command and control without accountability. Especially regarding to the pricing, the price 
setting methodologies and arrangements had severe distortion. Inappropriate negotiation process 
among government, state-owned company, and consumers made the regulatory situation worse. 
Above all, it was in an ironical situation that regulation was conducted by state-owned electric 
company which is involved in operation itself. Oil, gas, coal and electricity prices mostly set by 
large state companies were completely distorted. Cross subsidies produced an inefficient use of 
resources. Unnecessary investments were being made and capital was being diverted from other 
social needs. The regulation of the sector evolved from an initial supervisory role regarding tariff 
levels and quality standards to full nationalization of the three segments of the industry 
(generation, transmission, and distribution). Until the early 1930s the role of the State remained 
largely passive and, according to Soto (1999), the government lacked of sector policies. By 1971, 
the stated had built, bought, or acquired through indirect means all major facilities in the country.  
(#5→#2) Regarding to the power sector reform program, Chile could not have any financial and 
technical supports from the outside of the country, because there was no perfect reference at that 
time. This situation also partially influenced on the organization of the regulatory body and its 
functioning. This was referred from the interview with Skoknick. 
There was nobody thinking about this kind of reporting, there wasn’t at that time.  Even 
people from the – I remember talking with people with the World Bank at that time that 
came from time to time, I think they were not sure that this was a good idea.  They doubt 
about this, and afterwards they were expanding the idea all over the world, but at the 
beginning some of them at least were not so sure that was a good idea.  There were not at 
all – not at all – there was no influence. (Source: Skoknick(2015), interview note #7) 
There was the idea of a market, especially in a market, where you can set margin cost, 
you can easily calculate that and you can implement that and the general idea.  But 
nobody, even in I think in France, where the idea of economics in the power sector, 
calculating marginal cost, economics of power plant, I think it was a modest economic 
application in the power sector.  They didn’t think at all in single really splitting the 
market with several competitions in the generation market, not at all. 
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Even in the idea of generation, but even the idea of model of to set tariffs in distribution 
companies, not with the historical account values, like in the state is that historical rate 
of return, but in theoretical model system was not something that were applied anywhere.  
They apart from the generation sector, the distribution setting the tariff were also a 
complete new idea at that time. 
 
(#1,#3,#5→#2→#4) When the power sector reform embarked, the first institutional change in 
regulation was the establishment of an independent regulatory body. At the same time, 
unbundling of the state owned Endesa started, which was referred as a standard model by many 
researchers (Hunt 2002; Joskow 2006). The regulation function of the Endesa transferred to the 
independent CNE and many experienced workers in Endesa also moved to the CNE, who took 
charge in practical works later. Along with the practical base given by the former Endesa 
workers, the theoretical base from the concept of marginal pricing was led by technocrats who 
were appointed under the Pinochet regime.  
(#25→#15→#16) On the other hand, there were a group of economists that gave an overall 
philosophy for the reform, who are called as technocrats. Many existing researches have 
mentioned about the influence of the technocrats on Chile’s social transformation in late 1980.   
(#17→#25, #14→#25) Then, how those technocrats were formed at that time and what were 
directly related with the power sector reform? It has been a general and common agreement on 
that the appearance of the technocrats was possible mainly due to the political supports under a 
very specific political environment; dictatorship by Pinochet regime (Solimano 2012).  
(#9→#7) However, It should not be overlooked how it was possible. Chile apparently had 
potential capacity of regulation, which was not yet activated. Even though more than twenty 
years had already been passed since the first three young Chileans students were selected and left 
for Chicago to study economics from 1965 by the ideological supports from U.S., economical 
and technical ground for effective regulation were not established yet (Reinhardt, 2012). They 
are called as Chicago boys. 
(#8→#10) When the Chicago-trained economists returned to Chile, those Chicago Boys had 
trouble finding political supports for their proposals. Some of them found their jobs as professors 
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at the Catholic University and others found lucrative jobs within Chilean private firms(Silva 
1991). Their knowledges and ideological social movement were not accepted by political leaders 
and were not utilized as a technocratic policy maker. In 1970s, when the young Chilean 
economists who studied at Chicago returned to Chile, most of the Chicago boys came back to the 
Universidad Católica. In that situation, they established their own think tank, but they did not 
have enough supports at that time (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002). At first, the Chicago 
Boys had trouble finding political backing for their proposals. The political parties initially 
supporting the military regime included the Christian Democrats and the right-wing National 
Party, neither of which was “neoliberal” (Kurtz 1999, Silva 1991).  As a result, during the first 
two years of the dictatorship, the influence of the Chicago Boys on economic policy was quite 
modest.  
(#11→#12) Under the highly polarized political environment of Chile, a business organization, 
known as the Inter-American Committee on Trade and Production (CICYP), helped finance a 
new campus for the School of Economics at the Catholic University and helped found an 
institution for social and economic study; the CESEC (Center for Social and Economic Studies), 
which served as a forum in which the Chicago Boys could disseminate their ideas to a broader 
public (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002). After 1968, the news daily El Mercurio and the 
weekly Que  ´Pasa (both owned by a prominent business group active within the Monday Club) 
published articles on economic analysis that educated businessmen on the Chicago point of view. 
Some of the Chicago Boys were also important participants in the Monday Club meetings, for 
which they prepared a post- coup recovery plan under Pinochet. 
(#12→#14→#25) Consequently, the political fortunes of the Chicago Boys began to rise. The 
Chicago boys started obtaining positions as advisers in several ministries and state agencies after 
the military Pinochet government overthrown the Allende government. During the in-depth 
interview with snowball sampling, name of Hernán Büchi, former Treasury Minister, was often 
mentioned by some interviewees. He is a representative technocrat selected as the presidential 
candidate of the Pinochetista forces. Büchi was an engineer than an economist and had studied 
not in Chicago, but at the University of Columbia. He was appointed head of the economic team 
in early 1985, and conducted the economic recovery process that began the following year. He 
developed basic ideas and had a wider vision for the power sector reform. Specific 
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implementation of power sector reform in regulation level was mainly developed by Bruno 
Philippi and Sebastián Bernstein. The followings are the quote from interview and literature 
review.  
“Hernán Büchi after that, they were mainly in the Ministry of Finance and they had the 
general idea that this should be done, but the specific implementation to the power sector 
was mainly I think Bruno and Sebastián.” (Source: Interview with Esteban Skoknick, 
Note #7)  
In 1975, Pinochet appointed Chicago graduate Sergio de Castro as minister of the 
economy. The following year, de Castro rose to the even more important position of 
minister of finance, and fellow Chicago graduate Pablo Baraona took over at the head of 
the Economy Ministry. From 1975 through 1982, a series of Chicago graduates headed 
the Chilean central bank. (Source: Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2002) 
 
(#25→#15) As quoted in the interview above, Bruno Philippi, an engineering professor at 
Catholic University of Chile and a Stanford Ph.D. in engineering took over as an executive 
director of the newly created regulatory body for all practical purpose. Under Philippi’s 
leadership, a nationwide energy strategy was formulated(Rudnick, O’Ryan, and Bravo 2001). A 
key element was that decentralized decisions by energy consumers and producers had to yield 
economic efficiencies. Sebastian Bernstein, an engineer with the state company who joined 
Philippi at the CNE, formulated solutions (ibid.) Bernstein was influenced by the French 
economic school, which stressed use of market prices in regulated sectors. He considered that an 
efficient and coherent electricity price policy could be based on the use of marginal supply costs. 
Consequently, the idea of competitive electricity market at the generation level was born and 
actions were taken to facilitate the development of such a market. 
 “They have a vision of the power sector, especially Büchi because he was very tight, in 
connection with Bruno Philippi, when one was the Ministry of Finance and the other was 
the energy commission, they worked together a lot. I think he’s very liberal and he is in a 
sense Chilean leader.  For the market, nothing like that.  Maybe some of the ideas they 
discussed with Bruno were from Hernán Büchi.” (Source: Interview with Esteban 
Skoknick, Note #7) 
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(#4,#15,#16→#6) In conclusion, in initial stage of the power sector reform in Chile, they were 
possible to practice regulation with simple and logical rules and human resources who have the 
practical base from the engineering side and theoretical base from economics side. Those 
technocrats could provide overall philosophy that made coherent and consistent reform possible. 
(#17→#23)  Chile was the only Latin American country where power was repeatedly handed 
over peacefully from one political party to another (Reinhardt 2012). Until the military coup of 
1973 led by Augusto Pinochet, Chile was an exception to the dictatorial governments that 
characterized other Latin American countries. Unlike its neighbors, Chile had maintained smooth 
constitutional power shifts throughout most of its history.  The military coup of Pinochet in 1973 
overturned an admirable history of democratic politics. This led to a host of societal problems, 
including both civil unrest and human right violations. However, the legacy of Chile’s nearly two 
decade of dictatorship is a high degree of stability in both the political regime and in regulatory 
policy (Solimano 2012). Ironically, Chile could minimize the political risk under the dictatorship 
of Pinochet(Heller and McCubbins 1996). Spiller and Guasch (1999) also argue that Chile has 
had “strong political support for maintaining the financial viability of the companies” and 
regulation is decentralized. This following quote also describes a similar situation.  
“This is not just an economical behavior.  The political factor is key, with or without 
support, how they control this oligopolistic situation, but how to handle the worker 
unions.  It’s not the same, though, a reform under democracy and under military regime, 
it’s absolutely different.  It’s not comfortable, the changes in Chile, vis-à-vis Argentina.  
Argentina was under democracy under Menem in the ‘90s.  Chile was under Pinochet, so 
these are key.”(Source: Anonymity interview, Note #1) 
 
(#23, #24→#27) According to the interview with anonymity, weak power of labor union of Chile 
also influenced on the process of restructuring as quoted below. In Chile, minimized political 
interference made clear separation of unbundling process.  
The presence and the impact of the labor union.  For example, in Argentina labor union 
are very important.  That’s part of the balance of power. But in Chile, they don’t. 
(Source: Anonymity interview, Note #1) 
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 (#28→#29→#33) Before the power sector reform in Chile, the Chilean government conducted 
comprehensive program of institutional reform in various sectors in society. The “Seven 
modernizations” was the title given to this ambitious effort(Schamis 2002). It includes 1) a new 
labor code, 2) the privatization of the social security 3) and the health systems, 4) the 
introduction of market incentives in education, 5) a reversal of past land reform policies, 6) 
regional decentralization, 7) and the design of new legislative acts. This previous privatization of 
social security accelerated the privatization of SOEs over time. The most important economic 
event in terms of shaping financial market and explaining capital market evolution in Chile was 
the early pension fund reform. Since its inception in the early 80’s, significant pension funds 
have been accumulated in Chile, representing an important source of funds for companies that 
are channeled through the Chilean financial system.  The following is the quote: 
“The pension fund savings – personal savings of each of you, but they need to invest this 
money.  But at that time, obviously, most of the investment was done in Chile.  Now, 
they’re allowed to invest everywhere, or roughly.  But they didn’t have much to invest in 
Chile.  The big corporate company belonged to the state and they didn’t open it.  But the 
energy sector, particularly the electrical sector, is ideal for pension fund, long-term, 
single-firm, relatively small.  They need a lot of money for capital, bonds, so they started 
emitting bonds, and then they started floating shares.  The government had to transform 
the state companies in corporation and the government retained the control of those 
companies for many years.” (Source: interview with Bruno Philippi, Note #4) 
 
(#33→#38) The healthy economic situation of the time and abundant domestic financial market 
which was prepared by the reform of pension fund system also accelerated privatization process 
and increased the investments on power sector at the initial stage. The parallel privatization of 
Chile’s pension system in 1985 provided an important domestic source of private funds for the 
electricity sector. Initially restricted to investing inside the country, newly privatized pension 
companies generated capital for equity purchases on Chile’s stock exchange, quickly becoming 
the most important institutional investors. In the initial stage of the power sector reform with 
sufficient domestic sources of finance and proven technical expertise in operating established 
firms, the government did not need to seek FDI through special incentive policies. Several AFPs 
were controlled by foreign banks, thereby only linking FDI indirectly to electricity sector 
privatizations. Other equity sales occurred directly to company workers as well as to public 
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employees, members of the military and other private citizens. This diversification of ownership 
helped provide legitimacy to the privatizations and made their reversal more difficult (UNCTD 
2009). Read and Rudnick(2000) evaluate the result of the initial power sector reform in Chile as 
a success in terms of investment for rapid expansion, despite the security was not fully fulfilled.   
(#37→#38) Assurance for private investors from strong protection of private investors by 
jurisdiction is empowered by electricity law(Rudnick, O’Ryan, and Bravo 2001). According to 
(ibid.), Transmission investments were often linked to new generation plants being developed, 
and thus were included as part of those actions.  
(#24→ #37→ #38) The treatment of the utility employees affected by privatization raises 
important issues. Sorting out employment issues before privatization through formal agreements 
with labor unions helps attract investors to power sectors. In Chile, state-owned utility Endesa 
allocated to staffs some shares in privatized entities and it was an important element in some of 
the participation deals.  
(#33, #36, #37 →#38) In conclusion, Chile showed remarkable expansion of investment on 
generation capacity in their initial stage of the reform. According to Rudnick, O’Ryan, and 
Bravo (2001), from 1982 to 2002, generation capacity grew 4.4% in SIC and 10.7%  in SING. 
(#35→#36→#38) The early electricity market design in Chile was fundamentally centered on 
system of marginal pricing. Short-term electricity markets were created, trusting that spot prices 
would promote the efficient use of existing generation resources and provide signals to foster the 
interest of investors in building new capacity if needed (Schweppe et al, 1988; Vagliasindi and 
Besant-Jones, 2013). This capacity payments complemented generators’ energy revenues and 
provide incentives for the entrance of new capacity. The need to ensure efficient generation 
adequacy forms the backbone of electricity markets. This includes the establishment of correct 
mechanisms and incentives to allow the entrance of new generation in order to meet load growth. 
This is particularly crucial in developing countries, where the primary challenge is to ensure 
sufficient capacity and investment to reliably serve their fast-growing economies. The basis of 
competitive electricity markets is that, under system marginal pricing, short-term energy spot 
prices promote the efficient use of existing generation resources and provide signals to foster the 
interest of investors in building new capacity if needed (Schweppe et al., 1988). An imbalance 
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between supply and demand because of demand growth, for instance, results in spot price 
increases and thus creates incentives for the construction of new plants. Moreover, the optimal 
amount of capacity can recover total costs, expected spot market revenues are enough to 
remunerate investment and cover operational costs. Despite this fact, different economic 
arguments regarding electricity pricing introduce additional explicit capacity remuneration 
methods or capacity requirements (or obligations) as needed mechanisms on electricity markets 
to incentivize investment and so ensure generation adequacy (Oren, 2000; Tezak, 2005). 
 (#39→#40) Conglomerates have been a traditional business structure in Chile for a long 
time(Fernando Lefort 2004). During the first half of the 20th century, a number of large state-
owned companies were created in the context of a national plan of industrialization under the 
supervision of a public entity, CORFO(State development agency). Their origins and evolution 
importantly respond to the political and economic events. Lefort and Walker(1999) say that 
Chile have shown that conglomerates have been able to grow and increase their scope and self-
intermediation practices even during times of fierce economic reform and deregulation. This 
kind of evidences has supported a more favorable view of conglomerates in emerging economies 
sustaining that economic groups are a natural and efficient way for firms to deal with imperfect 
capital markets, poor institutions, corruption and other imperfections that plague emerging 
economies (Fernando Lefort 2004). Among the traditional Chilean conglomerate groups, Luksic 
family, a traditional Chilean group, and Endesa, controlled by multinational Endesa Spain are the 
major Chilean conglomerates. Figure 11 below shows ownership structure of Endesa and it 
seems to be clear that the gigantic conglomerate group occupies most of important companies in 
power industry. 
 
Figure 11 Ownership Structure of Endesa Chile Group 
Source: Fernando Lefort (2004) 
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 (#41→#42) the conception on these water resources as an essential basic right and social good 
was changed by the enactment of Water Code in 1981. Water Code of 1981, empowered water 
management according to the rules of private property, legally backed-up by the Constitution of 
1980. The most critical aspect in the Water Code of 1981 is that it defines water as “a national 
public good”, but at the same time as “a market asset”, authorizing the privatization of water 
through the granting of rights for free and in perpetuity, not setting limits on said grant(Larrain 
and Schaeffer 2010). According to the Chilean Water Code, once water rights are given to an 
individual or a private company, the state no longer intervenes. The reallocation of these water 
resources is done through what is called the “water market” where the private owner of the water 
rights can rent, buy or sell them, the same like any other asset. This transaction mechanism 
between private water rights favored an extreme concentration of ownership of this resource. As 
shown in Table 14, only three companies concentrated 90% of the ownership of water rights for 
power generation nationwide.  
Table 14 Principal Owners of Water Right (for Non-consumptive Use) 
Water right Users Sector 
Total 
Volume 
% 
Endesa Energy 6,256 81.00 
Compañía General Industrial Industry 370 4.80 
Chilgener S.A. Energy 320 4.16 
Pehuenche Energy 188 2.40 
Fisco Riego State 107 1.39 
Jorge Wachhoitz B., CMPC Celulose 100 1.30 
Codelco Chile State Mineral 77 1.00 
Unión Nacional de Coop. Exportadoras de Algas Pesca 54 0.70 
Hidroeléctrica Guardia Vieja Energy 46 0.59 
Chilectra Energy 45 0.58 
Sociedad Austral de Electricidad Energy 30 0.39 
Total  7,683 100 
Source: Larrain and Schaeffer (2010) 
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3.4 Causality diagram in Chile case 
Based on the links of the factors identified in the previous section, the final causality diagram is 
presented in Figure 12 below. From the proposed causality diagram, each element that connected 
to the related factors can be grouped as same category, setting aside some external factors and 
exceptional outliers. Here in this research, each categorized group is designated as a domain. The 
result of the causality analysis could be classified into four domains on: A) regulatory capacity, 
B) political interference, C) investment expansion, and D) power market.  
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Figure 9 Causality diagram on Chile case 
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3.5 Analysis results of Chile case 
After derive the causality diagram, all links of factors were also investigated by applying weight 
to determine critical factors of the case. For this, criteria were set as shown in the table 15 below. 
If a factor was mentioned as one of the critical/important/ key/essential factor in the in-depth 
interview and also appeared in the references, it was considered as a high weighted factor. If a 
factor was mentioned in the in-depth interview or confirmed from the other references, it was 
classified into moderate factor. Besides, a factor that could be presumed relevant from logical 
consideration also was regarded as a low weighted factor. 
Table 15 Criteria for the weight 
Weight Criteria 
High 
Factors that mentioned as ‘one of the critical/important/key factor’ in the in-depth interview. 
AND also appeared in the references.  
Moderate 
Factors that were mentioned in the in-depth interview.  
OR Factors that were confirmed from the references. 
Low Factors that indirectly influence on the process from logical consideration. 
 
3.5.1 Identification of the initial condition 
Table 15 and 16 describes the characteristics of the initial condition in Chile’s power sector 
reform. The initial condition of Chilean power sector reform could be characterized with absence 
of clear regulation governance, vertically integrated monopoly by state-owned power company, 
Endesa and its fiscal constraints. On top of that, less political supports for the national human 
resources, Chile's unique political condition, general social comprehensive reform before the 
power sector reform in security service and education are initial condition that is distinct from 
the other developing countries.  
3.5.2 Analysis on the initial implementation by domains 
Causality was investigated separately by following domains that categorized in the previous 
section. Each part of the causality diagram and its detailed explanation is shown in Figure 10 to 
Figure 13.  
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(1)  Capacity of regulatory body domain 
 
Figure 10 Causality analysis on Chile case: capacity of regulatory body domain 
As identified in the previous section, there was no clear regulation governance because the 
regulation on the power sector was done by the state-owned company and government. And also, 
the elite human resources could not be utilized because of the less supports from the government. 
However, after reform started, there was financial support from the business organization. They 
helped Chicago boys to establish a research institute and it enabled them to disseminate their 
economic ideas to the public. This effort influenced on the formation of technocrat appointed by 
Pinochet regime. Without supports from outside and with the strong political supports, Chilean 
regulatory body could have high capacity with logical regulations and could keep continue stable 
regulation and regulatory policy. 
Consequently, in the initial stage of the power sector reform in Chile, the regulatory body’s 
institutional capacity was high enough to regulate the tariff with simple and logical economic 
rules. This was influenced by a body of technocrats who were capable of highest level of policy 
making rationally and coherently. They were so-called Chicago boys who were a group of young 
neoliberal economists came back to Chile from the University of Chicago in 1960s.  Therefore, 
the Chile case can be concluded that rational and consistent regulation was possible in initial 
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stage due to the ability of technocrats and political supports for them. Minimized political 
interference in Chile contributed to make unbundling and privatization process go smooth. 
(2) Political interference domain 
 
Figure 11 Causality analysis on Chile case: political interference domain 
The political initial condition that was under the dictatorship is very distinct with other countries.  
Ironically, the dictatorship government strongly supported the Chicago economists who made 
theoretical and ideological basis for the power sector reform. On top of that, when the regulatory 
body was established, the main human resources were transferred from the engineers and 
technician from the former state-owned companies so, Implementation of the regulation was well 
conducted by them who gained practical experiences in former state-owned companies and this 
could minimize political interferences.  
The political system that was separated into independent legislation, administration also 
influenced the organization of the regulatory body. The regulatory body at the initial stage was 
able to be very independent from the political influence because of the existence of military 
government as well. 
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(3) Investments Expansion domain 
 
Figure12 Causality analysis on Chile case: investment expansion domain 
Chile succeeded in making assurance for the potential private investors in the market in their 
initial implementation. That credible environment could be developed by many incentives for the 
investors. First of all, the market signal was accurate with marginal pricing model, which was 
empowered by electricity law. Moreover, the investors was able to be protected by the 
jurisdiction and explicit regulatory framework imbedded in legislation. We cannot deny the 
influence of the abundant domestic capital market on the initial success in attracting new 
investment on generation capacity which was resulted from the general and comprehensive 
reform in social security and education prior to the power sector reform. This precedent 
condition influenced on the domestic capital market and created reliable environment for private 
investors. 
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(4) Competition in the power market domain 
 
Figure 13 Causality analysis on Chile case: competition in the power market 
Contrary to the expectation on the power sector reform to promote more competition in the 
power market, Chile could not successfully achieve the competitive market. Vertical integration 
maintained in the market because of an inadequate allocation of water right, which deterred any 
other newcomers from entering power market. Endesa, dominant power Distribution Company, 
maintained their power position through profitable contracts and it caused limited competition in 
the market. The vertically integrated monopoly by the conglomerate formulated before the 
reform steadily prevailed the result of the reform 
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3.6 Chile Summary 
In Chile case, the initial condition of Chilean power sector reform could be characterized with 
absence of clear regulation governance, vertically integrated monopoly by state-owned power 
company and its fiscal constraints. On top of that, less political supports for the national human 
resources, Chile's unique political condition under the dictatorship, general social comprehensive 
reform before the power sector reform in security service and education are initial condition that 
can be differentiated from the other developing countries. Among these initial conditions, the 
unfavorable regulatory governance was improved by establishing independent regulatory body 
and capacity building by utilizing local human resources who are qualified in economics and 
engineering and by funding form the domestic business group. Besides, Chilean regulatory body 
in initial stage had to build their capacity by themselves because they did not have any reference 
cases and supports from outside. Through the internal capacity building process, consequently, 
they could have high institutional capacity enough to regulate the tariff with simple and logical 
economic rules. Fiscal constraints of state-owned power company were improved by promoting 
private investment on generation capacity, since they successfully fostered investor’s confidence 
in the power market through the initial implementation. That credible environment could be 
developed by many incentives for the investors. First of all, the market signal was accurate with 
marginal pricing model, which was empowered by electricity law. Moreover, the investors was 
able to be protected by the jurisdiction and explicit regulatory framework imbedded in legislation. 
We also cannot deny the influence of the abundant domestic capital market on the initial success 
in attracting new investment on generation capacity which was resulted from the general and 
comprehensive reform in social security and education prior to the power sector reform. With 
regards to the political interference, Chilean unique political environment ironically had positive 
influence on the power sector reform, promoting quick decision making under the dictatorship. 
Regulatory body also could maintain their independency under the military government. Lastly, 
fulfilling competition in the market were failed to meet the expectation that the reform would 
bring more efficiency throughout competition in the market. Vertical integration maintained in 
the power market due to an inadequate allocation of property right and loopholes in law 
enactment that allow cross-ownership between generation and distribution caused limited 
competition in the market.  
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4 The Philippines Case 
4.1 Summary of power sector reform  
Historical context (Sharma, Madamba, and Chan 2004) 
Table 17 below summarizes the history of power sector reform in the Philippines. In 2001, the 
Congress enacted the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which was meant to 
achieve a total overhaul of the power industry and wrest control of the generation and 
transmission sectors from NPC. There were, therefore, argued the proponents of reform, an 
imminent need to restructure the electricity industry. Such restructuring will:  
Pursuant to the Electric Power Reform Act 2001 (EPIRA), Power Sector Assets and Liabilities 
Management Corporation (PSALM) were mandated to reform and restructured the sector. Since 
its formation, PSALM has privatized generating plants. The Wholesale Electricity Spot Market 
(WESM) commenced its initial operations in Luzon in 2006. In the Philippines case, from the 
period of early 1990s, when the IPP contracts and BOT were introduced to the year of 2006, 
when the competitive power market was set, would be regarded as the initial stage and the post-
initial stage in this research. 
Table 17 The Philippines’ power sector reform history 
Year Event Description 
1936 NPC was established 
 
1960 
Meralco was transferred to 
a new company owned by 
local private interests 
 
1965 
NPC's preeminent position 
in the power industry  
1980 Power shortage in 1980s  
1990 Severe power crisis 4 up to 8 rotating brownouts 
1986 
Mothballed Nuclear Power 
Plant 
This exacerbated the power demand/supply situation. 
1992 President Aquino 
Allowed private sector participation in generation 
Economic activity increased power demand  
1987 NPC's debt increased 
NPC had accumulated billions in debt and hence lacked the financial 
capability. 
1987 
Aquino permit and 
encourage private sector  
1995 NPC's operation subsidies NPC had spent a total P1.36 billion in operating subsidies. 
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1990 
BOT scheme was 
introduced  
1999 IPP contracts 
NPC contracted a total of 5583 MW of IPP contracts with the form 
of take-or-pay provision. In 2002, NPC had already signed 43 IPP 
contracts. 
1992 Energy demand high Energy demand quickly outpaced energy supply 
1993 
The height of the POWER 
CRISIS 
The country experienced 103 days of blackouts resulting in 251 GWh 
of lost energy sales. Projections based on the 1993 and 1996 
Philippine Development Plan estimated that the power demand and 
supply gap would increase in the succeeding years. [Source: DOE] 
1993 
Electric Power Crisis Act 
of 1993 
Ramos administration pushed the act, which gave the president the 
power to enter into negotiated contracts for the construction, repair, 
rehabilitation, improvement or maintenance of power plants, projects 
and facilities and to reorganize NPC. 
1993 Activate the IPP contracts 
A total of US$6 billion in investments in approximately 4,800MW of 
installed generation capacity had been made by independent power 
producers (IPPs) 
1997 
ASIAN FINANCIAL 
CRISIS  
1998 
World Bank sent AID to 
the Government 
World Bank document noted that NPC is having severe difficulty in 
meeting its commitment to lenders and the IPPs. 
2001 President Estrada 
 
2010 President Arroyo Arroyo approved the NPC's privatization plan. 
Initiation of the power sector reform 
2001 EPIRA 
EPIRA became mandated Rate Reduction: leadership need to 
rationalize power rates. 
2002 NPC's operating deficits 
1. The non-recovery of operating and fuel expenses of some IPP 
contracts 2. The reduction in NPC's effective rates. 3. PPA cap 4. 
Fuel cost increases 5. Further decreases in sales following the full 
operation of Meralco's own IPPs. 
2004 
DELAY of implementation 
of EPIRA 
While EPIRA was promulgated in 2001, the first significant step to 
address NPC’s financial crisis was not taken until September 2004. 
2006 
Wholesale Electricity Spot 
Market started 
DOE has commenced establishment of WESM. The Wholesale 
Electricity Spot Market (WESM) commenced its initial operations in 
Luzon in 2006. 
2012 
PSLM had privatized 70% 
of the total capacity of 
generating assets of NPC 
 
Source: This was written based on Sharma, Madamba, and Chan (2004), “The Energy Report: 
Philippines Growth and Opportunities in the Philippines Electric Power Sector” (2013), and the website 
of Department of Energy of the Philippines government (https://www.doe.gov.ph/)  
Power sector Structure 
Figure 17 below shows how the power sector structure in the Philippines had been changed after 
the reform. Before the reform, the state-owned generation and transmission company (NPC) and 
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distribution company (Meralco) mainly consisted the power sector. Regulation and long-term 
planning for future energy policy were undertaken by the government (Department of Energy) 
and Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). The distinct changes after the reform are unbundling the 
sector into generation, transmission distribution and retail supply. The generation and retail were 
opened to competition to both domestic and foreign companies and the transmission and 
distribution were remained as natural monopolies subjected to the regulation of the ERC, which 
is a new independent regulatory body. The role of department of energy as a policy making 
agency remained but the role of supervision and administration of the sector was redefied after 
the reform started. 
Figure 17 The Philippines’s Power sector structure before and after the reform 
Source:Vagliasindi and Besant-Jones (2013), Power market structure 
 
4.2 Finding Factors from the sources 
Based on the literature reviews and the in-depth interview shown in Chapter 2, factors from each 
source or evidence were identified in a same with Chile case. These identified factors were also 
classified into three phases, following the definition that was set for this research in the previous 
section 1.3, which is initial condition, initial implementation, and initial result. The identified 
factors are shown in Table 18 below.  
Table 18 Factors from source and classification by phase and domain (The Phlippines) 
# Source Description Stage Domain 
1 ERC 
(http://www.erc.gov.ph:809
9/Pages/history) 
Numerous reorganization and changes in its 
mandate: changes in responsibility for the 
forecasting from NPC to DOE 
I.C A 
2 
Poor institutional coordination: regulatory 
bottleneck 
I.C A 
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3 DOE’s insufficient institutional strengthening I.C A 
5 
Republic Act No. 9136: 
Electric Power Industry 
Reform Act of 2001,  
Pascual (2006) 
Establishment of ERC I.I A 
6 Cham (2007) High dependence on president's decision I.I A 
7 
Cariño (2005), Minogue 
(2006) 
Failure to attract and retain qualified and 
experienced professionals 
I.I A 
8 
Pascual (2006), Geoffrey 
Brown, de Dios, and 
Valderrama (2011), Diokno-
Pascual (2006) 
Technical Assistance from ADB I.I A 
9 Clemente (2009) Newly hired graduates and high turn over I.I A 
10 Clemente (2009) 
Use of external consultant: No procedures to 
review the recommendations 
I.I 
A 
11 
Johannsen (2003),  
Minogue (2006) 
Lost Autonomy of regulation I.R 
A 
12 
Cham (2007)  
Diokno-Pascual (2006) 
Internal Institutional weakness: difficulties in tariff 
setting 
I.R 
A 
13 
Diokno-Pascual(2006), 
ADB (2004) 
Too much dependence on foreign consultants I.I 
A 
14 Cham (2007) wrong demand forecasting methodology I.I A 
15 Cham (2007) 
Planning failure: countries generation needs are 
inappropriately planned 
I.I A 
16 Roxas, (2010) 
Delay on decision making: Legal disputes 
regarding award of the franchise 
I.C B 
19 Roxas, (2010) 
EPIRA delayed: delay of legislation and 
implementation 
I.R B 
20 Minogue (2006) 
Interest coalition and political interference 
intensified 
I.I B 
21 Cariño (2005) 
EPIRA gives ERC very strong powers to regulate 
market operation 
I.I B 
22 
Sharma, Madamba, and 
Chan (2004), David Celestra 
Tan, (Article 17. Feb. 2014)  
Corruption and lobbying I.R B 
23 
David Celestra Tan (Article 
17. Feb. 2014)  
Changed cross-ownership percentage: allowed 
distribution utilities (the main buyers of power) to 
enter into bilateral supply contracts  
with affiliated generators of up to 50 percent of 
their power requirements 
I.I B, D 
24 
SEPO, the Policy Brief 
(2008), Republic Act No. 
9136 
Allowed cross-ownership between G&D I.I D 
26 Geoffrey et al. (2011) 
Defective wholesale Spot Market structure and 
rules 
I.I C 
27 Geoffrey et al. (2011),  Entrance barrier to the new market participants I.R C 
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28 Roxas(2010) Insufficient number of market participants I.R D 
29 Mendaza (2008) 
Market violations or abuse by the dominant 
industry players 
I.R D 
30 Cham (2007) 
Limited competition in the power market: 
Ineffective WESM(wholesale market)- 
I.R D 
31 Cham (2007) 
Couldn't provide guidance for allocation of 
investment resources 
I.R D 
32 Roxas(2005) 
Changes in Economic situation: fixed exchange 
rate collapsed, depression of Peso, high fuel price 
I.I C 
33 Roxas(2005) poor finance feasibility of NPC: NPC's DEBT I.C C 
34 
SEPO, the Policy Brief 
(2008) 
EPIRA promulgated I.I A,D 
36 Roxas(2010) Structure dominated by leading business families I.R D 
37 Geoffrey et al. (2011) Interest groups' opposition I.I B 
39 Mendaza (2008) Unreliable investment environment I.R C 
40 Cham (2007) Underinvestment on Generation I.R C 
41 
Mendaza (2008), Cham 
(2007) 
Insufficient electricity supply, Blackout and risk of 
power crisis 
I.R C 
43 Mendaza (2008) Affect industries and national economy I.R C 
44 Geoffrey et al. (2011) low electrification in rural area: I.R C 
45 Cham (2007) privatization of Transmission was slowed I.I C 
48 
Abrenica(2004), Sharma et. 
al., (2004), Abrenica(2004) 
financial, technical problems I.C C 
33 
SEPO, the Policy Brief 
(2008) 
Inability of financing I.C C 
48 
SEPO, the Policy Brief 
(2008) 
poor performance of SOE I.C C 
49 
Abrenica(2004), Sharma et. 
al., (2004), Abrenica(2004) 
Executive order 215: permit private sector 
participation through IPP 
I.C C 
50 
Abrenica(2004), Sharma et. 
al., (2004), Abrenica(2004) 
Introduction of IPPs I.C C 
50 Woodhouse(2005) take-or-pay provision I.C Ct 
33 Cham (2007) Poor finance of NPC position I.C C 
53 Cham (2007) Political concern: politicians' populist I.I B 
54 Roxas(2005) Natural endowment I.C C 
55 Cham (2007) ERC did not permit the power tariff increase I.I B 
57 Cham (2007) 
Transmission loss problem: need better 
transmission system 
I.I C 
58 Clemente (2009) 
Delayed Privatization of NPC's generation 
facilities 
I.I C 
59 
SEPO, the Policy Brief 
(2008) 
NPC's dominant market power I.I D 
60 Cham (2007) 
Financial disability of Distribution 
company :nonpayment of electricity bills by 
consumers/low credit : MERALCO's credit rating 
was bad BB+ _> CC/low credit/ financial inability 
I.I C 
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of 18 other private distribution utilities and 119 
RECs 
63 Clemente (2009) 
Regulatory body(ERC)'s lower salary than other 
regulated entities 
I.I A 
64 Clemente (2009) insufficient fund for capacity building I.C A 
62 
De Vera (1997),  
Cariño(2006), Basilio(2005) 
political ties with the president I.I B 
61 Clemente (2009) 
Inability of funding to undertake the capacity 
building 
I.C A 
65 Minogue (2006) political appointee of the regulatory body I.I B 
66 Clemente (2009) 
Least autonomy of regulation: high dependence on 
president's decision 
I.I A,B 
67 Cham (2007) exclusive focus on privatization of Generation I.I C 
68 Cham (2007) 
slow resolution of legal issues on the privatization 
of Transmission 
I.I C 
*Phase- I.C: Initial Condition, I.I: Initial Implementation, I.R: Initial Result 
*Domain-A: Regulatory capacity,  B: Political interference, C: Investment expansion, D: Power market 
 
4.3 Link of the factors 
Here, I will investigate each link in detail. Whole links are summarized in Table 19 below. 
Table 19 Links of causality diagram on the Philippines case 
From Box To Box 
1 
Numerous reorganization and changes in its 
mandate: changes in responsibility for the 
forecasting from NPC to DOE 
2 
Poor institutional coordination: regulatory 
bottleneck 
3 DOE’s insufficient institutional strengthening 
3 
DOE’s insufficient institutional 
strengthening 
5 Establishment of ERC 
8 Technical Assistance from ADB 
8 Technical Assistance from ADB 10 
Use of external consultant: No procedures to 
review the recommendations 
10 
Use of external consultant: No procedures 
to review the recommendations 
13 Too much dependence on foreign consultants 
13 
Too much dependence on foreign 
consultants 
12 
Internal Institutional weakness: difficulties in 
tariff setting 
12 
Internal Institutional weakness: difficulties 
in tariff setting 
14 wrong demand forecasting methodology 
63 
Regulatory body(ERC)'s lower salary than 
other regulated entities 
7 
Failure to attract and retain qualified and 
experienced professionals 
7 
Failure to attract and retain qualified and 
experienced professionals 
9 Newly hired graduates and high turn over 
9 Newly hired graduates and high turn over 12 
Internal Institutional weakness: difficulties in 
tariff setting 
14 wrong demand forecasting methodology 15 Planning failure: countries generation needs 
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are inappropriately planned 
15 
Planning failure: countries generation needs 
are inappropriately planned 
31 
Couldn't provide guidance for allocation of 
investment resources 
12 
Internal Institutional weakness: difficulties 
in tariff setting 
31 
Couldn't provide guidance for allocation of 
investment resources 
61 
Inability of funding to undertake the 
capacity building 
8 Technical Assistance from ADB 
34 EPIRA promulgated 5 Establishment of ERC 
16 
Delay on decision making: Legal disputes 
regarding award of the franchise 
19 
EPIRA delayed: delay of legislation and 
implementation 
19 
EPIRA delayed: delay of legislation and 
implementation 
20 
Interest coalition and political interference 
intensified 
20 
Interest coalition and political interference 
intensified 
65 political appointee of the regulatory body 
65 political appointee of the regulatory body 66 
Least autonomy of regulation: high 
dependence on president's decision 
66 
Least autonomy of regulation: high 
dependence on president's decision 
12 
Internal Institutional weakness: difficulties in 
tariff setting 
20 
Interest coalition and political interference 
intensified 
22 Corruption and lobbying 
22 Corruption and lobbying 
23 
Changed cross-ownership percentage: allowed 
distribution utilities (the main buyers of 
power) to enter into bilateral supply contracts 
with affiliated generators of up to 50 percent 
of their power requirements 
24 Allowed cross-ownership between G&D 
34 EPIRA promulgated 24 Allowed cross-ownership between G&D 
23 
Changed cross-ownership percentage: 
allowed distribution utilities (the main 
buyers of power) to enter into bilateral 
supply contracts  
with affiliated generators of up to 50 percent 
of their power requirements 
29 
Market violations or abuse by the dominant 
industry players 
36 
Structure dominated by leading business 
families 
29 
Market violations or abuse by the dominant 
industry players 
26 
Defective wholesale Spot Market structure 
and rules 
29 
Market violations or abuse by the dominant 
industry players 
30 
Limited competition in the power market: 
Ineffective WESM(wholesale market)- 
23 
Changed cross-ownership percentage: 
allowed distribution utilities (the main 
buyers of power) to enter into bilateral 
supply contracts  
with affiliated generators of up to 50 percent 
of their power requirements 
30 
Limited competition in the power market: 
Ineffective WESM(wholesale market)- 
28 Insufficient number of market participants 30 
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58 
Delayed Privatization of NPC's generation 
facilities 
28 
Insufficient number of market participants 
27 
Entrance barrier to the new market 
participants 
28 
23 
Changed cross-ownership percentage: 
allowed distribution utilities (the main 
buyers of power) to enter into bilateral 
supply contracts  
with affiliated generators of up to 50 percent 
of their power requirements 
27 
Entrance barrier to the new market 
participants 
48 financial, technical problems 49 
Executive order 215: permit private sector 
participation through IPP 
49 
Executive order 215: permit private sector 
participation through IPP 
50 Introduction of IPPs 
50 Introduction of IPPs 33 poor finance feasibility of NPC: NPC's DEBT 
32 
Changes in Economic situation: fixed 
exchange rate collapsed, depression of Peso, 
high fuel price 
33 poor finance feasibility of NPC: NPC's DEBT 
33 
poor finance feasibility of NPC: NPC's 
DEBT 
67 exclusive focus on privatization of Generation 
67 
exclusive focus on privatization of 
Generation 
45 privatization of Transmission was slowed 
57 
Transmission loss problem: need better 
transmission system 
40 Underinvestment on Generation 
60 
Financial disability of Distribution 
company :nonpayment of electricity bills by 
consumers/low credit : MERALCO's credit 
rating was bad BB+ _> CC/low credit/ 
financial inability of 18 other private 
distribution utilities and 119 RECs 
40 Underinvestment on Generation 
39 Unreliable investment environment 
39 Unreliable investment environment 
40 Underinvestment on Generation 
59 NPC's dominant market power 
40 Underinvestment on Generation 41 
Insufficient electricity supply, Blackout and 
risk of power crisis 
41 
Insufficient electricity supply, Blackout and 
risk of power crisis 
43 Affect industries and national economy 
40 Underinvestment on Generation 44 low electrification in rural area:  
68 
slow resolution of legal issues on the 
privatization of Transmission 
45 privatization of Transmission was slowed 
 
(#1→#2, #3)  In order to understand the initial capacity of power sector regulatory body in the 
Philippines, many past changes in their energy governance should firstly be investigated, since 
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when the electricity had been introduced in the Philippines in 18901. The first governmental 
organization was Electrification Administration (EA), which was established in 1960 and in 
charge of rural electrification. At that time, the population enjoyed the benefits of electricity was 
concentrated mostly in Manila and only cities around Manila, so the government needed to 
expand electricity to a larger part of the country and it contributed to make EA as a main 
institution in charge of the nation’s energy policy. Turning to the 1970s, the radical increase of 
imported oil price changed energy governance of the Philippines. High oil prices in early 1970s 
underscored a need for a strong institution to manage the country’s energy needs. Therefore, the 
Department of Energy (DOE) was created in 1977. In late 1980s, high economic growth 
accelerated the demand of electricity and hastened the need for new generation, transmission and 
distribution capacity. As part of its restructuring efforts, the government issued Executive order 
in 1987 for the creation of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) whose responsibilities included 
electricity tariff settings. The ERB was primarily responsible for determining the rates and other 
cost adjustments of the National Power Corporation (NPC), private and public electric utilities 
and rural electric cooperatives; prices of coal and other energy resources under the most 
economic and competitive terms as possible. From 1992, when the Department of Energy (DOE) 
was re-created, ERB’s policy-making authorities transferred to some part of the DOE. It is 
apparent that since its establishment, the ERB took on new responsibilities to adapt to significant 
changes in the energy sector while fulfilling its mandated functions. Before the reform started, 
regulation of power rates and service of electric utilities were conducted by ERB. Thus, the 
power to regulate the power rates and services of electric utilities was transferred to the ERB.  In 
June 1998, the Philippine oil industry was fully deregulated, thus, ERB’s focus of responsibility 
was centered on the electric industry. These numerous reorganization and changes in its mandate 
caused poor institutional coordination and insufficient institutional strengthening of DOE.  
(#2, #3, #34→#5) The major reforms in the power industry were embodied in the newly-enacted 
law, namely, the restructuring of the electricity supply industry that calls for the separation of the 
different components of the power sector, and the privatization of the National Power 
Corporation (NPC), which involves the sale of the state-owned power firm’s generation and 
                                                 
 
1
 The causal relationship between numerous changes in regulation responsibility of the Philippines case was 
summarized based on the ERC(Energy Regulatory Commission) website (http://www.erc.gov.ph:8099/Pages/history) 
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transmission assets to private investors. These reforms were aimed at bringing down electricity 
rates and improving the delivery of power supply to end-users by encouraging greater 
competition and efficiency in the electricity industry
2
. The enactment of Republic Act No. 9136 
introduced a new regulatory framework and provided for new government roles in the industry. 
As a result, ERC was established as an independent regulator in the power sector to improve the 
regulatory framework.  
(#63→#7→#9→#12) After the ERC was established, their organizational insufficiency in low 
salary policy than other sectors’ regulatory entities caused unsuccessful results to attract and 
retain qualified and experienced professionals in regulatory body. As a result, ERC hired new 
graduates and there is a very frequent turn over and this connected to internal institutional 
weakness. 
“At the same time, the turn over of experienced and well-trained personnel pose a big 
challenge to ERC since it still lacks capacity to attract and retain qualified and 
experienced personnel. The high turn over can be attributed to personnel demoralization 
and poor motivation mechanisms in the ERC and the more attractive incentives being 
offered by other companies, particularly the regulated entities.” (Source: Clemente 2009) 
 
(#65→#66→#12) With regard to the appointee to the chairperson of the regulatory body, 
president’s decision was highly and decisively reflected.  This presidential appointee also caused 
unqualified and inexperienced (Cham 2007). 
(#61→#8) A related concern was the availability of funds to undertake the capacity enhancement 
project. Insufficient funds for capacity building Reforms that were introduced in the Philippines, 
particularly in the electric power industry, have always emanated and patterned from developed 
countries. Given the novelty of such reforms, plus the fact that the electric power industry is 
dynamic (keeps on changing) by nature, gaps in the technical knowledge and skills have to be 
filled.  Thus, the local and traditional brains need to be upgraded correspondingly and constantly 
to ensure the successful implementation of such reforms (Clemente 2009) . The ERC is 
                                                 
 
2
 Republic Act No. 9136: Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (http://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/R.A.-9136.pdf) 
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inordinately influenced by the USAID, the World Bank, and the ADB as these institutions 
provide the technical assistance for ERC’s capability building (Pascual 2006). These 
development financing institutions have actively assisted the Philippines power sector. ADB 
mainly took lead in providing policy advices to the government on power sector restructuring 
while support to NPC prior to its privatization(Geoffrey Brown, de Dios, and Valderrama 2011). 
The World Bank, the other hand, would focus on providing assistance in rural electrification. 
Since 1997, World Bank has not lent to NPC, while ADB has kept approving technical and 
financial assistance as shown in Table 20.  
Table 20 ADB's technical assistance to the Philippines energy sector after WB quitted lending 
Year Project Title $’000 Type 
1998 Electricity Pricing & Regulatory Practice in a Competitive Environment 600 TA 
2000 Consumer Impact Assessment 720 
2000 Rural Electrification Institutional Strengthening 750 
2000 Rural Electrification 600 
2001 Competition Policy for the Electricity Sector 990 
2002 Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets 800 
2003 Promoting Good Governance in the Restructured Power Sector  800 
2003 
Rehabilitation of Renewable Energy Projects for Rural Electrification and 
Livelihood Development  
800 
2003 Institutional Strengthening for the Development of Natural Gas Industry  800 
2004 Institutional Strengthening of ERC and Privatization of NPC  1,200 
1998 Power Sector Restructuring Program 300 Lending 
2002 Electricity Market and Transmission Development 40 
Source: Geoffrey Brown, de Dios, and Valderrama (2011)  
From the financial and technical assistance by the external organizations, the Philippines started 
their institutional strengthening program. The ERC was inordinately influenced by the USAID, 
the World Bank, and the ADB as these institutions provided the technical assistance for ERC’s 
capability building (Diokno-Pascual 2006). These development financing institutions have 
actively assisted the Philippines power sector. ADB mainly took lead in providing policy advices 
to the government on power sector restructuring while support to NPC prior to its 
privatization(Geoffrey Brown, de Dios, and Valderrama 2011). The World Bank, the other hand, 
would focus on providing assistance in rural electrification. Since 1997, World Bank has not lent 
to NPC, while ADB has kept approving technical and financial assistance. 
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(#8→#10) With regard to regulatory body’s capacity, ADB provided technical assistance to the 
Philippines government for “institutional strengthening of energy regulatory commission and 
privatization of NPC” in 2004. This technical assistance included an adoption of same regulation 
model with pioneered reform countries and education program for working staffs of the 
regulatory body, the ERC. Table 21 below shows the summary of the technical assistance 
including input of human resources and funding. The technical assistance program was designed 
to improve accountability and transparency of regulation and also included training programs for 
staff members in ERC and PSALM. About 1.7 million USD was granted by ADB and the 
Philippines government funding in total. In terms of human resources, international consultants 
who were a group of experts in various fields were involved in building capacity of regulation, 
including market monitoring, information technology and financing. Domestic consultants and 
ADB staffs were also associated with this project.  
Table 21 Summary of Technical assistance to the Philippines by ADB 
Source: ADB (2004), “Proposed technical assistance to the republic of the Philippines for Institutional 
strengthening of energy regulatory commission and privatization of national power corporation” 
As shown in Table 22, in the ADB’s technical assistance, two external consulting firms were 
involved for ERC and PSALM respectively. The detailed contents and activities of each 
consulting were different. For the ERC, a guideline of ‘Rules of Practice and Procedure’ was 
published and IT equipment and software were purchased as a procurement procedure. Staff 
trainings and human resource development program were provided as well. For the PSALM, 
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which was created to oversee and manage the privatization of NPC’s generation and Transco’s 
transmission assets, proper asset evaluation method and advisory services were provided.  
Table 22 Contents of Technical Assistance by ADB 
 For ERC For PSALM 
Inputs Two consulting firms were engaged respectively 
Activities Issued ‘Rules of Practice and Procedure’ and 
put in place a computerized case tracking 
system 
IT equipment and software were procured  
Relevant staff trainings were conducted 
Human resource development program was 
provided. 
Asset evaluation of NPC generation plants and 
provided advisory services to PSALM for the 
privatization of NPC and TRANSCO (2005) 
Termination -> additional financial valuation  
requested 
Expertise of the Consultant team did not 
match the requirement  
Source: ADB (2004), “Proposed technical assistance to the republic of the Philippines for Institutional 
strengthening of energy regulatory commission and privatization of national power corporation” 
 (#10→#13) In the Philippines, tones of amount of money and efforts for upgrading the local 
human resources had been correspondingly and constantly invested by multilateral financial 
institutions such as ADB and World Bank. According to the project evaluation report of ADB, 
they defined the result of the technical assistance as a very successful (ADB 2004). They 
evaluated that key expertise and knowledge have been effectively transferred to the recipient of 
technical assistance within the contract cost, whereas some mismatched results were found. 
Despite the positive evaluation of ADB’s assessment, the ERC depended so much on its foreign 
consultants in order to walk through and go about the reforms, most especially during its 
inception period. The consultants who generally came from the donor agencies shaped the policy 
of reforms and regulatory processes. This could be said that major decisions of the ERC have 
been written by its external consultants. Further, it was also noted that there was no established 
procedure that can review the recommendations made by the consultants (Diokno-Pascual, 2006).  
(#13→#12) However, it is hard to tell that the capacity strengthening program was thoroughly 
and successfully assigned, because the ERC started to demonstrate some institutional weaknesses. 
Internally the ERC employers had difficulties in understanding new tariff setting methodology 
and were not able to undertake relevant regulation works. The quote is like below:  
“ERC employers are unable to undertake thorough analysis because of a lack of 
knowledge and skills in regulation and tariff setting methodologies. ERC’s document 
tracking and filing system was poor as business processes are not clearly defined. The 
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staff is inexperienced in handling consumer complaints and dispute resolution. ERC has 
yet to establish ground rules for the effective implementation of performance-based 
regulation. Market monitoring is also a new area of responsibility that ERC has to learn 
while WESM is still not operational”.(Source: Cham 2007) 
While it is true that the ERC benefits from the donor agencies’ technical assistance for 
capacity building, which the ERC for itself cannot afford to provide, the alleged influence 
of donors can be very difficult to establish and prove as the ERC’s actions is guided by 
and is consistent with its mandate prescribed under the EPIRA.  (Source: Assessment 
Report on the Electricity Governance in the Philippines by Diokno-Pascual 2006) 
 
(#12→#14→#15) All these weaknesses affected the function of the regulatory body; especially 
on the demand forecasting of the electricity and after all, it was eventually connected with 
inappropriately planned power generation capacity of the country due to the planning failure 
(Cham 2007). 
(#20→#65→#66) Assessment Report on the Electricity Governance in the Philippines by 
Diokno-Pascual noted that though the ERC claims to be an independent body, appointments 
thereat are highly political as it is left to the sole prerogative of the President.  Such being the 
case, there is no transparent and clear process of appointing ERC officials (Diokno-Pascual, 
2006).  This notion affirms the argument of Cariño (2005) that regulation is also a political 
process.  In the same light, Johannsen (2003) argued that:   
“Bearing the label “independent” is not completely without practical implications for the 
regulatory authorities, but the label is definitely no guarantee of full autonomy.”   
Moreover, Johannsen (2003) further claimed and that: “The establishment of regulators 
who are independent in name has not necessarily led to independent regulation in actual 
fact.”   
 
(#20→#7,#11) Minogue (2006) also affirmed the possibility that the political executive retains 
basic control through the power of appointment, and such political intervention will always be 
inherent in any area of regulation.  Thus, when regulators owe their positions to the political-
bureaucratic elite, the possibilities of independent judgment and action are somehow reduced or, 
in worst cases, totally absent.  It is, therefore, apparent that: “national political and bureaucratic 
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cultures themselves can and do hinder the release of economic functions from government 
control, making independent regulation unworkable.” (Source: Minogue, 2006).   
(#20→#65) This concern pertaining to political appointments in the ERC is due to the fact that 
two of the previously appointed Chairpersons of the ERC were former Congressmen who belong 
to the same political party that the current President, i.e. Pres. Arroyo is affiliated with (Minogue, 
2006).  It must be pointed out, however, that the President cannot be faulted for such action as 
she is merely exercising her privilege to appoint the Chairman of the ERC, as provided for in the 
EPIRA.  
(#62) De Vera (1997) argues that “Regulatory practice in the Philippines has shown that 
whenever controversial issues arise, the ERC adopts a hands-off policy and leaves the final 
decision to the President.  This has made the President a powerful interventionist in resolving 
conflicts and has made the President and not the ERC as the final regulator.” (De Vera, 1997). 
This upholds Cariño’s (2006) claim that:  “The Philippine style of regulatory governance is 
complex, with regulators adequately endowed with power and independence deferring or being 
forced to deter to higher or parallel authority.”  Thus, also affirms the notion that regulation is a 
political exercise (Cariño, 2005). This claim of the ERC taking “hands-off” policy on 
controversial issues, however, is highly improbable, aside from being unfounded as the author 
did not lay her basis for such claim.  The ERC is the sole regulator and is mandated under the 
EPIRA to address concerns relating to the electric power industry.  Thus, the ERC cannot simply 
avoid and pass the burden of resolving controversial issues to the President or to any other 
person or institution, as long as the issue/s falls within its jurisdiction.  Moreover, decisions on 
matters concerning the EPI, whether controversial or not, have to be duly supported with facts, 
figures, and appropriate underlying principles.  Hence, it is only the ERC who is in a proper 
position to technically address concerns in the EPI. 
(#62) Political Ties with the President: The report also claimed that the political tie between the 
President and the Chairman politicizes regulation, and pointed out that there is a perception 
among academics in economics and the industry players that tariff setting is influenced by the 
populist political stance of the Presidency, resulting to low tariffs.  Again, the notion of Cariño, 
(2005) about regulation being a political process holds true with this claim in the subject report.  
Nonetheless, this can also be linked to the concept of Regulatory Capture, particularly coming 
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from the government or state. The state has its own interests and demands that can make it 
influence the regulatory process (Basilio, 2005). 
 (#20→#21,#37, #53 ) The civil society organizations, as reflected in the said report, perceives 
that the ERC is prey to regulatory capture by influential industry players thereby resulting to 
poorly regulated pricing, particularly in the determination of rate base and automatic recoveries.  
This upholds Cariño’s (2005) concept of Regulatory Capture which could either come from the 
private sector, i.e. regulated entities, or from the state itself.  An illustration of the former case 
would be, the captor and the capturer couching their mutual demands in neutral language and 
provide rationale that may seem acceptable on the surface, e.g. one legislator’s recourse to 
philosophy in defending a valued monopoly.  A similar situation occurs when, for instance, 
advice from international consultants that serve the interests of their agencies are accepted 
without question by staff whose knowledge of new developments come mostly from the same 
source.  On the other hand, the latter case occurs when the government tries to protect itself by 
appointing allies as the highest officials in the regulatory agency.  Cariño argued that the state is 
not necessarily a neutral party, but also has interests and demands which taints the regulatory 
process.  One manifestation of this claim, particularly in the Philippines’ ERC is the President 
given the power to appoint the heads of the said agency.   
(#32→#33) Roxas(2005) describes the economic changes such as Fixed exchange rate collapsed 
depression of Peso, high fuel price and their influences on the fiscal status of the NPC.  
Moreover, it has put the government into large debt during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The 
situation worsened when countries faced currency devaluation but payment was still dollar-
pegged. Although the Philippines were not severely affected, the 1997 Asian economic crisis had 
a contagion effect. Economic growth slowed, unemployment rose, and controls over credit and 
foreign exchange markets were tightened. The economic slowdown led to decrease in the 
demand for electricity at a time when many IPPs were beginning to operate their newly 
commissioned power plants. IPPs were shielded from the effects of the Asian economic crisis 
because of take-or-pay clauses in their contracts with NPC, together with government guarantees. 
The remains of the vigorous IPP contracts were financial burden of NPC. 
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(#48→#49→#50→#33) During the late 1980’s to early 1990’s, the government of the 
Philippines legalized IPP to allow private participation in the electricity sector. During the late 
1980's and early 1990's, the country's rapid economic growth led to high electricity demand. 
Blackouts of up to 10 hours were common and their economic cost was substantial (Sharma et. 
al., 2004). In 1989, the first IPP contract was signed. By the end of 1993, more than 25 IPPs 
were producing electricity in the Philippines and the power shortage problem seemed to be 
resolved (Abrenica, 2004). However, inequitable contracts such as take-or-pay clause which 
forces the government to buy all the unutilized energy brought about large financial burden to 
the government (Abrenica, 2004). In 2001, about 41 percent of electricity is produced by IPPs 
and the rest by NPC (Woodhouse, 2005). The take-or-pay clause, which forces the government 
to buy all the unutilized energy, caused the state-owned enterprise to shut down its plants and 
buy electricity at higher prices from some IPPs even when the electricity demand was low.  
(#16→#19) A thing of note is the time required to pass an enabling law. The earliest version of 
the reform act was filed for congressional debate in second half of 1994 but the EPIRA was 
passed in June 2001. This took more than seven years of congressional hearing and consultations. 
Major reason for the delay in the EPIRA’s enactment is the delicate balancing act between 
protecting the vested interests of the private sector participants and the reform outcomes desired 
by government. (Roxas, 2010) 
(#19→#20→#22) In the Philippines, corruption is rife in the country (Sharma, Madamba, and 
Chan 2004). The Corruption Perceptions Index for Philippines for the year 2001 was 2.9 (0 
represents the worst value and 10 represents the best) (Transparency International, 2001). The 
legal system of the country, despite its liberal leanings, is viewed by the outsiders with 
skepticism. Sharma, Madamba, and Chan (2004) revealed that 71 percent of the 21 
multinationals surveyed viewed Philippine courts as ‘capricious’  
 (#34→#24) SEPO, the Policy Brief 2008 reports that the EPIRA strictly restricted market share 
and cross-ownership in the power industry to prevent market power abuse so that EPIRA limited 
generation companies to a 30% share of the market in a single grid and a 25% share of the 
national grid as shown in Figure 15.  Regarding to cross-ownership, while the EPIRA disallows 
generators of Distribution utilities from participating in the transmission sector, cross-ownership 
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between generator and Distribution utilities is allowed as also shown in Figure 15. ‘Distribution 
utilities were not allowed to source from bilateral power supply contracts more than 50% of its 
total demand from an associated firm engaged in generation but such limitation.’ 
 
  Figure 15 EPIRA clauses on market power abuse and anti-competitive behavior 
Source: Republic Act No. 9136 (http://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/R.A.-9136.pdf) 
 
(#22→#23→#29) The political culture in the Philippines is a critical factor that cannot be 
ignored. There was so much lobbying against strict cross-ownership that is was weakened. Only 
the transmission company was prohibited from owning generation and distribution assets. 
Section45 of EPIRA, under a pretentious premise of promoting true market competition and 
preventing harmful monopoly and market domination, allowed distribution utilities(the main 
buyers of power) to enter into bilateral supply contracts with affiliated generators of up 50% of 
their power requirements. Originally the number of percentage was set as 30% but it became 50% 
by active lobbying of distribution utility companies. The quote is below: 
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A senior senator was against any form of cross-ownership but that would require 
Meralco and Davao Light to divest themselves of generation assets, a sure way to incite 
formidable opposition to the law. He compromised on grandfathering the existing 
generating companies and allowed up to 30% of generation to be bought from a sister 
company. Meralco itself had been lobbying only 35%. It was a mystery how it became 
50% in the last two days of finalizing the law at the bicameral conference committee. 
(Source: David Celestra Tan, (17. Feb. 2014) Article, retrieved from 
http://opinion.inquirer.net/71667/righting-whats-wrong-with-the-epira) 
 
The influence of political factors on deciding budget was also strong. Requests from politicians 
are, almost, compulsory, as they can influence the budget to be granted to the ERC. Thus, any 
request has to be considered and granted in order to maintain good relations with them. 
(#36→#29) EPIRA allowed cross-ownership between generation and distribution companies. 
Thus, most of the winning buyers of NPC generation assets are distribution utilities such as 
Aboitiz, First Holdings, and Clalca. For example, Manila Electric Company (Meralco), the giant 
distribution company with franchise covering most of the main island of Luzon, has figured in 
controversy involving high electric rates. Meralco would hide from the public the fact that it had 
been generating power from its own sister generation companies. The WESM is also an 
indication that the major players in the supply sector are also the main players in the generation 
and distribution sectors such as Aboitiz, Lopez and their foreign counterparts as shown in Table 
23. Limited competition in WESM was caused by market structure with dominant conglomerate 
company owned by Lopez family and Aboitiz. Lopez family had generation assets mainly in 
Visayas and occupied almost 53% of market share.  
Table 23 Market share of dominant generation firm by region   
Region 
Gencos 
Luzon Visayas Mindanao National 
Lopez 19.8% 53% 5.6% 15% 
Aboitiz 12.3% 6.53% 35% 14% 
Source: Roxas(2005b) 
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In distribution also, Meralco the largest distribution utility owned by Lopez family had dominant 
share in Luzon area as monopoly integrated. This is shown in Table 24 below. 
Table 24 Market share of dominant distribution firm by region 
Luzon Visayas Mindanao National 
Lopez – Meralco:largest distribution utility    
 VECO Davao Light&Power Co  
Source Roxas(2005b) 
(#27→#28→#30) Therefore, most of the winning buyers of NPC Gencos are distribution utilities 
such as Aboitiz, First holdings, and Calaca. For example, Manila Electric Company (Meralco), 
the giant distribution company with franchise covering most of the main island of Luzon, has 
figured in controversy involving high electric rates. Meralco would hide from the public the fact 
that it had been generating power from its own sister generation companies (Quezon Power and 
First Gen) and NPC-bought Gencos to a level that may have breached the 50 percent cap and had 
been reneging on its supply contract with NPC. The WESM is also an indication that the major 
players in the supply sector are also the main players in the generation and distribution sectors 
such as Aboitiz, Lopez and their foreign counterparts. EPIRA might have eliminated subsidies 
and unbundled generation, transmission and supply, with over 80% of assets privatized, but the 
liberalization programmer has failed in its affordability objective. Therefore the market status of 
dominant players could be maintained.  
(#39, #60, #57→ #40) Meanwhile, exclusive focus on privatization of generation caused 
relatively slow down of privatization of transmission assets, which led to transmission loss 
problem. Ironically this transmission problem affected the private participation making the 
private investors hesitate investment (Cham 2007). 
(#40→#41→#43, #40→#44) Unfortunately, in the Philippines, very few companies had shown 
the willingness to invest into the power industry. Foreign investors also hesitated to invest in the 
development stages when it was needed the most. Under the proposed industry reform, new 
generation must be constructed by the private sector. However, there was little appealing for 
such investment because of tariff regulation, poor credit and financial difficulties of distribution 
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company. Especially investment in generating capacity was urgently needed in the Visayas and 
Mindanao region, which were experiencing outages due to generating capacity problems. This 
brought out severe economic loss for the national and regional developments. 
4.4 Causality diagram in the Philippines case 
Based on the links of the factors identified in the previous section, the final causality diagram is 
presented in Figure 16 below. From the proposed causality diagram, each element that connected 
to the related factors can be grouped as same category. Here, each category is indicated as a 
domain same with Chile case. Setting aside some external factors and exceptional outliers, the 
result of the causality analysis could be classified into four domains such as:  a) regulatory 
capacity, b) political interference, c) investment expansion and d) competition in the power 
market.  
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Figure 16 Causality diagram on Chile case 
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4.5 Analysis results of the Philippines case 
Causality was investigated separately by following domains that categorized in the previous 
section. Each part of the causality diagram is shown in Figure 17 to Figure 20. In this section, 
whether and how the initial conditions have been overcome by the initial implementation with 
regards to each domain is the main concern in this analysis. Moreover, it was investigated that 
which factors or action in the initial implementation was critically influential based on consistent 
criteria with Chile case. When the factor was mentioned as a critical or important or key element 
by the interviewee in the in-depth interview and also argued in the related literature, it was 
identified as a factor which has high weight in the causality diagram. In case a factor was argued 
by an interviewee or referred from literatures, it was seen as a moderate factor. Even when a 
factor has indirect influence on the other factor, if it has logical validity, I considered that as one 
of the low weighted factor that cannot be ignored in the analysis of the causality diagram. 
4.5.1 Identification of the initial condition 
The initial condition of the Philippines power sector reform could be characterized as frequent 
changes in energy governance, weak regulatory body, insufficient funds for capacity building, 
IPP contracts and its burden to NPC, and vertically integrated monopoly by conglomerate. 
Absence of well-organized political party and family oriented political activities is also a distinct 
feature of the initial condition that influences on the power sector reform.  
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4.5.2 Analysis on the Initial Implementation by domains 
(1) Capacity of regulatory body domain 
 
 
Figure 17 Causality analysis on the Philippines case: capacity of regulatory body domain 
According to Besant-Jones (2006), when the developing countries are adopting power sector 
reform, techno-economic design and implementation issues are main concern that mostly and 
firstly considered. The Philippine also did concern these issues and created ERC as an industry’s 
independent regulator to deal with existing problems. Through a test year and technical 
assistance, ERC changed the electricity rate-setting methodology from traditional return-base to 
performance-based one.  However, the technical assistance from ADB did not effectively raise 
the capacity of the regulatory body. Some weakness in rate setting appeared and the employers 
were lack of knowledges and experiences. After the technical assistance session was over, high 
dependence on the external donor consultants was exposed, showing several shortcomings in 
policy making. This was also caused by failure in attracting qualified and experienced 
professionals when the ERC was established. The salary of the ERC was lower than other 
regulated entities and this brought about movement of experienced professional. New employers 
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who have undergraduate level of education were hired and there was high turnover. Moreover 
the regulatory body’s independence and autonomy was threatened by political appointee of the 
chair and high dependency on government supports.   
(2)  Political interference domain 
 
 
Figure 18 Causality analysis on the Philippines case: Political interference domain 
The result of causality analysis proves the notion that the power sector reform is a political 
process. The political actors sometimes support or oppose the reform. Reform policies are 
implemented within institutional context- utilities, markets, court, and regulatory body. All of 
these policy processes are profoundly influenced by political concerns. Politicians who are 
motivated by popularity from voters and strongly related with existing conglomerates made an 
interest group, which is not quite relevant with economic theory. Thus the regulatory body that 
should have kept the autonomy with transparent and consistent regulation was interfered by 
political concerns such as presidential appointees of chairpersons, decision making matched with 
political objectives. After the power market was opened, involved with privatization of the 
unbundled entities, the decision making process becomes extremely difficult by coalition of 
interest groups. The scheduling of privatization is very sensitive problems to the employers of 
the power company and sometimes it brings about severe backlashes. Therefore, incumbent 
politicians who face on reelection against politicians who oppose the market reform and 
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privatization have a tendency to put the privatization schedules behind. The delay of the 
privatization caused insufficient number of private participants in the market and finally limited 
competition was observed, which was not matched with original objective of the reform.  
(3)  Investment from private investors domain 
 
Figure 19 Causality analysis on the Philippines case: investment expansion domain 
In initial stage of the power sector reform, the Philippines failed to create a reliable environment 
for private investors. This caused underinvestment on generation and finally slowed down the 
privatization process. Meanwhile, exclusive focus on privatization of generation caused 
relatively slow down of privatization of transmission assets, which led to transmission loss 
problem. Ironically this transmission problem affected the private participation making the 
private investors hesitate investment. Financial disability of distribution utilities also influenced 
on the  In addition to that, weak ability of strategic planning on future energy use brought about 
paucity of information to investors who want to invest in generation assets, because there were 
no guideline for them how to allocate their investment resources. Those comprehensive factors 
influenced on the invest environment in the initial stage of the power sector reform and resulted 
in underinvestment. External shock such as Asian Financial Crisis and Enron in 1997 would be 
another critical factor for those unexpected results in the Philippines.  
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(4) Competition in power market domain 
 
Figure 20 Causality analysis on the Philippines case: competition in the power market 
With regard to the establishment of competitive power market after the sector reform, limited 
competition was caused by the market structure with dominant conglomerate company, which 
had already been formulated before the power sector restructuring. As an initial implementation, 
the Philippines mandated the law that disallows cross-ownership between transmission and 
generation to deal with those ownership problems. However, there was a loophole in the law 
clauses that allow cross-ownership between generation and distribution. Besides, the permitted 
ratio of distribution company’s purchasing electricity from bilateral contracts with affiliated 
generation company over the total requirements was raised up to 50% by lobbying and political 
reasons. By the critical impact of the initial condition, the conglomerates could maintain their 
market status and even manipulate the market price. These hindered fair competition and caused 
an entry barrier to newcomers in the power market.  
4.6 The Philippines Summary 
In the Philippines case, the initial condition of the power sector reform could be characterized as 
frequent changes in energy governance, weak regulatory body, insufficient funds for capacity 
building, IPP contracts and its burden to state-owned power company, and vertically integrated 
monopoly by conglomerate. Absence of well-organized political party and family oriented 
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political activities is also a unique feature of the initial condition that influences on the power 
sector reform. Other external factors such as Asian financial crisis, supports from ADB and 
USAID were also reflected on the causality analysis. Philippines had concerns on techno-
economic design of regulation, when the independent regulatory body was created, because the 
regulatory responsibility had been unclear before the power sector reform. Due to the inability of 
funding on capacity building, ADB provided technical assistance but this caused high 
dependence on external consultants without building internal competency. Regulatory body’s 
organizational features for example, salary policy also failed to attract qualified personnel 
because of relatively lower salary than other sector’s utility regulatory body. Moreover the 
regulatory body’s independence and autonomy was threatened by political appointee of the chair 
and high dependency on government supports. These strong political influence is also one of the 
characteristics of the Philippines that hamper the quick decision making process.  Especially in 
the initial stage, there was severe delay in decision making on whether to initiate the reform or 
not, prior to the reform. Before the official enforcement of the reform, the political interest 
groups could had information about the future industry and easily involve in rent seeking 
behavior. Delay intensified the coalition of the interests group, thus delays in decision making 
iterated. In terms of the investment expansion on generation, the Philippines failed to increase 
the private investment by privatizing state-owned generation assets. Due to the risky contract 
with the IPPs made NPC too much focus on generation’s privatization, rather than transmission 
assets. Moreover, with high transmission loss problems, private investors hesitated to invest on 
generation. External shocks such as Asian Financial Crisis and Enron in 1997 also influenced on 
the financial feasibility of Distribution Company who is the main purchaser of the generation and 
deteriorated the investment climate. Consequently, as the number of the private participants in 
wholesale power market, competition in the market was also not fully accomplished. On top of 
that, the Philippines mandated the law that allowed cross-ownership between distribution and 
generation in a certain percent but the permitted ratio of Distribution Company’s purchasing 
electricity from bilateral contracts with affiliated generation company over the total requirements 
was raised up to 50% by lobbying and political reasons.  
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5 Comparative Study 
5.1 Overview 
The research objective to be achieved in this chapter is to clarify the initial implementation and 
design that influence on the initial results by comparing two cases and finally to derive a policy 
implication for better design and implementation of the power sector reform in developing 
countries. For the comparative study in this chapter, the causality analysis results from the 
previous chapter will be utilized to determine the comparable dimension.   
5.2 Comparison on the initial condition 
In this section, the situation of the power sector including power resources and endowments, 
electricity use and demand, existing problems and crisis as a trigger for the reform, and the state-
owned power company’s financial and technical situations will be compared. Moreover, the 
country’s political situation, cultural and organizational background, institutional factors such as 
legislative, executive and judicial institutions were compared as well. Table 25 summarizes the 
comparison on the initial condition and the external factors. 
With regarding to regulatory body in the reform process, two case countries commonly had 
institutional weakness before the reform despite the reason of weakness and background was not 
exactly similar each other. Chile did not have clear and independent regulatory body because 
some part of regulation on power sector had been conducted by state-owned power company. 
The Philippines as well had ambiguous regulation system, which was not well organized. As 
already mentioned by Clemente(2009), power sector reform in developing countries would be 
defined as a capacity building process because reform itself needs human resources to adopt and 
implement new system.  Thus, of course, the capacity building necessitates financial supports to 
undertake reform and authority at least to make smart brains to be maintained in regulatory body 
without other interferences.  
Both case countries mandated laws that included clauses mentioning about establishment of 
power market and its operation. They intended to introduce competition to power market to 
achieve price reduction and general improvements in electricity service, whereas vertically 
integrated monopoly structure by conglomerate was a prevailing feature of power sector in both 
cases. However, only limited competition worked in power markets. Investment through private 
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participation in the power market is meaningful in two aspects. One is for market operation with 
competition and efficiency. In order to make efficient and competitive wholesale power market, 
it should firstly be needed to increase market participants to an enough level. The other one is for 
smooth electricity supply with respond to high electricity demand in developing economy for 
economic growth. Underinvestment on generation capacity in a rapid growing situation cause 
severe threat for the economic growth. 
Table 25 Summary of the comparison on the initial condition 
 Dimension 
Internal Condition 
External  
Condition 
Chile The Philippines Chile Phil 
P
o
w
er
 s
ec
to
r 
si
tu
at
io
n
 
Main resources Water Geothermal     
Electricity use 
Growing demand with 
economic growth 
High demand 
Temporarily decreased 
due to the Asian 
financial crisis 
    
Crisis as a trigger 
Fiscal constraints of state-
owned power company. 
IPP contracts and its 
burden to national power 
company. 
  
1997 
Asian 
crisis 
State-owned power 
company's 
situation 
Conglomerates have been a 
traditional business structure 
Conglomerates owned 
by family 
    
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 s
p
ec
if
ic
 
Legislative and 
executive 
institutions 
Competency in legislation and 
its enforcement  
The legal system is 
viewed by the outsiders 
with skepticism. 
    
Judicial institution         
Custom or general 
norm 
Protectionism on private 
investors 
Family oriented political 
activities 
    
Character of the 
contending social 
interests  
Weak labor union  
Dictatorship under Pinochet  
  
Ideological 
supports 
from US  
  
Administrative 
capabilities  
Unclear responsibility of 
regulatory body, 
Insufficient funds for 
capacity building. 
    
 
5.3 Comparison on the initial implementation 
5.3.1 Capacity of regulatory body domain 
The most contradicting execution in the initial stage of power sector reform in the two cases is 
the way of institutional strengthening process. In Chile, economists studied in Chicago could 
organize their academic circle by funding from the business group and voluntarily develop their 
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neo-liberalism economic ideology, which became the grounded basis of regulation in CNE 
(Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002). Moreover, as Skoknic(2015), Fourcade-Gourinchas and 
Babb(2002) and Rudnick, O’Ryan, and Bravo (2001) mentioned, economists and engineers 
could have political supports by being appointed as advisers in government. On the other hand, 
in the Philippines, the capacity building for the regulatory body was pretty much supported from 
financial loan and technical assistance from ADB and World Bank. That technical assistance 
usually included foreign consultants’ involvement in policy making process. Thus, in some 
extent the autonomy of the country’s decision-making process was limited even after the 
transition period was finished. The staff training and rate-setting methodologies injected by 
external consultants was not able to last long, showing many challenges and difficulties in real 
operation of regulation after all. An impact of political factors cannot be overlooked too. Political 
interference on the regulatory body in the Philippines impeded the independence and 
transparency of the regulation. Chairperson’s and commissioners’ security of tenure was not kept 
because they did not finish the fixed-term appointment. Instead of it, political appointees with no 
background in regulation of public were involved in regulation. Table 26 summarizes the 
analysis above.  
Table 26 Comparison of causality analysis regarding regulatory body 
 Initial Condition Implementation 
Other 
domain’s 
influence 
Result 
C X 
Absence of clear 
regulation governance 
(Box #1,Source: 
Soto(1999), Silva 
(1991)) 
 Economists and engineers 
appointed by government with 
political supports.(Box 
#13,#14,#15 source: interview 
with Skoknic(2015), 
Fourcade-Gourinchas and 
Babb (2002), Rudnick, 
O’Ryan, and Bravo (2001)) 
  Financial supports from 
domestic business groups. 
(Box#11, #12 source: 
Fourcade-Gourinchas and 
Babb (2002)) 
 
O 
Relevant capacity 
of regulatory body 
and advanced 
regulation with 
simple and logical 
rules.(Box #6, 
source: interview 
Philippi(2015) 
P X 
Unclear responsibility 
of regulatory body. 
Insufficient funds for 
capacity building (Box 
 Financial loan and technical 
support from ADB and World 
Bank.(Box #8, source: Pascual 
(2006), Geoffrey Brown, de 
Less 
independ
ence due 
to 
X 
Insufficient ground 
rules for effective 
implementation of 
performance-based 
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#1, #61 source: 
Clemente (2009)) 
Dios, and Valderrama (2016)) 
 High dependence on foreign 
consultants’ involvement in 
policy making process. (Box 
#10, source: Diokno-Pascual, 
(2006), Minogue and Cariño 
(2006), Cariño(2005)) 
political 
interferen
ce(Box 
#7, #20, 
source: 
Johannse
n (2003) 
Minogue 
(2006)) 
regulation 
(Box#12, source: 
Cham (2007),  
Diokno-
Pascual(2006)) 
5.3.2 Political interference domain 
Political factors influence overall reform process, sometimes supporting the process and 
sometimes intervening the smooth progress. Therefore, the pace of progress is critically affected 
by this political issue. Chile’s unbundling process was clear and conducted much faster whereas 
the Philippines experienced severe delay in serial process of power sector reform.  The reason of 
this distinct difference is largely affected by influencing factors in initial stage, which is the 
extent of political interference and decision-making process. As explained in the previous 
chapter, the political background originated from absence of well-organized political party and 
family-based political activities in the Philippines is the most contradicted aspects as initial 
condition. This difference in initial condition caused different decision-making process and 
contradicting environment of political interference. Therefore, it can be concluded that the initial 
condition as political structure and tradition of political activities strongly influence on the result 
of initial stage. Table 27 summarizes the analysis above.  
Table 27 Comparison of causality analysis regarding political interference 
 Initial Condition Initial Implementation Result 
C O 
 
 
X 
3 party separation 
Weak labor union 
(Box #19, 20, 
source: Holburn and 
Spiller(2002)) 
Dictatorship under 
Pinochet  
Less opposition (Box #24, source: 
Anonymity interview) 
Less political interference (Box #17 
source: Reinhardt 2012, Solimano 2012, 
Anonymity interview) 
Political supports (Box #14. Source: 
Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002, 
Interview with Esteban Skoknic) 
 Quick decision-
making(Jadresic 
interview 2015) 
 
 
P X Family oriented 
political activities 
(Box #36, source: 
Cham (2007)) 
 
Delayed decision-making process 
(Box #16, #19 source: (Roxas, 2010)) 
 Coalition of interest 
groups (Box #20, 
source: Minogue 
(2006)) 
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5.3.3 Investment expansion domain 
Investment through private participation in the power market is meaningful in two aspects. One 
is for market operation with competition and efficiency. In order to make efficient and 
competitive wholesale power market, it should firstly be needed to increase market participants 
to an enough level. The other one is for smooth electricity supply with respond to high electricity 
demand in developing economy for economic growth.  
However, the outcomes with regard to the investment expansion showed distinct results in each 
country. In Chile’s initial stage of power sector reform, they could expand new investment on 
generation. The expansion of generation capacity was achieved under implementation of general 
social reforms in security, education system. Especially abundant domestic financial market 
developed by reform in pension fund system critically influenced on establishing financial basis. 
In the Philippines, under EPRIA, the responsibility for new investments in generation was 
transferred from state-owned power company to the private sector. However the financial burden 
and poor management of the distribution companies and technical loss of transmission line 
prevented new investment in power sector. In other world, the market could not provide an 
reliable environment to investors. Pricing signals might not be timely or sufficient incentive for 
new investment in generation. Therefore the successful result in expansion of generation 
capacity should start from well-established sector restructuring first, handling poor initial 
conditions and preparing distribution and transmission. Table 28 summarizes the analysis above.  
Table 28 Comparison of causality analysis regarding investment 
 Initial Condition Implementation 
Other 
domain’s 
influence 
Result 
C X Fiscal constraints 
of state-owned 
power company. 
 General social 
reforms and domestic 
financial basis (Box 
#28, #30 source: 
Schamis (2002),  
 Reliable environment 
by judicial backup 
(Box #18, source: 
Pollitt (2004)) 
 Marginal pricing 
signal to investors 
 O Expansion of new 
investment on 
generation  (Box 
#28,#29,#33,#38 
source: interview with 
Philippi(2015), 
UNCTD (2009), Read 
and Rudnick(2000)) 
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(Box #35, #36 
Schweppe et al, 
(1988)) 
p X IPP contracts and 
its burden to 
national power 
company. (Box 
#33, #49 source:  
Roxas(2005a), 
Sharma et. 
al.(2004)) 
 Unreliable investment 
environment  and 
marginal pricing 
signal(Box #60, 
source: Cham(2007)) 
 Slowdown of 
privatization of 
transmission assets 
(Box #39, source: 
Cham(2007)) 
 Renegotiation of  
contracts, risk 
reduction with long-
term contract(Box 
#32, source: check) 
Global 
economic 
changes such 
as Fixed 
exchange rate, 
depression of 
Peso, high 
fuel price(Box 
#32, source:  
Roxas(2005a)) 
X Insufficient investment 
on generation. (Box 
#40, source: 
Cham(2007)) 
 
Slowdown of 
privatization. (Box 
#45, source: 
Cham(2007)) 
 
5.3.4 Competition in the power market domain 
Conglomerates in both cases have been a traditional business structure and especially in the 
Philippines the conglomerates owned by family. Vertically integrated monopoly structure by the 
conglomerate was a prevailing feature of the power sector in both cases. By mandating the power 
sector reform both countries intended to introduce competition into power market to achieve 
price reduction and general improvements through the competition in electricity service. 
Therefore, both case countries mandated laws that included clauses mentioning about 
establishment of power market and its operation with competition.  However, the legislated law 
provisions had shortcomings and difficulties in controlling abuse of market power because of 
some flaws in law allowed the existing conglomerates to keep their market power. In Chile, 
Water Code and the Electricity Law bestowed water right to Endesa. Allowed cross-ownership 
based on EPIRA in the Philippines would be the example of flaw. Thus, existing conglomerate 
and traditional family business groups who had maintained their market status and property right 
in the power market cleverly used the legal shortcomings. This common inappropriate result in 
terms of competition among power players shows how difficult it is to break the existing power 
of conglomerates. The inappropriate initial condition with market structure and its ownership of 
conglomerate which was assigned and characterized before the reform finally caused limitation 
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of competition in the market. However, only limited competition worked in power markets. 
Table 29 summarizes the analysis above.  
Table 29 Comparison of causality analysis regarding power market 
 
Initial Condition Implementation 
Other 
domain’s 
influence 
Result 
C X 
Conglomerates have 
been a traditional 
business structure(Box 
#39, source:Fernando 
Lefort (2004), Lefort 
and Walker(1999)) 
Flaws in law: Water Code, 
Electricity Law (Box#41, #42 
source (Larrain and Schaeffer 
(2010)) 
 
X 
Failure in 
establishing 
competitive power 
market 
P X 
Conglomerates owned 
by family (Box  
Flaws in EPIRA: Allowed 
cross-ownership between 
distribution and generation. 
(Box #34, #24, source: 
SEPO(2008)) 
Political 
factors: 
Corruption 
and 
lobbying(Box 
#22, #23, 
source: 
SEPO(2008)) 
X 
Failure in 
establishing 
competitive power 
market (Box #27, 
#29, source: article 
David Tan 2014) 
 
5.4 Summary of the comparative study 
5.4.1 Findings from comparative case study 
From the comparative study conducted in this chapter using causality analysis in two case 
countries, similarities and differences in each stage were investigated. Some similarities were 
found in Chile and the Philippines and some differences also notified by the comparison. These 
kinds of generalization between Chile and the Philippines help us conclude some policy 
implications for better design and implementation of the power sector reform, though it has 
country specific situations. 
5.4.2 Implication 
First, appropriate implementation of the reform policy could lead to better results even though 
the initial condition is in a bad situation. From the case study of Chile, Chile’s success in power 
sector reform is guided by general principles, including promoting investment, ensuring fair 
competition, protecting the environment, and satisfying basic social needs, and by capable 
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regulation. Especially the initial implementation shown in the example of regulatory body’s 
capacity and increased investments contribute to overcome the bad initial condition and lead to a 
successful result of the reform.  
Second, the way and the source of capacity building critically matters for the regulatory body. 
Too much dependence on technical assistance by multilateral institutions in developing countries 
might cause insufficient level of capacity building and have a chance to impede the autonomy of 
the regulation. Developing countries, therefore, should have assessment procedure to evaluate 
their capacity building outcomes in their way. Furthermore, they have to prepare the efficient 
way to maintain the effect of capacity building program and try to develop their own capacity by 
themselves. These policy implications from this study would be applicable. First, to increase 
regulatory body’s internal competency and consider the various local contexts, enhance the 
partnership with local universities and research organizations, NGOs, and local experts. Second, 
recruitment of highly qualified staff at the regulatory agencies is a main concern. Incentives 
should be considered, including improved salary schemes for regulators and use of external 
consultants for highly specialized tasks. Third, rather than attempting to extract useful lessons 
from the developed-country settings, referring other developing countries in a similar condition 
would be more adoptable.  
Third, setting up a reliable environment for investors to enter into a newly opened wholesale 
power market is fundamental for the expansion of investment in initial stage of the reform. 
Especially the financial soundness of sector should firstly be accompanied with. Radical reform 
without preparation periods should be avoided and developing countries need to build a social 
and financial basis before the power sector reform.  
In Chile and the Philippines, lack competition in the power market was common phenomenon 
even after the power sector reform. Therefore, developing countries who want to introduce 
power sector reform have to really carefully check their market system and prepare a system to 
restrict and mitigate the power of dominant players. To attract more private investment in power 
market, these policy implications from this study below would be applicable: 
1. More focus on distribution reform and privatization of distribution first, while improving 
the Transmission &Distribution loss.  
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2. Create a system to restrict and mitigate the power of dominant players in the power 
market.  
 
Fourth, political factors are very critical in all processes of the reform. All selections in the 
process are finally led to political problems. If something is decided, some groups oppose and 
some other groups support it. Special attention is needed to building and sustaining political 
coalition that favor reform.  
6 Conclusion 
6.1 Conclusion 
Through case studies and their comparative analysis, this study showed the roles of policy design 
and implementation in the initial stage of power sector reform in developing counties. Main 
findings can be summarized as follows: 
First, common unfavorable initial conditions that developing countries faced in their power 
sector reforms are identified. That is 1) limited capacity of the regulatory bodies, 2) lack of 
investments to infrastructure and business, 3) market power of the country’s dominant 
conglomerate, and 4) political intervention.  
Second, we could clarify that reform design and implementation that critically influence on some 
of the unfavorable initial conditions that developing countries often face in their power sector 
reforms. First of all, careful design and implementation can overcome unfavorable initial 
conditions for capacity building in regulatory body and provide incentives for investment in 
business and infrastructure, while shortcomings in policy design and implementation lead to 
inappropriate initial results. Most of all, it is difficult to avoid political interference and to ensure 
competition in market by policy design and implementation. 
Third, we can conclude that in power sector reforms in developing countries, policy design and 
implementation need to be done considering the following aspects. 
Since power sector reform can be done in step by step, goals in the initial stage are not 
necessarily full competition in power market in developing countries, where political 
interventions are difficult to avoid.  
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Aids in knowledge and money are necessary, but capacity building of the regulatory body 
should be carefully designed so that the given resources strengthen domestic capacity and the 
recipient country ensure their own pace of the power sector reform, not just following the 
textbook model 
For establishing favorable investment environment, legal and judicial backups carefully 
designed considering the whole power sector’s provision across the entire electricity 
landscapeare effective to overcome lack of investments. We emphasize these are especially 
important in power sector since connection among generation, transmission and distribution 
matters in the sector.  
Even when it leaves rooms for benefiting conglomerate or political intervention, successful 
initial results can be achieved if the decision making is done in a speedy manner.  
6.2 Contribution of this study 
Deeper understanding with new approach 
This research has contributed to deeper understanding on the initial stage of power sector reform, 
which is a new approach to more focus on the initial stage of the power sector reform.  
This research has clarified the importance of the initial stage of the power sector reform. Careful 
design and implementation can overcome unfavorable initial conditions, while shortcomings lead 
to inappropriate initial results. 
Applicability to the other developing country 
Based on this research, several policy implications are presented. It would be practical tips on 
improving implementation and design of power sector reform program in developing countries. 
Initial stage of the developing countries power sector reform could be a mid-way process that 
shows both monopoly and competitive market structure in the sector at the same time. Every 
developing country which has possibility to start the reform in the future might have to undertake 
this this period. Focusing on the initial stage of Chile and the Philippines are meaningful 
approach because the target of developing countries power sector reform cannot be 
accomplishing fully competitive market in a short time. 
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6.3 Limitation and Future Work 
Limitations 
This study has targeted two case countries and it may be difficult to determine the difference 
because it might be originated from the characteristics of the country. This is the weakness of the 
case study that can be generalized, but it is expected that if more depth study is conducted further, 
it will be able to offer more and better policy implications.  
In this research, the post-initial stage of the power sector reform was a kind of validation process 
that proves the importance of the initial stage. As more intensified and complicated factors 
appeared in the post-initial stage of the reform, the relationship among the result of the reform 
and its influences on the post-initial stage should be more complicated. This study is mainly 
based on the in-depth interview about initial stage; therefore, the connection between initial stage 
and the post-initial stage was relatively weak part. If further reviews and data collection on the 
post-initial stage followed, this could more contribute to verifying importance of the initial stage 
in power sector. 
Further works 
Based on the limitations of this research as well as observations made throughout the progression 
of this research, following suggestions for future research are made.  Based on these findings and 
extra initial factors in power sector reform, a checklist for developing countries could be 
developed. Moreover, since the findings of this research were based on analysis of qualitative 
data, conducting a quantitative study to strengthen the findings of this research through more 
accurate validation measures would be an appropriate next research step. 
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APPENDIX A.   
Interview Survey in the Philippines 
1. Purpose of Visiting 
My research topic is about deregulation and privatization in power sector which has been 
started from Chile, UK, and Australia and until now has been a hot topic in Asian countries to 
follow the reforms. Among the Asian countries, the Philippines had restructured their power 
sector through the promulgation of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) in 2001. 
The Philippines government targeted more efficient market and encouraged greater 
competition by the EPIRA, which was technically designed and financially supported by ADB, 
but this has not resulted in the desired outcomes.  
In this situation, I would like to meet experts in ADB and interview them about overall history 
and current situation of the power reform in the Philippines. The main purpose of this visiting 
was to identify what kinds of supports were given to the Philippines and what they learned 
from the Philippines and to examine the validity of the existing hypothesis by exploratory 
research.  
 
2. Interviewer 
Minju Kim(Author), Professor Shunsaku Komatsuzaki  
 
3. Visited Places and Interviewees 
I visited ADB headquarter office in Manila to have interviews with ADB experts who have 
various working experiences in energy and power sector.  Furthermore, I had visited the 
University of the Philippines and Asian Institute of Management. These below are visiting 
institutions and the interviewees. 
① ADB: Jong-Inn Kim, Kee-Yung Nam, Sohail Hasnie 
② the University of the Philippines, Dilliman: Helena S. Valderrama 
③ Asian Institute of Management: Fernando Roxas 
 
4. Dates of Visit 
19. Jan. 2013. – 23. Jan. 2013.  
 
5. Interview Summary 
 
1) For the common questions 
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I asked all interviewees about overall history and current situation of the reform, the role of the 
ADB, and what the ADB learned from the experiences in the Philippines. Experts in ADB said 
that the assessment on the Philippines's deregulation in power sector should not be said to be 
failed. It is now in the process and still going on the real world though electricity price is still 
high and power supply is also not stable. In the process of the technical and financial assistant 
from ADB, they generally provided the same model with UK and Chile’s case. I assumed that 
roadmap design provided by ADB had influenced the result of the reform, but interviewees 
mentioned ADB only gave funding and advices and government made their own decision 
independently. About the lessons from the Philippines’s case, long-term phase plan was 
introduced in Vietnam on the contrary to the Philippines’ one-way roadmap planning.   
For the successful reform, it should satisfy three measurements on supply security, 
accessibility and affordability. Though there is no common rule for the reform process because 
it is very country specific and does not have conclusions to be answered, assessment on these 
three measurements is needed with regards to both ex-ante and ex-post.  
 
2) Other Issues 
 
 Internal Motivation VS. External Force 
Internal motivation is critical element of the successful power sector reform. When we 
approach the power sector reform, whether an internal motivation exists or not is one of the 
most important key factors. External forces easily distort the reform. In the Philippines’ power 
reform, the initial motivation was from the debts of National Power Company. We should 
focus on the interaction between the internal motivation and external forces. 
 
 Current Situation in Power Sector Reform over Southeast Asian Countries. 
About the Validity of power sector reform, it should be investigated by the country because 
reform is very ‘country specific’ process. If the reform satisfies the ultimate goal to make 
competitive wholesale market, the reform should be introduced. However, we need to carefully 
approach each case with holistic methods.  
 In many Southeast Asian countries starting to restructure the power sector, it is important to 
apply previous experiences to a new country by making an Asian Model which is different 
from European Model.  
According to Dr. Nam, ADB Economist, the most challenging part of the research on the 
power reform would be obtaining data from each country, especially in Kyrgyzstan and 
Georgia.  
  6-117 
 
Power Reforms in Southeast Asia and its characteristics 
 
 
 Existence of Mega-conglomerate (Lopez Family and MERALCO) 
In the process of the reform and also thereafter, the Philippines has been struggle with controlli
ng of Meralco, the Philippines’ dominant power distributor. Meralco has affected the country’s
 severe economic inefficiencies and underscores, and is still strongly controlled 
by a conglomerate, Lopez family. This powerful Lopez family, franchise owner and largest sha
reholder of Meralco , holds 33.4% of the stake. Lopez family also maintains the largest number
 of seats on the power distribution company’s 11-member board. 
 
 Political backgrounds 
The Philippine Government has had a long history of treating electricity prices as a political va
riable. Subsidies on electricity rates may sway populist sentiments but they make matters wors
e.  
  
  6-118 
APPENDIX B.   
Interview Survey in Chile 
1. Dates of Visit 
23. Jan. 2015. – 04. Feb. 2015.  
 
2. Interviewer 
Minju Kim(Author), Professor Shunsaku Komatsuzaki  
 
3. Visited Places and Interviewees 
 Washington D.C.  
Federico Basanes (IDB) 
Emilio Sawada (IDB) 
Christian Gischler (IDB) 
Shohei Tada (IDB) 
 Santiago, Chile 
Alejandro Jadresic (Former Minister, Professor Universidad Adolfo Ibanez) 
Ronald Fischer (Professor, Universidad de Chile) 
Mitsubishi Corporation(Noriaki Takano, Masahiko Kinugawa) 
Bruno Philippi (Former executive secretary of CNE) 
Raimundo Soto(Professor, Universidad Catolica de Chile) 
Patricio Mansilla (IDB) 
Esteban Skoknic (Expert, Former worker in ENDESA) 
Takashi Ito (JICA, Santiago) 
 
4. Interview note 
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Meeting Note #1 
Date: 2015. 28. January 
Time: 16:30~17:30 
Place: Anonymity 
Interviewee: Anonymity (A) 
Interviewer: Minju Kim(M) , Shunsaku Komatsuzaki(K) 
 
<A>: I have a couple of questions before starting on my side.  I was following from the ‘80s until 
2007 infrastructure in general, basically in the south countries.  But more specifically, regarding the 
electricity sector, we started to looking at the more details starting from 2007 because we had a 
reorganization here in the IDB.  We were based on geographical distribution so far and starting from 
2007 we were divided in division by sector.  I started more concentration in energy sector, in 2007.  
My first question is I know nothing about Philippine electricity sector.  How is the situation of the 
sector and when did they started the reform? 
<K>: 2001 embarked a new act, new law called EPIRA and then it has been passed more than 10 
years and then they faced very price hiking and they are suffering from lacking of new investment for 
generation to make their economic development fully accomplished.  Many researchers say Philippines 
case is not that successful compared to Chilean case, so.  But this is the current situation, but as 
many references say Chilean case was evaluated as positive. 
<A>: Okay.  2001, okay.  Let me have one other different comment.  I prefer not to be quoted in 
your paper. 
<K>: Okay. 
<A>: You can take the ideas whatever you want because we are public servant of the institution I 
prefer not to be quoted. 
<K> 
All right. 
<A>: Please. 
<M> 
Okay. 
<A>: In Latin America, several countries followed the reform being Chile, one of the first coming into 
the reform.  At that time, a group of very young professionals, Chicago Boys started the reform, not 
only in this field, but in the economic in general, in Chile.  Part of the reform of electricity sector in 
Chile is not only sectorial reform, but a general reform of the economy.  This is one important 
statement.  Hernán Büchi was the Minister of Finance at the time.  He was less than 40, I think, just 
graduated Chicago Boy, with the group.  We started with market-oriented reform.  The context is I 
think important.  I don’t know in the case of Philippines it’s just electricity or energy sector but it was 
the general reform. 
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<K> 
Seeking for general reform. 
<A>: There would be some parallel in that.  Argentina followed and Brazil as well, Colombia but I 
think Chile started earlier.  Looking to the past, in general, I would say the reform was successful but 
at the same time, after 20 years on, 20 year plus of the new regime, new challenges are arising 
because of the reform.  This is if you would, the concentration of the power of the market in few 
players and very limited instruments from the government’s side to overcome special situations.  The 
government doesn’t have so much control on the market.  They can provide incentives to have a more 
power generation, trying to reduce the electricity costs and tariffs, but the end market created based 
on the law is what is leading the market. 
Chile has today one of the most expensive electricity prices in the region.  It started to affect the 
competitiveness of the productive sector, being the copper industry one of them.  In the copper 
industry, or mining in general, you have 25%, 30% of the cost of the production is electricity.  If you 
compare copper, Chile and Peru is very interesting to compare.  They are producing the same thing 
for international market, but the portion of the electricity cost in Chile is at least twice higher than 
Peru, the energy costs.  It’s starting to affect the competitiveness of the copper industry.  So on in the 
other industries as well. 
For Chile, it’s very important, this discussion on how-to handle the long-term future, to have less 
oligopolistic market and to have more players in the market, so more competition that could reduce 
the price of the energy.  That’s the challenge of this government.  You know that under the market 
mechanism, every company is free to identify new power plant, hydro plant, thermal plant or 
whatever.  Put that in the process of the environmental licenses and to have a compromise to the 
government saying for that year, this plant will start operating.  But during the process, environmental 
license is getting more and more complicated too, to be approved.  One of the cases is the HidroAysén 
project.  I don’t know if you have heard about that. 
<M> HidroAysén, the southern part of system. 
<A>: Yeah.  This is a huge hydro plant that was key in the power sector because it is renewable but it 
was stopped, the process of the project because of environmental problem.  The private company that 
was pushing the project abandoned the project because the government said; we won’t support the 
project anymore.  Then you have a lack of 2000 megawatts.  In a country which does which the peak 
demand is nine, so it’s huge. 
But what happens in the market?  Because of the delay of this huge project, new project has to be 
developed, but the prices are going up, but the private company doesn’t lose money because the tariff 
is adjusted.  This is the complicated part when you have everything on the hand of the market.  They 
made the effort.  But at the end if you look at the balance sheet, they are not losing money.  But the 
government doesn’t have an instrument to put new generation because the government doesn’t have 
any public utility company, no one. 
Now they are starting to reinforce the company, ENAP.  ENAP is the public oil company.  They have 
some own generation for the processes in the finance, for example.  They are changing the law to 
allow them to be a better – more big player in the energy sector as well, through cogeneration and 
other plans.  This is one of the actions. 
The other natural trend of the market was the renewable, wind power and solar, PV, photovoltaic, 
they are increasing now.  This is the new act, which are generating more competition.  If you look at – 
if you Google papers regarding the diagnosis of this power system in Chile, you will find many of them, 
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very good, that I can send you later some of the name of the papers.  Most of them are in Spanish, 
but very good diagnosis view from the government, from the opposition parties, from the regulator 
side, from academician.  At least 7 to 10 very good papers with a lot of information about this 
diagnosis. 
I mentioned the mining sector, which is one of the interested parties in generating more competition 
in the energy sector.  They started to be partners in new projects in renewables.  For example, they 
have 50% of the equity in certain projects for solar and wind power, and even this intermittent power 
supply, and they assume the risk to cover the difference buy from the spot market, even though they 
prefer to have that and not to rely only on the few four or five big players.  That’s the situation. 
In summary, going to the question, if this is successful, yes, but during certain period of time, in 
which they didn’t have any major deployments was very good.  But when a very special situation – 
stress situation arise, market only, or market 100% dangerous for the country in the long-term. 
The problem started in the middle 2000, when Argentina – I am from Argentina, we got the gas 
supply from Argentina to Chile.  This is because it was the consequence of the 2001 default on the 
debt, inflation, huge devaluation, the government wanted to keep the inflation low, so they frozen all 
the tariff of electricity, gas, water any supply and then there was no incentive to the gas exploitation 
companies to produce more gas. 
Then the gas required special annual permission for export.  Argentina government prohibited the 
export of gas.  Then, suddenly, Chile was relied on gas from Argentina and there was no gas, so they 
started to replace the gas for fuel oil, which is very expensive and coal, which is very problematic for 
contamination.  The government didn’t have the way to react to that because market was [Unclear] 
defining in which field to invest. 
For that kind of situation, market mechanisms are not strong enough.  At the end the impact goes to 
the market, market goes to prices, and prices go to consumers, and to the industries.  Then it affects 
the competitiveness of the whole economy.  The studies reflect that 0.5 of the GDP growth rate could 
be affected for the situation of energy in Chile, right now, so it’s affecting a lot. 
<M> 
GDP growth. 
<A>: Yeah.  This is in summary, the view of… 
<K> 
Where there some kind of domination by few players or were not able to be predicted at the time of 
the power sector reform in late ‘70s? 
<A>: In the late ‘70s and the ‘80s, I think the situation of our previous reform was so inefficient that 
the people involved in the reform don’t see so much detail of what could happen in 20 years ahead.  
You have to solve the situation in the past.  The same thing happens in Argentina.  We are talking 
about electricity system in which the losses – technical and non-technical losses was more than 30%.  
Most of the sector was controlled by the very inefficient public utilities.  In that situation, the 
concentration of the reform is how to overcome that situation.  The electricity losses now in Chile are 
less than 10%, the average of a normal country.  During several years, a couple of decades the result 
was relatively good. 
<K> 
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Probably, from considering the result, the government should have kept some power on the policy-
making on power sector? 
<A>: Yes, probably the answer looking into the past is that even if we have complete reform, the 
state government should keep some instrument or a company to have the possibility to challenge 
when the oligopolistic situation happens in the market.  Chile has there. 
In Argentina, we had a complete reform, most of the power generation went to private sector and 
distribution company, most of them also went to private sector, but nuclear was kept by the 
government.  By national, large dams Argentina, we have two, one with Uruguay Salto Grande is 
almost 2000 megawatt and with Paraguay, 2800 megawatts, Yacyretá dam these are public. 
Several of the smaller public utilities at provincial level, local government level were still in the hands 
of the public sector.  Chile is a small country.  They don’t have a federal structure, so they don’t have 
provincial utilities.  In Argentina, we do have that.  In Argentina, after the devaluation, the 
government started to shift and created a new public company and started to increase the presence of 
the public sector in the power sector.  Now, the situation is very special and complicated in Argentina.  
This is another problem. 
<K> 
Generally, for instance, very large players like in Japan, we have TEPCO.  TEPCO is a private company, 
but very closely tied with the national policy.  I’m not sure, the Endesa or Enersis is also a huge 
company, but is there no influence from the government on the Enersis activity. 
<A>: Well, they try to follow the government policy from time to time, but at the end they are private 
companies and their major objective is to get dividends.  If the system allows that, they will do that, 
unless the government started with new changes in the focus. 
The new government that started in March last year, the new Bachelet Administration, is trying to do 
the changes.  For example, if you follow in the web pages, the Ministry of Energy, you will see they 
are trying to elaborate 2050 target strategy with a very wide consensus in the country. 
For example, one of the problems is that most of the new projects are not located in Santiago area.  
Santiago is half of the country.  But the local government and the local community are against new 
power plants, hydro, thermal, or whatever, because they are receiving all the negative impact of 
environment, but the benefit of the plant goes to Santiago.  He’s trying to create a new distribution of 
taxes so part of the benefit of the project is kept locally.  You instead have some support, at municipal 
level, at city level to have the plant, even coal plant, if you have some additional revenue, but this is 
changing the philosophy of how to develop new plants.  That’s one of the example of how to, how new 
government is trying to handle the situation. 
<K> 
Do you have any idea about the reason why that Chile had initial success and the other countries in 
Latin America didn’t have even initial success?  Or I should say initial success for just few years and 
then, went to the worse situation.  At least Chile had 10, or 15, or 20 years for successful period and 
after that Chile is now struggling.  But initially Chile had better situation than other countries.  Do you 
have any idea about the reason? 
<A>: Well, that’s a very difficult question to answer.  I will leave you to you to make the investigation, 
but focus in the political situation after the reform and who was in charge of the government in the 
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first, let’s say, a decade after the change.  How the politics involved, if there was one type of 
government and leftist, and then rightist, or military, or whatever, that’s one. 
Second, the presence and the impact of the labor union.  For example, in Argentina labor union are 
very important.  That’s part of the balance of power. 
<M> 
But in Chile, they don’t. 
<A>: In Chile, they change, the government, the government they started in the late ‘70s and there 
was one decade of military government until 1999.  Even after the change from military government 
to the civil government, this was not discussed so the economic trend was to stay the same.  This was 
very long-term stability in the rules. 
<M> 
How about Chicago Boys’ influence on the future conditions? 
<A>: It was key, yeah. 
<M> 
The technocrat like, but… 
<A>: Yeah, same thing, yeah. 
<M> 
That could make a stable pursuement [ph] of the new policy. 
<A>: At the end, if the situation previous to reforms, the worst is the problem, the better the 
possibility of success because you fill the gap.  Starting from a very bad situation before, you change 
that and you start feeling relief because you don’t have power outage.  It’s more stable and people 
are happy even today, more, if they have the service. 
Let’s take the example of Uruguay, which is a neighbor country of Argentina.  The structure is almost 
the same.  But they didn’t go to the path of the reform.  The public utility UTE is a 100 years old 
company, public, vertically integrated.  They control generation, transmission, and distribution.  Why 
they didn’t privatize that?  It went to the referendum on several times and it didn’t have success in 
trying to change that. 
They opened a little bit of participation for public sector for renewables, for power, for wind power and 
for solar energy.  That was it.  The reason behind – if you look at the past, is because even at the end 
of a very powerful labor union, inefficiency in the company and the situation was not that bad as 
Argentina.  It was bad, but not that bad.  Even today, nobody talks about privatization of UTE, the 
public utility.  That’s – for example, power losses is in the level of 15% or 16%.  There is a room of 
improvement, but it’s not 30%.  If the company was in that bad situation probably, the public opinion 
will support to have a huge change from here to here because of the previous bad situation. 
<K> 
That sounds very similar to the situation in Costa Rica. 
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<A>: Yeah.  We see successful stories because probably the previous was really, really bad.  You 
have room for improvement that is noticeable for the consumers.  Yeah, they will support that, yeah. 
On the other hand, you will see cases of very efficient public companies.  We just had [Unclear] in the 
region.  The general idea is that private is efficient, public by definition is bad.  But look at the EPM 
case in Colombia, Empresas Públicas de Medellín.  EPM is the case of public company, 100% public, 
but they act as private.  They even have investment abroad. 
It is possible to have public sector companies with high efficiency.  Little bit less than that is the case 
of Ecuador.  Ecuador used to be private, half private half public, but under the Correa Administration, 
they started to change and renationalized almost everything in the electricity sector, because they 
consider that strategic.  Being strategic, they want to have the control.  They had an average of 25% 
of public.  I use the example of power losses because it’s one of very good objective indicator. 
In Ecuador, the average of power losses was more than 25, 7 years ago.  After that, they nationalized, 
renationalized, but they reduced from that level to 12% of being public, not private.  There is a way to 
have a more efficient power sector even in the public sector, which is the key.  What is the main factor 
for these changes?  Political decision.  The political decision to put in jail whoever is taking an 
[Unclear].  Usually when you have a public sector company and politicians in charge of all these 
irregular connections, because of political problem, but in the case of Ecuador, Correa decided to have 
an intervention and he’s very strict on that.  That’s political decision. 
<M> 
But we cannot say we are going back to the nationalized era in Chilean case, we cannot say that. 
<A>: No, we’re not thinking in such huge transformation, but there is a consensus in the public that 
something has to be done, something that compensates this small group of energy oligopoly with the 
new players, including the government as one more player to balance that.  If the public sector is not 
willing to do it, I will do it.  That’s the reaction of the government.  This is because it is starting to 
affect the growth – the GDP growth of the country, the whole country.  They have to do something. 
<K> 
I think there is no 100% answer to the power sector reform.  Some country takes the private way, 
and some country takes the public way.  The public way, there can be an efficient public company, 
even though, that the company and the country has efficient public company, but I think it also made 
some private investment for more development of generation of power. 
<A>: Yeah.  It’s not black and white, exactly.  The other key factor is when you privatize, 100% or 
part of the system, you have to have on the regulation side, public servants, technically strong well-
paid, and well-paid is very important because otherwise you create corruption opportunities.  That’s 
part of the package.  You cannot have private sector run public utilities, if you don’t have a regulation, 
appropriate regulation in place. 
<M> 
Regarding to the regulation in Chilean case, when they make… 
<A>: Was relatively good but there is certain things that is part of the discussion.  They changed from 
governing government and then Minister of Energy is after he finished his mandate goes to the private 
sector, being the president of a power utility and then he comes back.  That’s created a conflict of 
interest.  There is no way to avoid that. 
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<K> 
The Minister of Energy becomes like CEO of… 
<A>: That could be important officer of a private sector.  For example, the current president of ENAP, 
the public oil company, Marcelo Tokman used to be Minister of Energy.  He went back to the private 
sector for 4, 5 years, and he was working for Vestas, the wind power company and he came back now 
to the ministry.  That happens.  That happens everywhere. 
<K> 
They also have good [Unclear]. 
<A>: Yeah. 
<M> 
How about the workers of the regulatory body?  In CNE, how the employees were organized at that 
time? 
<A>: Well, I think at the beginning it was very weak.  I don’t remember the details of that.  Today, 
it’s relatively strong and well organized and good counterpart to the private sector.  But at the 
beginning, I’m not sure.  But… 
<K> 
Yeah, sometimes there is an asymmetry of information between the regulatory body and the real 
operator of the power sector and generally the real operator has more experience and knowledge. 
<A>: Yes, exactly.  The new government, the new Minister of Energy is just working on that, saying 
private sector has better information, better quality of information than the regulator.  He wants to 
have the same level of information.  He is creating a huge unit in the CNE, strengthening that unit of 
information to have homogeneous information because the information now is spread out in the 
dispatching center, in the ministry, in the CNE, in the local government.  He wants to have every 
information with the same rule of more homogeneous information and open to the public. 
<K> 
Yeah, there are several solutions to that problem and I think Japan takes a different way.  Japan 
utilizes self-regulation by the real operator, like TEPCO so the public regulator doesn’t have a lot of 
information like the TEPCO.  But TEPCO is somehow forced to do self-regulation, so I think that self-
regulation works in Japan, but I think it’s very different from the Chilean case.  In Chile, the 
government, or the CNE tries to regulate more effectively by collecting more information in it. 
<A>: Yeah. 
<K> 
But it’s very difficult to get the updated information, keep collecting most updated information.  I think 
that’s why the Japanese government utilized self-regulation.  But, of course, it didn’t work in the 
Fukushima accident. 
But I think her focus is basically on such capacity of regulatory body and maybe the capacity of 
operators like Endesa, for instance.  There should be some difference in that capacity between the 
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Chilean case and the Filipino case.  In Philippine, I think regulatory body didn’t have or I should say 
less knowledge or capacity than CNE. 
<A>: Yeah.  How big – how large is CNE in Philippines? 
<K> 
CNE has about 250 employees in it. 
<A>: How large is the system?  How many megawatts is the system? 
<K> 
Do you remember that? 
<M> 
In Philippine? 
<A>: Yeah. 
<M> 
Three times of Chile? 
<K> 
It should be more because the population is almost 30 times. 
<A>: The population of Philippine is 60 million, right? 
<K> 
Yeah. 
<A>: Chile is 15 so it’s four times.  Much more complicated because of the islands. 
<K> 
Philippine has a lot of islands.  But the number of employees would be okay, but the problem is quality. 
<A>: Quality, yeah. 
<K> 
I think, do you have something? 
<A>: No, it’s okay.  My suggestion about the research in Chile, if you go today, with the government, 
the government is too busy now in this transformation, with the new government that has started last 
year.  You have more people willing to talk to you and contribute to your research and academic field.  
You will find in the academic field people with my age, not that young like you guys, that knows in 
real-time what happens in… 
<K> 
Yeah. 
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<A>: Because I don’t remember the time.  It started in the ‘70s. 
<K> 
Yeah, Christian [ph] suggested the name of Professor Rodrigo Palma. 
<A>: Yeah, Rodrigo Palma is a good case. 
<K> 
We are going to meet Ronald Fischer. 
<A>: Okay.  If you meet Ronald Fischer, you will have one of top. 
<M> 
Do you know Jadresic? 
<A>: Jadresic, yeah, as well. 
<M> 
He is the former Minister of energy. 
<A>: Before talking to Jadresic or Palma, what I would suggest is to try to read the reports, I 
mentioned. 
<M> 
The diagnosis of reform. 
<A>: Yeah, because a lot of information is there, and so you start the conversation with higher level 
based on more accurate information and updated information. 
<K> 
All right.  Do you have any other ideas about someone to meet in Santiago? 
<A>: If you talk to Jadresic, I don’t know him direct, but I read in papers, read about him and 
Rodrigo Palma, I think you have the tops.  Yeah. 
<K> 
Okay.  That would be fine. 
<A>: They can introduce some of the people, perhaps. 
<K> 
Okay.  We are going to meet the Professor in the Universidad, Adolfo… 
<A>: Adolfo Ibañez. 
<K> 
Ibañez.  Jadresic. 
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<M> 
Jadresic is the professor of Ibañez. 
<A>: Yes. 
<K> 
Tomorrow, right? 
<A>: Yeah, okay.  He is the writer of some of these papers as well, yeah of the diagnosis. 
<M> 
Okay.  Can we have those papers? 
<A>: Yeah, I will send you the links of the papers. 
<K> 
Great, thank you very much. 
<M> 
Oh, thank you very much. 
<K> 
I think you can download it in Atlanta maybe, when we transit. 
<M> 
But is it written in Spanish? 
<A>: Everything is Spanish. 
<K> 
You can utilize the Google translator. 
<M> 
Google translator. 
<K> 
Spanish English would be okay.  Japanese English is terrible. 
<A>: Do you have any contact in CEPAL? 
<K> 
CEPAL, I met some last time I visited.  I think I met them for another research about the regional 
integration.  I think they are very different from her research interest. 
<A>: But in CEPAL there are people with knowledge of Chilean transformation. 
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<K> 
Oh, really.  Do you have any name in CEPAL? 
<A>: No, not now, but CEPAL continues to work on the power sector, beyond integration.  That could 
be another possibility. 
<K> 
CEPAL.  You may ask Daniel [ph] to contact past interviewees? 
<M> 
Yeah, actually I tried to contact someone in CEPAL, but they are having summer vacation. 
<A>: Yeah, summer vacation is going on. 
<K> 
Okay, that’s fine.  Do you think is it useful to meet someone in CNE?  Maybe we should meet the 
academic people. 
<A>: Yeah.  My suggestion is because what you are asking is what happened, 20, 30 years ago, so 
none of this people know directly.  They just know it by reading.  They know the problems that are 
facing today, but not the past.  I think in that case, it is a little bit different.  In summary, I would 
suggest to focus a little bit more the political side of the problem.  This is not technical and pure 
economical. 
<K> 
You’re definitely right. 
<A>: This is not just an economical behavior.  The political factor is key, with or without support, how 
they control this oligopolistic situation, but how to handle the worker unions.  It’s not the same, 
though, a reform under democracy and under military regime, it’s absolutely different.  It’s not 
comfortable, the changes in Chile, vis-à-vis Argentina.  Argentina was under democracy under Menem 
in the ‘90s.  Chile was under Pinochet, so these are key. 
<K> 
She wanted to get some insight from different cases in Chile and Philippine.  I think that could be, but 
we still are struggling to find some idea of such possible insight, generalizable idea from those two 
cases.  Anyway… 
<A>: Okay.  Hope it’s useful. 
<K> 
Yeah, thank you very much. 
<M> 
Thank you very much.  Very fruitful time for me.  Thank you very much. 
<A>: 
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Thank you. 
<M> 
Yeah. 
END 
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<M>: …already had an appointment with Professor Ronald Fischer and Raimundo Soto and someone 
in the IDB. 
<K>: Mr. Patricio Mansilla-Caro in IDB. 
Alejandro Jadresic: Are you going to meet somebody else or not? 
<K>: Yeah, of course.  We will have to meet but we haven’t found some good person to meet. 
Alejandro Jadresic: Yeah, because it would be interesting that you meet – but I know, of course, a 
little bit.  But it’s nice to talk to somebody that was involved directly when they started the 
privatization process.  I have a good friend, but let’s see if I could.  Because I can tell you who it 
might be, but he was in the government at that time and maybe he can give you insights.  Maybe he’s 
in my.  Let’s see. 
Okay.  Because it’s a very wide topic, very – there are many things that have been written.  Have you 
been able to read the few things?  Okay.  I think Bruno wrote something too but I’m not sure if it’s in 
English or in Spanish.  Okay.  You want to know what were the reasons why the process was started. 
<M>: Yeah. 
Alejandro Jadresic: It’s good to talk to Bruno, because one has one idea but maybe he can tell you 
the real reasons.  But, of course, I think many of the problems were fiscal constraints.  There was at 
that moment, the companies were in the hands of the state.  The state didn’t have that many funds to 
invest in power because this was also a matter of ideology, because it was part of the military 
government of Pinochet and, of course, they implemented the policy of promoting private investment 
and competition. 
But this is something that maybe this was a theory afterwards, but it’s good.  But maybe the real 
problem they had, you know, we didn’t have funds to invest and then probably there was a problem 
also with the efficiency of the state-owned companies, all of that.  Also they had the power to do of 
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this reason because it was a military government, it was a dictator and he had the power to go ahead 
because it’s difficult in many countries to go to a privatization process.  It typically starts with raising 
the tariffs and that usually is politically difficult. 
Whatever the reasons were, because there were a few of this but the process started, as you said in 
the late ‘70s.  It was at that moment was really a big innovation because I think we were the first 
country to apply a process like this.  But really privatization took place in the ‘80s, not in the ‘70s 
because in order, there was [Unclear] that it was the law, but it took a while until this company was in 
the hands of the state.  For a while, they had made the reform but the companies were in the hands 
of the state.  They were state-owned companies.  But working through a central planning system to 
ensure that the investments that were being done were efficient, but then by the ‘80s, then the 
government – once the system was already operating, this decision was made to start privatizing the 
companies. 
But the system had been in place already for a few years.  They had the National Energy Commission, 
they had the CNE.  They had the law.  At that time, we didn’t have Congress so the law – we didn’t 
have to go to Congress to approve the law.  There was the Junta.  The Junta was all the commandos 
in chief, they were the Congress.  Of course, it was to some extent easier to approve the law like that.  
But the privatization started in the ‘70s, in the mid ‘80s.  They started by privatizing the distribution 
companies and probably that was easier.  I think Bruno told me once, why they wanted to – they 
started by the distribution companies, but I forgot. 
<M>: You had worked in the distribution company? 
Alejandro Jadresic: No, he was in government but the reason why did they start to privatize by the 
distribution company and later by the transmission and generation company.  It makes sense, but it 
will be good to ask why, why they did it, the real reasons.  I think I have a lot of my colleagues 
explain that.  But nevertheless, they privatized the distribution companies.  Endesa was like the state 
monopoly.  One thing that they were not able to do and I’m not sure if they really tried, anyway, was 
to separate transmission and generation.  They separated distribution, but generation and 
transmission remained in the same hands. 
<M>: By Endesa. 
Alejandro Jadresic: By Endesa.  They started selling Endesa by the late ‘80s and when they sold 
Endesa.  They also sold in the company were the transmission lines.  Now, I joined the government in 
the 1990 because when democracy was recovered, there were new presidents, there was a Congress 
now and at that time I started working in the Ministry of Economy.  At that time, I started to be 
involved in some of this – some of the things that went on. 
The new government decided to keep on privatizing the sector.  The privatization process was ended 
in the ‘90s.  It was started in the ‘80s but by the ‘90s with democracy now, all the remaining 
companies were sold.  I became a minister by 1994, and when I was minister, I think, we sold the last 
state-owned companies which were one in the north, which was Edelnor.  Colbún was also privatized.  
Colbún had been part of Endesa at sometime, but then Colbún was a project that was started by 
Endesa, but they decided to keep it apart and Colbún was sold as a separate company.  I was 
[Unclear].  Then I think there was one or two more companies that were sold, one in Aysén, but the 
late ‘90s, all the companies had been sold. 
<M>: Market was established. 
Alejandro Jadresic: The market was established in the ‘80s because when they created the market, 
even with state companies, but then you had, so the market started operating, but then later you sold 
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the companies, and in the ‘90s you sold all the companies, the market had been operating already.  
However, there were a [Unclear], one was – one simple problem was with transmission that because 
main lines were owned by Endesa, that put many constraints and created many problems with other 
generators.  Because Endesa was competing with other generators and those generators had to agree 
on transmission fees with Endesa and the main competition somewhat unfair was difficult. 
One of the things the government tried to do was to improve the transmission regulations.  Those 
regulations were finally changed by 2004, 2005.  At that time there was a new law for transmission. 
On the other hand, it was an additional thing that the government tried to do was to separate 
transmission from generation.  It was involved in some of that.  We had some issues in the anti-trust 
commission, our competition commission.  They started analyzing the case.  We said that it would be 
good to separate both businesses and the anti-trust commission said, yes, this should be done.  
Endesa finally separated the transmission company.  Its own transmission asset, it put it into a 
different company and Endesa sold the company.  That happened in about 2000.  But at that time, I 
would say efficient marketing, which you had in transmission, generation, distribution and several 
generation companies. 
<M>: Doing throughout the privatization process, some researchers say the government’s authority 
will be lost, so the power of the making policy by the government decreased from now until now.  At 
the time of making this reform policy, what Chilean government did have like for the future policy, like 
these advantages from the power sector reform, so…? 
Alejandro Jadresic: Yeah, you say, it has lost power, I don’t know that is the when they say.  Let’s 
say the government will have less power is what you’re basically, that is something good or that is 
something bad. 
<M>: For example, the connection of the northern part and southern part, no private companies want 
to invest to connect the two systems, so… 
Alejandro Jadresic: Yeah, but that’s a matter of creating incentives because the thing is when you 
privatize, the government cease till there and the government is very powerful because it sets the 
rules or it can go to counter – to change the rules.  It all depends on what – if you provide the right 
incentive and if you set the right rules.  Now, you know, just today in the newspaper, you can read 
that the minister was announcing that there would be an interconnection between the northern 
system and the central system.  I think that would be in the newspaper tomorrow, but I was reading 
now.  That has been – that will be done by the private sector. 
But incentives were created by the government.  There this over by the regulations.  There is now a 
process by bidding process and there are also market incentives because there is a price difference 
between the north and south.  You can do more or less the same things in the private hand or the 
public sector.  The question what you do is better or efficient, with which funds, you can do things in 
the private sector except but what do you do in paper.  The challenge is to have the right rules. 
<M>: About the regulatory body, at the time, how their workers and employees was organized and 
created?  We guess, some people from Endesa, like private companies went to the regulatory body as 
chairman or technical workers, so it may affect the regulation. 
Alejandro Jadresic: But you know, when they started the regulatory CNE – I when they started, 
there was a very small body.  That’s true that they came from the companies.  Maybe somebody had 
been in the companies, but Bruno Philippi, who was the chairman of this, that’s the guy encouraged, 
Bruno Philippi.  He was a university professor.  Sebastián Bernstein, maybe he had been in – probably 
five or six – there were many young people there that didn’t come from the company, so it’s not true.  
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Later, you started having some people coming from the companies, but I don’t think that’s something 
relevant. 
<K>: I that Chile has a… 
Alejandro Jadresic: It was very small, when we started.  You had another agency, which was the 
Superintendent and that was larger, but it’s more technical regulation but the reform was more were 
quite independent from the government – from the companies. 
<K> 
Chile has successful privatization of power sector and at least in the initial 15 to 20 years.  But I think, 
generally, such past state-owned company should have the most and best expertise and experience in 
the power sector.  I think I had a question about how the government successfully made a policy 
without or maybe with such an expertise accumulated in the past state-owned companies.  Chile had a 
very successful privatization policy.  But how that policy was designed?  Is it in collaboration with 
Endesa or just created by the bureaucrats in the ministries? 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Of course, not everyone agrees.  But, yeah, some people say that the privatization was not done very 
well, it could have been done better.  One problem is that, it probably was difficult to do it, but, no 
standardized style, [Unclear] nice and modern, so it’s better to have more companies and Endesa 
could have been splitted into two. 
The price, there was also the debate on the way you privatized that; it was not very fair or very 
transparent, the way the companies were sold.  They weren’t – I wouldn’t say that it was that 
successful.  It took place, the systems casual, but if you would start looking in today, you would find 
some. 
<K> 
Yeah, right.  I would say they are rather successful than other Latin American companies. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
But in general, it has worked well. 
<K> 
Yeah. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
It’s true.  But now I think, when they promoted reform, many people in Endesa were against.  The 
state companies, they said, well, we’re going to lose the power.  Many times the workers or officials in 
the company were against this.  The bureaucrats like Mr. Bruno Philippi, they had to challenge against 
that.  Of course, you get support from the government. 
But it was also the time there was a military government and some of these companies you have 
some general sometimes running the company and they would try to say, why are they doing this.  
But then in the government, there was another general saying, no, we don’t agree with this.  There 
were these things and sometimes you don’t find it in the documents and Bruno can tell you nice 
stories like that. 
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<K> 
That should be very interesting. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Once he was telling me, I don’t remember, they wanted to make reform on the tariffs, increase the 
tariff, or provide subsidy, then somebody in the general said, we are against this and the real reason 
was that his tariff was going up.  There were many.  One thing is couple of you hear the nice stories, 
but also there are other resistance. 
Overall, it was the bureaucrats were pushing for this against the will of the companies, many times.  
The company had to adapt.  To do this, they had to reduce the power of the companies.  The 
companies were – they had all the knowledge and the capacity, but more engineering grounds, but on 
economic and financial matters, they didn’t understand very well.  Many of these companies had very 
good engineering, but many times they are not very good at economics of finance. 
<K> 
Basically, the overall design of the privatization itself was designed by the economists? 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, well, engineers, I don’t know if it’s economists, engineers, the National Energy Commission.  
The two very important people are Bruno Philippi and Sebastián Bernstein.  Do you want to write 
down those names?  Bruno Philippi, you write this.  Sebastián Bernstein, he was the executive 
secretary.  He was the second in charge.  He was the man in charge and then he resigned and he 
became the executive secretary.  I would recommend that you talk to them. 
<K> 
Sebastián Bernstein. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Let me see here if I can write a mail to them. 
<K> 
Bruno Philippi. 
<M> 
Philippi and Sebastián. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
One is German, and the other – German names, last names.  Philippi is German, Bernstein’s also 
German.  They’re Chileans both but.  Yeah, this one, I found one of them.  What I’m going to do is 
send both of them a mail with a copy to you and see if we can set up a meeting with them. 
<K> 
Great.  Thank you very much.  I’m sorry, I have another question.  You mentioned that until – it takes 
about 20 years, so until late ‘90s; all past state-owned companies were sold and privatized. 
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Alejandro Jadresic 
Yes. 
<K> 
It took almost 20 years to sell everything. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yes. 
<K> 
But I think until then the government became democratized so before military to democratize.  Oh, 
yeah, sure. 
[Foreign Language] 
<K> 
I think you mentioned that one of the factors decreased – reduced the opposition from the Endesa or 
the past state-owned companies was the military government. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yes. 
<K> 
But in let’s say ‘90s, the government had already been democratized. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yes. 
<K> 
Then how the government successfully keeps the privatization? 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Remember, I joined the government by that time.  I was a young professional at that time.  When the 
new government came into power, there were different views in the government.  Some say, 
everything that was done by the military was bad, so we have to change everything and go back and 
go back to state hands. 
There were the more extremist or more.  But there was a lot of other people saying, no, of course, the 
people with the government were against dictatorship, but they said something that went on were 
right and we have to, improve the same, correct the things that were done improperly, but keep the 
good things.  At the end, this second view was the one that prevailed. 
In fact, my role, I was an economist in government by that time.  Part of my role was convincing my 
senior officials that some of the thing had to be kept.  When I was in power, I was able to do water 
reforms for instance.  I was very much involved really from the water sector, I was involved in 
telecommunications, and in many of this, these things are okay, these things have to change. 
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I was 4 years in the Ministry of Economy and I was involved with many of these sectors and reform 
and we had discussions.  But at the end, the idea that prevailed was we have to keep reforming and 
improve.  In telecommunication, I was involved and I would say, yeah, this is okay, but now we have 
to introduce more competition.  Many of the [Unclear] were done in the ‘90s were to say, okay, let’s 
keep moving, but ensure there will be more competition and there will be more transparency, stronger 
regulatory agencies, etcetera. 
<K> 
But actually, the one IDB officer said that Chile now has some problems with the very dominant 
Endesa, still dominant Endesa because Endesa or the past state-owned companies still have a very 
dominant power in the Chilean power sector.  Then, Chilean government doesn’t have any political or 
administrative instrument to control the power sector policy. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
That’s not true.  I didn’t say [Unclear] is true, yeah, you hear, but the government has a lot of – it’s a 
matter of using the right instrument and knowing clearly what you want to do.  But the problem is 
that you have to know what you want to do.  I mean, the former government, I think they didn’t do it 
very well.  I was in government, but I’m not a politician. 
But I think they didn’t have – they didn’t make very clear decisions, very great decisions.  This 
government has been much more active in the power sector but the law and the rule is the same.  It’s 
a matter of – if the government wants to use the system or not.  It’s not a matter of no, but it’s a 
problem of the government.  This ministry has done good things.  Today, they were doing the 
definition.  They did the bid with renewable energy, but it’s exactly the same model, you have to 
change the people and have a idea.  But it’s not the problem with the model.  It’s the problem with 
the people. 
<K> 
I understand.  I think, the same thing can be said to the – I mean the same thing – I mean, how to 
say, the political will would be very important in the ‘90s and then also market. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
I was 4 years in the ministry and we wanted to do certain things and you would – I had, I was in 
charge of the gas interconnection with Argentina and so two governments got together, we signed and 
we pushed for that.  The purpose – my president was supporting us.  Two to three years, we were 
able to settle the rules to build all the pipelines on private hands, but it’s a matter of decision.  I have 
the political will and I have the clear idea.  These general comments, I don’t agree very much with 
them because it depends. 
<M> 
The Pinochet era, the power sector was privatized and then the telecommunication and water, as you 
mentioned, also started to privatize that after the Pinochet era.  Even after the change of the regime, 
government, how they continued to keep their privatization efforts? 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Well, that’s I think what we were talking about.  The privatization was started in late 1985, more or 
less.  Telecommunications privatization started around ‘88 or ‘89.  There were two companies in 
telecommunications, Entel and what it was called CTC.  Now it’s Movistar or Telefonía from Spain. 
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<M> 
Can we say the privatization was introduced in general in Chile at that time?  I mean kind of, 
circumstances like environment was prepared for those privatization, eager to become privatize. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, there were reforms because in order to do this, you have to first, you want to privatize, you 
start setup, defining the rules, you then have the law, then you have to create the regulatory agencies.  
Then you have to prepare the companies to privatize.  But this happened, at least, in stages in all the 
sectors.  Now, in the ‘80s, I would say – the energy sector little bit before, but the ‘80s was really the 
years when this was.  But, for instance – and I say, when the new government came, the democracy, 
there was the discussion, but the decision at the end was to keep moving.  The water sector was 
privatized in the ‘90s.  Much later, the private sector was privatized in 1995.  That was the moment, 4, 
5 years after democracy.  But it was a continuation of what had been before. 
<M> 
For example, water sector can be privatization at that time in the democracy regime; it means citizens 
support the privatization.  Relatively in Chile, they don’t have much resistance for the privatization.  It 
means that change of price – the utility price was not that much higher – become high. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
No, let me tell you, I was involved in water.  I was in the Ministry of Economy when water was 
privatized.  In order to privatize the water sector, because price tariffs were very low, we had to 
increase tariffs in many of the companies.  Because we had in the case of water companies, there was 
one company in Santiago and one in Valparaíso, there was the ministry that supplied water in the rest 
of the country. 
The first thing was to split the ministry into several companies.  That was early ‘90s.  Then we had to 
increase tariffs, even though politically – easy to increase tariff, but a device created by which we 
provided subsidies. 
In Chile, the water sector, you have a very good system of subsidies by which – I do know today, but 
at that time 20% of the poor population have big subsidy.  They can get up to 75% of the tariff is paid 
by the government.  Tariff started to increase, but the poor people had access to the subsidies. 
We even, we had a timescale but it took I think 5 years to go increase tariff.  Sometimes political 
personalities [ph], I remember at that time you had to go to the [Unclear] explain, why we would 
have to raise the tariff.  You will say – well, then you have to say, well we have to increase tariff 
because it’s not fair that people in the [Unclear], the water is expensive.  It’s not easy, but the people 
not necessarily they say, yeah, I’m happy with privatization, that’s not true.  It’s a political challenge, 
how to do that. 
<K> 
Definitely. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
You have to do good.  The water state company, when they were privatized, the President said – that 
was when I was in government, he said, these countries have to have wastewater treatment.  We 
must for a developed country to have wastewater treatment.  But the government doesn’t have funds 
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to do that.  The only way we can do that is privatizing the companies.  That was the political message 
and say, okay, we’re going to privatize because we want to have wastewater treatment.  Wastewater 
treatment, at that time, was really 5%.  At the present, now it’s 95%. 
<K> 
But, yeah, I had kind of interview about the role of PPP in Chile last time I came here and I ask the 
questions to I think IDB person or I forgot, Ministry of Public Works.  They said that the Chilean 
people generally accepted the role of PPP.  I was a bit surprised because in other countries, 
sometimes privatization or PPP are a subject of opposition from the public.  I think you mentioned, 
also, it is not easy to make people understood the rising price after the privatization.  How and why 
the Chilean people still accept the privatization and sometimes the rise of the tariff or price. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Well, one thing, when power sector reform was started, it was dictatorship, so it was a little bit 
different.  But also that, but then you why, I was telling the water because, first, you created a 
subsidy scheme.  So, say, no, we are aware, the tariffs have increased, yes, but you know, this 
subsidy, if tariff is benefiting the rich people and not the poor, we want the poor people to be 
connected. 
You need to create political support and usually the people that are worse off are the people are the 
poor.  The rich people often they benefit from subsidies and they are happy because they get very 
good service.  But the poor people don’t have connections.  You need to find the support for it.  It also 
depends on – well it depends, all countries are different, but in some countries have very poor 
services, so sometimes if you have a complaint that don’t work very well, people will be happy when 
you privatize them.  It depends.  I’m sorry, let me see, if my friend [Unclear]. 
<K> 
So far such social fairness can be understood by the general public. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
It’s difficult.  Sometimes you have.  That’s the political challenge.  But I was telling this example with 
the wastewater treatment, the best part of the story; you have to have a good story.  We need to 
privatize because we want to have clean environment. 
<K> 
Okay.  The people chose that such wastewater treatment in trade-off between wastewater treatment 
or lower tariffs? 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, but the tariff had already been increased by that time.  The tariff had already increased so that 
was before that.  But then, let’s say, okay, privatize but this is the.  It’s not only that older people 
matters because many of these discussions does takes place in Congress, in other places.  So it’s not 
necessarily you have all the people, some people yes. 
<M> 
But energy policy in Chile, Chile government has established 2050 plan for the future. 
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Alejandro Jadresic 
Yes. 
<M> 
When it is designed? When the power sector reform started, the government has some kind of picture 
for future, like those strategy for 2050.  Maybe, so I would like to know the future plan for the future 
at the time? 
Alejandro Jadresic 
No, one thing about the energy sector electricity – they have this 10 year plan.  They have plan de 
obras, you know, the energy sector is – electricity development is based on a plan which is called the 
10-year plan, which is used for setting price.  Prices are based on a 10-year plan.  But that plan is not 
very mandatory so private companies can do different project.  This is a referential plan and you can 
do it. 
Now, so that’s something that is there and has been there for 20 years.  That’s for public, when the 
company were in state hands, that plan was mandatory.  When the companies were privatized, 
anybody could do that an investment they want.  But that plan is not very used that much, except for 
setting tariff.  Whatever, that the last 10 years, I would say there has been a lot of political opposition 
to new projects. 
Basically on environmental reasons or ecological reasons there need be – everybody opposes projects.  
Also, because of political reasons but today, any new large investment project in mining, electricity 
has problems, difficulties.  But also because it’s more difficult today to – also because we are a rich 
country and people like environment more so in order to gain some political support, this government 
has been trying to do, no, okay, we’re going to build the plant and this is something we are getting 
consensus and we have a lot of discussions, social debate, and we are going to find a plan and all 
country we are moving into that direction, because there was an idea that the government didn’t have 
plans. 
But this 2050 is a lot of science fiction.  Who can plan – yeah, I have a friend of mine who is a 
professor here, he participates in this plan.  But who can guess what will happen in 2050.  It’s more a 
political – it’s good that it takes place, very useful because you have people discussing, this should be 
better, this, this, this.  But, it’s a political instrument not more than if you, more than a technical or 
engineering instrument.  Because it’s very difficult to know what will happen.  Maybe it makes sense 
for 10 years or 15 years, maybe 20, but 2050, that’s too much.  Maybe, okay. 
<M> 
We could say the political effects on the power sector would be more powerful than the policy 
administration. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
No, today I mean this has been changing over long time, but today in Chile the opinion of the people, 
of the communities, a lot has to do with local communities.  It is very important.  Probably the same 
thing happened in Japan… 
<K> 
Yeah. 
  6-140 
Alejandro Jadresic 
The government said this is good for development and yes we will do and everyone would say, that’s 
great.  Today, it’s not great.  Everyone say nuclear energy.  Now, in Japan… 
<K> 
Also, we had problem of hydropower plant. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, same in all countries. 
<K> 
I think in Chile, pension fund is one of the unique factors in power sector reform.  Do you think that 
pension fund plays a very important role or without pension fund, it could – Chilean government could 
realize power sector privatization? 
Alejandro Jadresic 
It was useful because it was a source of… 
<K> 
Investment. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
…investment and savings but, yeah, okay.  Do investment in savings and that was great saves, but 
not necessarily. Probably for Chile, at that time, they don’t have much access to international financial 
markets.  That was in the ‘80s, Chile was a dictatorship.  They didn’t have much access to the 
financial markets.  In that sense, for Chile to start the process was very useful.  But I think in other 
places, it could take place around different way. 
That allows more domestic – it was interesting, but privatization process was started with national 
companies.  It was small group of investors that brought the assets and later they sold the companies 
to foreign investors.  But they started being local investors.  Many of them didn’t have much funds 
anyway.  Also, because the pension funds were not very transparent too, some people who sat on 
chairs and they got and then you have these pension funds.  Yeah, in Chile, it was an important 
element.  But it doesn’t have to be that way.  In other countries, what they have done, they privatize 
and they can international bid.  In Chile, it happened later. 
<M> 
Not much. 
<K> 
But I think at the initial stage, at least, I think such, how do I say, domestic process, I don’t know how 
to say, domestic stage or whatever, at some stage in which the domestic companies buy the share of 
power companies, would be better for the result of privatization, because in, for instance, in Argentina 
or in let’s say Indonesia, the all public utilities were brought by foreign investors and then finally failed. 
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Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, but usually, it has to do, for a reason.  They failed because of the policies.  They would have 
failed the same, be it domestic or international.  Argentina, what happened in Argentina, they 
privatized and then they are now going to increase the tariffs.  Any company would fail, if you’re not 
able to recover the investment. 
<K> 
It’s not a matter of… 
Alejandro Jadresic 
No, it’s a hands-on effect.  There is nationalism sometimes, but the reason that they fail, I believe is 
not because they were international companies, but because the policies were very bad. 
<K> 
But it means Chilean government designed a very good policy at the initial stage. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, good policy.  I don’t say it’s very good and they keep change and, of course, you have to learn 
and you change it.  It’s not something that’s very nice idea.  Yeah, the basic ideas were right, but 
there were mistakes I think that were collected afterwards.  Many of the law had, now, major changes, 
10 years ago, has two major changes.  But it’s good that – but because the law was not that good.  
Also because, they can say, we have learned now.  Now, we know much more about electricity 
markets than 20 years ago. 
<M> 
But at that time, Chile didn’t have reference because they started for the first time in the world. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, the UK started a little bit later, but in the ‘80s also, the United Kingdom, they also… 
<M> 
Yeah. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
I think they started little bit late, but there was this other case, so people started looking what was 
happening in the UK too… 
<K> 
But at least you first established the CNE. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
No, he was first. 
 
  6-142 
<M> 
Then CNE was first, and I think the process of the privatization difference from country to country and 
I think it might be very good that for Chile to create CNE at the beginning and probably CNE played a 
very important role in the designing of the privatization. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, that is true.  CNE were just a few people, not many.  This is two of the names I was telling. 
<K> 
Yeah, that’s amazing.  Yeah, very few people. 
<M> 
They were economists rather than… 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, they were technocrats. 
<M> 
From Chicago? 
Alejandro Jadresic 
No, Bruno Philippi, he studied in Stanford.  He was professor at Catholic University.  Sebastián 
Bernstein was – well, he was a civil engineer.  I think he had gone to France to study something about 
energy.  There were a few other, Renato Agurto, was the third guy. 
<K> 
There was someone who appointed them to CNE, right? 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Who? 
<K> 
Someone who appointed them to CNE? 
Alejandro Jadresic 
You know the government of Chile, there was this dictator, but he had people close to Chicago, the 
University of Chicago, the technocrats and probably people from the Chicago team, they invited them 
probably.  Probably they were closer because these guys were not close to the military, but were 
closer to the Chicago technocrats. 
<K> 
Yeah. I think it is some very interesting that Chile had some, not pure, but could have some pure 
environment to realize the real idea, theory of Chicago Boys because there is [Unclear], so they could 
do what they wanted. 
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Alejandro Jadresic 
Well, it could have had.  I don’t think you cannot do it in other circumstances and no other countries 
can do it.  We have done reforms in democracy too.  But that made things different and probably in a 
democracy, you have less room to make mistakes, probably.  If you make mistakes, well, [Unclear]. 
<K> 
Yeah. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
But I think you can make reforms in other sectors too, and probably it would be well reformed 
because of that.  Because if you need to have, convinced the Congress, at the end you have to think 
more carefully what you’re going to promote. 
<K> 
But, actually, we doubt that in a democratic society, for instance, her case in Philippine, we have more 
political interference from the different actors. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, well could be.  Yeah and, of course, problems again with countries have problems with 
corruption.  Many times, many countries, fortunately in Chile, we do not have that big a problem there, 
but many state-owned companies we have very corrupt people running the companies and they have 
different agenda and how you’re able to convince or buy this guy out, it’s not easy. 
Mexico is now trying to do interesting things because in Mexico they have big problem.  But this 
President was able to push forward several with reform in energy.  Now his current problem is 
because of what we have this tragedy, they have political problems.  Sometimes [Unclear] of the 
corruption and that could be also political liability.  We want to get rid of this corrupt people and that 
that’s a reason to do reforms.  Mexico is trying to do that. 
<K> 
I think also Pinochet government also tried to get rid of such corrupted and inefficient state-owned 
companies. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, but it’s true.  But I think in Chile, the problem was not that big because there was a tradition at 
least in these energy companies that they were relatively well-run and were relatively professional.  
This company, they were not that efficient, but they have – it was [Unclear] any would like to – a 
good guy would like to go to this company.  They were more or less professionally run.  But in other 
developing countries, that’s… 
<K> 
No.  I think that… 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Probably in the Philippines, I would say they have problems, I guess. 
  6-144 
<K> 
Yeah, I think that initial high-level capacity of state-owned company would be one of the key factors 
of success. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, but still, it’s good you talk to Bruno Philippi, when you talk to him, because he will tell you some 
of the problems his company had at that time.  He knows that very well. 
<M> 
Bruno. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Bruno, he had to lead negotiate with them. 
<K> 
Okay.  One or two questions? 
<M> 
I saw your paper about expert panel. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Okay. 
<M> 
Yeah.  I want to ask about that.  Why the government introduced the expert panel commission, even 
though they have independent regulatory body in CNE, why? 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, one thing, first of all, the CNE, unlike started independent, the regulator is part of the 
government.  In other countries you have the more independent entities.  But still, that has operated 
relatively independent.  But it’s not on in the law that the CNE leaders… 
<M> 
Is under the government. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
…is run by the government.  But you will have – even if it is independent, or if it’s part of the 
government, you will have some kind of conflict between the company and the regulator.  You need to 
have some kind of mechanism to solve the disputes.  In Chile, it was a great idea; all of these reforms 
introduced some kind of arbitrator or referee.  Because the other alternative is to go to the courts.  
You can only, if you have a claim, you can go to the court, but the court will take 2 years, 3 years to 
dispute.  It happens sometimes. 
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Argentina, I know the company went to court and they still, there is an international court and they 
have been 10 years filing.  Chile has created this mechanism of independent arbitrators and I have 
been arbitrator many times in some of the sectors have, ad hoc commissions.  You have this dispute, 
so we create an arbitration commission and you solve it. 
Some they say, well, it’s better to have, instead of having one committee for each company or each 
conflict, why not have a permanent arbitrator and that’s the panel of experts.  It has become very – I 
think it has been a very good solution because the good permanent is people that are there, they are 
very independent.  They don’t report to the government or to the companies and because being 
permanent they are able to learn and accumulate knowledge.  I think it has been a very good 
mechanism and they already announced to duplicate this in other sectors.  Yeah, I was the first 
president of this panel for a few years.  It’s very good, it’s a very good model, I believe.  That’s 
worked very well. 
<M> 
For example, what were those disputes between company and the regulator, for example? 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Setting prices or setting price reviews for, sometimes its technical disputes for interconnection, it 
could be price reviews of in transmission or in distribution.  There are many discussions in the 
operator, maintenance among the companies.  There are many technical issues.  The law states very 
clearly, what kind of disputes to solve there. 
<M> 
Is there any disputes on the introduction barrier, how to say?  Entry barrier because there is Endesa in 
the market so small, the other power… 
Alejandro Jadresic 
That’s more a role of the competition commission. 
<M> 
Anti-trust commission. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Anti-trust.  If they have a issue, they go there.  Now Endesa today, the power of Endesa is much less 
than it was 20 years ago.  People say Endesa, but the truth today is that the market power of Endesa 
is much less than in the past.  Because other companies have – the big entry barrier is not the 
companies, more the difficulty to make projects. 
<K> 
There is some law to structure or to frame the right and authority of this panel of experts?  There is a 
law. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, of course.  No, this is in the law and it’s very well-defined in the law, what they can do but we 
named experts. 
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<K> 
How they are appointed? 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Everything is in the law.  Now, I have to go to an arbitration… 
<K> 
Yeah. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
…because I am working.  At this moment I’m doing – we have some toll roads, so I am in arbitration 
commission in toll roads.  Now I have a meeting now. 
<M> 
Real exercising. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
Yeah, because there is a dispute between the ministry and the toll roads, so we have been analyzing 
this for almost a year and now we are giving our final decision. 
<M> 
Oh, you are in the expert panel. 
<K> 
The critical time now.  Okay, thank you very much. 
<M> 
Thank you very much. 
Alejandro Jadresic 
I’m sorry, but it’s. 
END 
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<M> 
Chile, done in 1980s and ‘78.  I am doing to case of power sector reform, one is developing country 
Philippine’s case and Chilean case would be a reference case for the Philippine’s case, so Chile 
already… 
Ronald Fischer 
It’s historical, so it’s not the current situation, but the situation 20 years ago, 40 years ago. 
<M> 
Yeah.  I am focusing on how the power sector reform initiated at the time.  How they make their 
regulatory body for the new introduction for new system, so I want to hear the real situation at that 
time. 
Ronald Fischer 
Well, I don’t know the details at the time.  At that time I was studying in the States, I think.  No, I 
hadn’t even gone to the States to study, so I was a student here.  No, but I know some people who 
are involved, you are interested, this guy Bernstein and this guy you would know… 
<M> 
Bernstein and Bruno Philippi. 
Ronald Fischer 
Yeah, those are the guys that were actually there.  You’d probably want to talk to them, if you want to 
know the story in detail. 
<K> 
Sure.  We are going to meet Bruno Philippi today. 
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Ronald Fischer 
Okay, so he’s going to tell you the story in detail.  I know basically what happened later on at that 
time. 
<M> 
That’s good too, I want to. 
Ronald Fischer 
I think at that time there was a state-owned electricity company and the distribution companies were 
also owned by the state.  They had been [Unclear] in the ‘70s.  But there was no clear separation and 
what they did in ‘81 was they separated into distribution companies, transmission, and generation as 
different sectors that were regulated at different roads. 
But when they actually sold the firms to the private sector, they kept the Endesa, which was the 
biggest company.  There were two companies at the time, Endesa and what is now called Gener.  At 
that time, I can’t remember what the name was.  It was a long time ago.  But they’ve changed the 
name several times.  It’s Gener now, but at that time, I don’t know. 
Gener was basically a thermal system and Endesa at that time was mainly water – a very small 
system at the time, I think probably 1/10 of the system.  Endesa also got all the connection lines from 
the places where they generated electricity to Santiago because they had also the transmission lines.  
Because Endesa was basically hydroelectricity and the rivers are to the south of Chile so they would 
have the plans there and they would send electricity.  Whereas Gener was the other company, it had 
basically thermal power plants and basically, there was one in Ventanas and I don’t think small ones 
around and sold they didn’t need the transmission because it was very close to Santiago. 
What they did at the time was to setup a system on marginal cost.  The system was – there was 
something called a dispatcher system in which the dispatcher organizes the power plants according to 
their marginal cost and will dispatch the different plants according to their margin cost.  The cheaper 
plants first, and in order to fulfill the demand, they start putting plants that are more and more costly.  
That’s efficient, in the sense that it’s economically efficient and also provides incentives to invest into 
low-cost plants because the price at which the companies trade for electricity is the spot price, so the 
spot price can be very high, you have very low cost, you make a lot of money. 
The other important thing is that that market is only for the generating companies.  Normal users 
don’t have access to that market, they have contracts.  Either in cities, they are served by the 
distribution system, by the network of lines in the city, and they are subject to the regulated price or 
they are outside big plants like the mining companies or the forestry plants.  They are somewhere else 
and what they do is they make a contract directly with the generating company, but it’s a long-term 
contract.  Normally, they don’t see this, the spot price, the marginal cost.  Those are the basics setup. 
The other thing that they did is they had efficient – an attempt at efficient regulation of the 
distribution system.  On the distribution system, what they did was they invent some – they modeled 
something that would be an efficient distribution company, but invented, but not a real thing, an ideal 
system that would serve the city and the demand for the next 5 years.  They seek what the costs are; 
this ideal system and they use those costs to determine the price that the distribution company can 
charge.  I don’t know if this is clear to you, but basically they – so in the generating system they’ve 
made it competitive and the distribution it was regulated with efficient – kind of efficiently, it didn’t 
work that way, but semi-efficiently. 
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What they didn’t do was much on the transmission system because at the beginning it was just used 
by Endesa so Endesa it was their own plants, so they didn’t have any – so it was the transmission 
lines were the ones that they use themselves to use electricity, nobody else used them, so there’s no 
need to regulate them. 
But in around at some point separated another company called Colbún from Endesa.  Very early they 
separated Colbún from Endesa and Colbún was state-owned at the time.  They tried to use it as 
control to see if the system would work, but they had lots of problems sending the electricity to 
Santiago because Endesa would never build enough capacity to serve them or they would charge them 
an enormous amount of money, so eventually what they had to do was to disintegrate the system and 
set up a special regulation for transmission, which is the situation now.  That would be the briefest 
thing. 
Now, the system was very inefficient before.  The example that Bruno Philippi is going to tell you is 
probably that at the time in which there was a lot of rain in the south and therefore the reservoirs 
were overflowing.  At that time, what you should do is just use as much as water you can for 
generation, the water in the reservoirs uses all of it because it has cost of zero, normal capacity in the 
reservoir.  At that time they were burning a lot of coal, so that meant that they weren’t using all the 
water and that was because there was – the coal miners were a political force and they couldn’t.  It 
was difficult to stop using their coal so that sort of thing, so very inefficient production of electricity.  
Nowadays, that doesn’t happen. 
<M> 
In generation sector, in the initial stage, the new investment was successfully introduced, but the 
distribution and transmission there is some… 
Ronald Fischer 
The investment was at the beginning, mainly either the state company, Colbún or before they sold it 
in ’94, ‘95 and Endesa or Gener, three companies, there was no entry at that time, no new companies.  
For a long time, it was like that and only more recently have new companies come in. 
<M> 
But the government established unbundled power market so only three companies have still dominant 
power for large generation. 
Ronald Fischer 
Even now. 
<M> 
Even now? 
Ronald Fischer 
But now at least, there are new companies coming in, but for a long time there were only the three 
companies.  The rules made it very difficult because it was very difficult to connect to the system.  The 
companies would make it very difficult for you, so people won’t try. 
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<M> 
How about distribution? 
Ronald Fischer 
Distribution is regulated.  The theoretical idea is that its value-added distribution, so you have this 
cost of the distribution network and you take the electricity – the distribution companies have 
contracts with the generating plants so they sell them at a certain price.  They add the distribution 
cost, and that’s the final price that people see with some adjustments, but to make the account simple 
and basically that’s what it is.  You have the distribution cost, you add the cost of electricity and that’s 
the price. 
<M> 
By the contract between generation and distribution will be decided. 
Ronald Fischer 
Right.  This year, the contracts were now – it used to be that contracts were just negotiated, but now 
they’re auctions, so companies compete for the right to have the contract.  This year they got fairly 
good prices because it was more competitive. 
<M> 
In Philippines case they have wholesale power market, so selling electricity every 1 hour. 
Ronald Fischer 
They have a pool? 
<M> 
Yeah. 
Ronald Fischer 
This is a system, it’s a managed system.  It does is basically there is a dispatcher that has – that 
knows the cost of operating every plant and then tells you which ones have to be working at some 
point.  They plan a week ahead.  They have the schedule, who is going to be on at each moment and 
then they have short-term adjustments, but that’s how they work. 
It’s administered rather than a market.  It has some advantages.  For instance, it’s difficult to do 
things that are anticompetitive.  You can do them, but it’s more difficult because you can’t do the 
things, for instance, that this company in the US did. 
Here you have to – you are told to operate only at marginal cost, when you hit the marginal cost.  
How they – the type of lie they have is – the type of trick they do is they lie about the marginal costs.  
They lie about their how much it can go down and still operate.  For instance, some companies say 
their plants can only work within a band of 95% to 100%.  They can’t operate at 80% when obviously 
they can, that sort of thing.  But that’s going to change because they’re going to test them, so they’re 
going to tell them you told me you can’t operate, let’s see, put it at 80% and let’s see if it works. 
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<K> 
That’s lessons learned from the case of Enron? 
Ronald Fischer 
The Enron case, so it’s difficult to have an Enron case because the central dispatcher is the one that 
tells went to, so they can’t do fake order and things like that. 
<K> 
That’s the merit of the current system, with powerful… 
Ronald Fischer 
When you don’t have too much competition, this is better.  If you have a lot of competition, the other 
one might be better.  But since we usually have had very little competition in market – and the 
competition is in investment here, so what happens is that if I may. 
What happens is the following.  Here you have megawatts and here you have price, okay?  Suppose 
the demand is here, this demand, we assume that it’s not flexible, doesn’t respond in the short run, so 
what you have is some plants has zero cost because of the run of water, the run of the river at their 
plants, they have zero cost.  These are the solar plants, so the wind plants, those have zero cost.  
Then you get the ones that have cost, for instance, the reservoir, one because the water can be used 
in other time, and that means there is a cost of using them now, so you have this capacity.  Then you 
have the coal plants.  All of this adds capacity and then you have the gas plants around here, etcetera, 
so you organize the plant. 
This is the plant with the highest marginal cost, and so all of these provide electricity and if this one 
that has the higher cost, this one is not called.  If the demand increases, then this one is called.  
When the price is this, this plant here is making a lot of money because it makes all of this money, so 
for each hour.  It’s a lot of money.  What happens is there’s a lot of competition to get in here.  That’s 
where the competition is.  It’s not only the price that they charge, but in this part because you make 
them. 
<K> 
Yeah, but I think the initial cost for hydropower plant would be very big, and also on the other hand, I 
think it’s very difficult to get the permission to build the new hydropower plant now, so I think the 
existing player would be getting more benefit. 
Ronald Fischer 
Exactly.  Well, that’s one of the problems that we’ve had is because of the entry limitations, the 
existing players have not made a lot of money.  Now, that is changing now because of the solar, 
because those things tend to – they go here and they’ve fairly easy to set it up here, but of course 
they are erratic, so they are. 
<K> 
But I think on the other hand, especially in developing countries due to such entry boundary, entry 
barrier, whatever, the lack of electricity itself takes place, so the new generators cannot produce 
efficient twice electricity, so I think the seller.  I’m not sure but I think Chile had Endesa produces 
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cheaper power using its hydropower plant, so I think Chile had – also it had some blackout, but have 
larger amount of electricity than other countries. 
Ronald Fischer 
Well, it’s difficult now to have blackouts because the reason why we have blackouts here, especially 
before, probably not so much now is because we had a big chunk of electricity came from hydropower.  
When you have drought, you have less power, so you have these coal plants, that’s sort of the system.  
Then since we don’t have that many, they’re big – they used to be big, not any more.  If anything 
happen to a line or something like that, that would fail and that would produce a blackout. 
Nowadays, that could still happen, but since hydropower is less important that is less likely.  I think 
that and the other thing that happened is that because of all those – because of the drought of ’99, 
lots of companies brought in diesel engines.  Diesel engine would be like around here and there’s a lot 
of it.  What happened is, even if this disappears, you still have these things.  I know it’s very 
expensive.  You have a big chunk of there and it doesn’t go away because they get paid even when 
they don’t operate. 
<K> 
It is not true that Chile had a huge capacity of hydropower plant by Endesa before drought and it 
contributed to the stabilization of power sector in Chile? 
Ronald Fischer 
To stabilization in what sense? 
<K> 
To cover the power demand in Chile? 
Ronald Fischer 
Well, what happens is that the reservoirs – I’m not sure if I understand you, but the reservoirs have 
the ability to adapt fairly easily to short-term changes in the band, but they have to have water.  If 
there is no water and when there’s no water, there’s also no water in the run of the river plants so you 
get like perhaps this thing – the whole system shifts to the left, because there is some chunk here 
that doesn’t exist anymore, so this moves here.  But if you have enough of these plants, you can 
adapt, I mean, you will have very high cost, but at least it won’t fail. 
That’s the situation now because we are stuck with them, like a lot of very cheap, very polluting plants.  
Nowadays they operate very little, but sometimes they do operate.  That gives us security, but high 
costs.  Because this is very expensive, this is like 260 megawatt and gas plant is like 100. 
<K> 
What I meant was probably something like this, so this is the amount and Chile had certain level of, 
this is that I think and this water, hydro by Endesa and the newcomers to power sector will produce 
higher price, higher cost things.  But there is certain level of hydro so the total cost to the nation 
would be lower than in this case, only this hydro and then… 
Ronald Fischer 
  6-153 
Right, of course, yeah.  No, of course, but that’s something that in a sense, we can’t act upon because 
it’s the areas in which you could use hydropower as opposed to it, so it’s… 
<K> 
Yeah, but in some country, the government tried to sell all the public companies to the private but in 
Chile I think Endesa still had some power. 
Ronald Fischer 
Yeah, but Endesa is private. 
<K> 
It’s kind of privatized. 
Ronald Fischer 
Everything is privatized here.  There’s nothing.  Now they are trying to get – they are trying to pass a 
law by which ENAP, which is an oil company, the state oil company would be able to participate in 
projects up to 49% power projects.  But they couldn’t do it up till now, but they’re going to change the 
law so then there will be a bit of possibility that, there will be some intervention, but right now there is 
no intervention directly. 
<K> 
Maybe, I should have said that the there is some dominant power company exists, the existence of 
some dominant power company may contribute to the… 
Ronald Fischer 
Well, yeah, in the sense in the following sense that they don’t want to invest a lot because what they 
want to do is if you have – suppose that there is only one company that can produce here so that 
company will expand its capacity very slowly so that you’re always around here at this price.  That’s 
what I think what you’re trying to say.  It’s true. 
<K> 
But I think that’s not the main point of your research. 
<M> 
But in the beginning they have, Endesa has had a lot of water sources and in that point, the 
regulatory body or Chilean government, how expects their future energy plan for the future after the 
privatization? 
Ronald Fischer 
But the privatization, you know, it was like ‘87, like 30 years ago I don’t know.  It’s a long time ago, 
30 years ago or something.  Well, what they expected was that the market would work, and they 
didn’t – what they didn’t take into account is that when they – there was a mistake, I think when they 
sold Endesa, they sold it with all of the water rights that they had then and they had most of them.  
All the good projects basically – not all of them, but most of the really attractive projects of water 
things were in the hands of Endesa.  They were the only ones that could build them.  That was a 
problem. 
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<M> 
They sold water rights to… 
Ronald Fischer 
Well, they had the water rights to begin with, so they kept them and they won’t sell them and they 
won’t use them so the price would rise a bit more.  What they did afterwards I can’t remember when 
like 2000 or something like that, they put a tax on the water rights that were not used, a small tax, 
not very important and so the government collects, so the idea is that Endesa would leave this water 
right. 
<K> 
Yeah, transfer the water rights to different companies. 
Ronald Fischer 
But that hasn’t happened yet.  On the other hand, in any case, you can’t do any projects, so water 
projects are very difficult to make, no matter what, so it’s kind of, they have all these water rights, 
but they can’t do anything with it. 
Well, there are lots of interesting things, but you have to ask me a bit that I might be able to tell you.  
I have something, oops; I was just throwing it away.  But look, you will probably get this.  This is the 
report of the government of how their… 
<M> 
The new agenda? 
Ronald Fischer 
The new agenda, you are right. 
<M> 
The new agenda for 2050? 
Ronald Fischer 
Well, not 2050.  That’s just the agenda for this year, what they have done, what they have achieved, I 
don’t know if you find it interesting.  You’ll probably get it somewhere else, but it’s also in the 
webpage, so it’s not that difficult to get. 
<M> 
What do you think what is the most problematic situation in power sector in Chile nowadays they 
fronted? 
Ronald Fischer 
Well, I think some of the problems have been kind of reduced in intensity in the last year.  We had 
serious problems, but in the last year they solved some of them.  But the biggest problem right now is 
to make some transmission lines from the north to the center of the country because we need those.  
They’re building them but apparently there is opposition.  That’s the most important thing.  What 
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they’re trying to do is to compensate the areas.  Way of compensating the areas through which the 
power lines goes through so that they won’t be sole post. 
<M> 
Regarding to the transmission line connecting north and center, I think the problem is no one wants to 
invest to the transmission? 
Ronald Fischer 
No, they want to invest, they want. 
<M> 
Because it’s less profit than the… 
Ronald Fischer 
No, it’s very attractive. 
<M> 
Attractive? 
Ronald Fischer 
It’s very attractive… 
<M> 
Why? 
Ronald Fischer 
Because the way it was paid now is what the company does is the way the transmission line is 
auctioned and the way it’s auctioned is the company asks for how much money I want to receive each 
year for the next like 50 years.  Let’s say, $10 million for the next 30 years, and you receive that no 
matter what, so it’s very attractive.  It’s your own choice how much you ask for and it’s permanent, 
there is no risk. 
It’s very nice for pension funds.  Pension funds love them because its long-term, it’s very safe so and 
it has a high return than a bond so very attractive.  The Canadians are investing a lot, the Canadian 
pension funds. 
There is no problem.  I mean so long as the transmission line belongs to what is called the Sistema 
Troncal, which is the basic system.  It gets paid very well.  Then you have the lines that – suppose 
that you have, so this is the central line, so Santiago is here, and this is the line that goes from south 
to north and there is another one from the other way.  You don’t have much of this way because this 
is a narrow country.  Suppose that you have a project here, so this line that connects here, that is 
your own.  That one, you have to pay for yourself.  That’s sometimes very expensive because there’s 
a lot of opposition from the families living here, etcetera. 
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But this one, if they tell you, you have the right to expand this part of the line it’s a very attractive 
business.  You can get, so lots of companies participate.  There is no problem with investment here.  
Problem of being able to make the line, but there is no problem. 
<M> 
But what is the real problem with this transmission line? 
Ronald Fischer 
That is very difficult to do them because there is too much opposition.  It makes it very, very 
expensive and very risky because you don’t know if you will be able to – suppose that you have a 
contract to have a line in two years and you try to put the line and there is so much opposition that 
you can’t do it, or you have to pay so much money to go through somebody’s land that the costs go 
up too much, so that’s the big problem. 
<K> 
Let me ask a question.  I think you mentioned about some dispute regarding the transfer of 
transmission, not transfer, the transmission line owned by Endesa and Colbún’s privatization and I 
think Endesa didn’t build the transmission line. 
Ronald Fischer 
Yeah, well, I can show it through here. 
<K> 
Yeah, and that transmission line dispute was solved partly by the newly established expert panel at 
that time I think. 
Ronald Fischer 
No, not by the expert panel by the anti-trust, so what they did is they ordered Endesa to sell the 
transmission line to transmission company and that was sold to the Canadians at that time.  What 
happened at the time before that is that Colbún wanted to connect here, and they had an expansion 
and they couldn’t, so they had to build their own line to Santiago.  If you go to the hills, you’d see a 
line around the hills.  It is very expensive for them, but it was better for them than going through here 
because they were asking them so much money.  But now the rules are different.  That was in the 
1990s. 
<K> 
Yeah.  I think Chile took about let’s say 20 years to finish the privatization from the 1978 when the 
CNE was established and until I think 1999 or I forgot, but, all state-owned companies. 
Ronald Fischer 
Until Colbún was sold fully. 
<K> 
Yeah, to the privatization.  During the 20 years, I think Chilean government established a CNE and 
utilize that anti-trust committee, I don’t know, anti-trust something or as I mentioned some expert 
panel. 
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Ronald Fischer 
The expert panel was later.  The expert panel I was a member so… 
<M> 
2005? 
Ronald Fischer 
’04 or ‘05, yeah.  ’04.  The expert panel does disputes – well, it doesn’t, it wouldn’t do something anti-
trust.  Something that’s anti-trust, they won’t be able to do that.  That’s a different thing, but it’s very 
nice, because not only they pay very well, but also that you have complete power, you have total 
power.  Whatever you say, not even the Supreme Court can go against it so there is no appeal. 
<M> 
You are saying now… 
Ronald Fischer 
The expert panel. 
<M> 
The expert panels. 
<K> 
That’s the final decision. 
Ronald Fischer 
Yeah, that’s very nice.  That’s very powerful then. 
<K> 
Do you think the influence of such CNE or anti-trust committee or something, or expert panel on the 
overall result of the privatization of Chilean power sector? 
Ronald Fischer 
Well, not on the privatization but on the working of… 
<M> 
Regulation. 
Ronald Fischer 
Yeah, well, the experts’ panel was something that the companies wanted.  It was not something that, 
I mean the government hadn’t thought of it, it was an idea of the companies because what the 
problem they had was they had lots of disputes among themselves and the disputes – the government 
would take forever to solve them before it went to CNE and would change its mind.  They would say 
yes, and then they would say no, and they would say no and take years and years. 
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If you want to go through the courts, through the judicial system, it was very slow, but also totally 
erratic.  You didn’t know what would happen.  They invented this system, which takes 30 days and 
gives a solution.  It might be the wrong solution, but the people that are on the panel are quite good 
and it gives 30 days, you get a solution in 20.  Even if it goes against you, at least you don’t waste 
any more money.  The companies love it.  They really like it. 
<K> 
Was there any opposition to establishment of that expert panel? 
Ronald Fischer 
Of the what? 
<K> 
The opposition to the establishment of that expert panel? 
Ronald Fischer 
There was no opposition. 
<K> 
Everyone got some benefit? 
Ronald Fischer 
So far, I don’t know of any opposition to it. 
<K> 
Was the establishment – the political process to establish the expert panel was easy? 
Ronald Fischer 
Well, it was part of the 2004, they for about 5 or 6 years – I think around ‘98, ‘97 people had been 
thinking of changing the law, to take into account some of the problems that they had at the time.  
They worked and worked and worked and eventually, especially with transmission problems they had 
lots of problems with transmission and the companies were opposed. 
The Gener wanted very little transmission and Endesa wanted a lot of transmission paid by everybody, 
so they didn’t have to pay the whole amount.  This whole process took about 6 years and instead of 
getting a big change, they got little changes.  That was Ley Corta Uno 2004-2003 and that Ley Corta 
Uno included the penalties expected.  But it didn’t solve all the problems.  That’s why it’s Corta.  Corta 
means the short one, not the complete law that people wanted at the time, but it solved some of the 
more urgent problems. 
<M> 
Ley Corta. 
Ronald Fischer 
Ley Corta means short law. 
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<M> 
Yeah, the short law was backed by the 1999s the drought and the blackout, maybe… 
Ronald Fischer 
Yeah, there was some, yes. 
<M> 
…that would be the reason… 
Ronald Fischer 
That, the transmission, those all things pushed to change the law. 
<M> 
What the short law mainly focused on regulations, so because the expert panel is mainly focusing on 
the regulatory body, so regulation? 
Ronald Fischer 
No, it’s conflicts, especially with huge companies. 
<M> 
But even there was the already existed the CNE? 
Ronald Fischer 
Yeah, the CNE existed and the SEC existed, the Superintendencia de Electricidad y Combustibles, 
which is another regulatory body, which punishes the companies for mistakes, procedures, and things 
like that.  I think you’re right, one of the problems they had at the time was at the time of the crisis, 
they found out that they didn’t have some of the tools they needed.  For instance, there was a tool 
that they needed was how to preserve the reservoirs that were close to collapse.  Because the 
reservoirs have two different benefits, one is they generate energy, but the other one is they stabilize 
the system.  What happens is that with the rules at the time, they could only consider the role of 
generation, but not the roles ability. 
One of the things that happened was that when they went very low, they should have stopped using 
the river and just used it for stabilization of the system and they continued draining it until there was 
no capacity and the system became very unstable and collapsed.  They needed tool for that.  Now, 
they have a tool which is [Unclear] or something like that, I think that’s the name.  [Unclear] means 
that that the reservoirs are used much more carefully, so the costs go up, but at least you have more 
security. 
Then there were other things, for instance, what do you do when a company doesn’t have a contract, 
I’m sorry a distribution company.  The distribution companies had contracts with the electric 
companies, what happens if they couldn’t get a contract and they found out some companies had no 
contract.  At some point they would to renew the contract, they couldn’t do it.  What would they do in 
those cases? 
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<K> 
Build generation by its own? 
Ronald Fischer 
No, it would take too long and besides, it’s not part of their business.  The cost would be too high.  No, 
what they did was, the government put a rule that said that since everybody had to – all the 
companies had to collaborate and selling them at an average kind of price of all the other sales, so, 
but that was not in the law, it was just, I think that the regulator didn’t because there was no option, 
they had to do something and then they put it in the law basically, something like that.  That was 
another thing in Ley Corta.  There were lots of things. 
Then they had rules about how to expand the transmission system, that’s also part of the Ley Corta.  
That was what they spent most time fighting about.  Then they found out that there was not enough, 
so they had to do the Ley Corta Dos, which was like 2 years later. 
<M> 
Chile got initial success from the reform and then they got some problems after the power sector 
reform.  By the new law, Ley Corta, short, they have responded to the previous fronted situation until 
now. I think the new enactment and new law would be main reason for the current situation so in the 
process they had some capacity to regulate and operate a power system.  How do you think? 
Ronald Fischer 
I forgot one thing about the Ley Corta; they also put in the, the basic rules for having renewables, 
nonconventional renewable power sectors.  That’s very important and it’s now finally working really 
well.  I mean, the renewables have become very important and there is no subsidy here, which is 
quite impressive, because for instance, Japan, I think they have quite a few subsidies. 
<K> 
So high – highly subsidized. 
Ronald Fischer 
Well, here the energy is so expensive that, of course, you don’t need subsidy.  That’s the reason. 
<K> 
I don’t know which is better. 
Ronald Fischer 
At least it’s not distorted.  If you look at, there’s a graph that appears in the latest report of the 
system, there is a law that says that you have to have a certain amount of renewables and we have 
like 80% more right now, so the law doesn’t even apply, it’s just. 
<K> 
It may finally reduce the power price? 
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Ronald Fischer 
It’s having that effect, yes. 
<K> 
Sorry, I think you mentioned that the regulatory bodies – before the Ley Corta Uno, the regulatory 
bodies didn’t have or lacked some tools to control the power sector and then that was the reason why 
the Ley Corta Uno was created. 
Ronald Fischer 
Yeah, but it wasn’t enough. 
<K> 
You mean Ley Corta Dos was created later? 
Ronald Fischer 
Yeah. Even then, there were some problems.  For instance, one of the problems they had was that the 
way in which the CDEC or the systems that dispatch and they are also the kind of short-term 
regulators of the system.  They have lots of roles.  They enact when there is very little water, they put 
the rules and how they operate.  They have rules about, something that’s very important, which is the 
maintaining when a plant has to be repaired and they have to plan this thing a year in advance or 
something like that.  There are lots of small details. 
I mean, it’s such a complicated system, you have the law, then you have the regulation, then you 
have another level, which are the resolutions and then you have something called the manual de 
procedimientos, which is like the low-level operation system, which also has to be discussed between 
all the companies. 
What happened was CDEC with this manual de procedimientos, which is how you actually apply the 
rules was the big companies had lots of power in it and they used it to their own benefit in a sense.  A 
law that came afterwards like 2 or 3 years ago kind of tried to make the CDEC, the system of dispatch 
even more independent of the companies.  They are a bit autonomous. 
<K> 
What’s that? 
Ronald Fischer 
CDEC 
<K> 
CDEC, was it caused by some law? 
Ronald Fischer 
Yes, there was. 
<K> 
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Some law made CDEC more independent, autonomous? 
Ronald Fischer 
Yeah.  You have good handwriting even in a different script. 
<K> 
Did it take place in at almost the same time of Ley Corta Uno? 
Ronald Fischer 
No. 
<K> 
Later? 
Ronald Fischer 
That was 10 years later that was somewhat 3 years ago.  I think the Piñera government in the middle, 
in small laws in the last few years; they are trying to improve little things, the left, because Ley Corta 
was Corta, so it didn’t incorporate everything. 
<K> 
You mean so no single solution solved everything, so just as gradual. 
Ronald Fischer 
There’ve been gradual changes. 
<K> 
Improvement, okay. 
<M> 
But in developing countries like Philippine, there was a very strong interference by the politicians, so 
how about the Chilean case, in this kind of? 
Ronald Fischer 
Well, I think, the way in which it manifests itself is by making very difficult to invest in plants.  Endesa 
for instance, just last week decided not to continue with this project in the south, the HidroAysén 
project because basically because of, you could say political things.  Mainly it was political.  They 
made it very difficult for them to develop the project, so they made it impossible, actually.  There are 
some that, there are some basically the interferences that you can’t do things, you can’t invest in 
some areas.  There is a lot of opposition.  That’s the political system intervenes and that’s the way it 
works.  It doesn’t – there is very little naked intervention.  It’s usually through the local opposition or 
even global opposition in some cases. 
<K> 
Well, let’ say, for instance, in the selection of members of that expert panel, the large company would 
like to have someone who is preferable – make preferable decision to that large company. 
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Ronald Fischer 
Yeah, but now I think it’s become much more independent because now the members are chosen by I 
think the Alta Dirección Pública which is a kind of – it’s a part of the civil service that selects the 
personnel.  In a sense, it’s more independent of the companies. 
<K> 
About conflict resolution, I think all companies – even the large like Endesa would like to have it. 
Ronald Fischer 
Yeah, they love it. 
<K> 
Yeah, but on the other hand, I’m not sure about like CDEC? 
Ronald Fischer 
I’m sorry. 
<K> 
CDEC.  I’m not sure about the independence or autonomy of CDEC would be preferable, desirable for 
the large companies? 
Ronald Fischer 
No, they don’t like it, but they are the – there has been a big push by the government and by the 
political system to have some independence because they feel out that there are some problems 
caused by the lack of it. 
<K> 
I think the characteristics of Chilean case would be that the Chilean government always make, let’s 
say, good decision. 
Ronald Fischer 
No, not always, but, well, I would say they usually don’t do stupid things, but they don’t always 
choose the best option.  They usually don’t do something really stupid, that’s true.  Except for the – 
for instance, something my impression is that that doesn’t change.  That has been the case because, 
up till now, basically, the technicians, the people who are the engineers, the economists, and people 
like that have had the power in this thing, but that has changed now in the last year or 2 years it’s the 
politicians who are in charge and I think that, well, things will quickly become worse.  Because 
politicians respond to very short-term priorities, so there’ll probably be some stupid things coming out. 
Up till now, basically you move in the right direction, perhaps not being the best thing that you can do 
and you forgot to do some things and you had pressure.  But I guess basically positive and now we 
are having, well, of course you can’t invest in plants, and we can’t do electrical lines and that’s very 
costly. 
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We had a big problem, I don’t know if you know this.  We – like 15 years ago, we made a pact with 
Argentina to import gas from them at a very good price.  We’ve built the pipelines and we invested in 
power plants, very efficient power plants, combined cycle, so very nice, very nonpolluting.  They had 
all the benefits and the Argentineans, and so our whole system changed from being a system which 
was based on coal and water to one of which gas was very attractive.  One of the things about gas is 
that you can put them very close to the cities because it don’t pollute.  There’s one in the middle of 
the city, there is a power plant. 
For a while, you didn’t make any extension of the transmission system and then the Argentineans 
stopped sending gas.  But at the beginning you never knew if they were going to continue sending gas 
or they would stop completely.  For about 4 years nobody knew if they had to invest in something else, 
or they had to keep what they were doing.  That was immensely costly.  That was a huge cost and so 
now we – I think everybody learnt a lesson and nobody wants to depend on one country forever again.  
I mean, you can depend on lots of countries, but not on one. 
<K> 
But that would be one of the – that could be one of the incentives for Chilean government to consider 
more seriously about the regional power grid like from Colombia to Chile? 
Ronald Fischer 
Well, one point, I think that we would only consider it if we have a way of, if it wasn’t one way, but it 
was two ways, because we don’t want to have a system in which they can cut us off.  But if we send, 
the other way, then we can punish them if they misbehave.  That’s the… 
<K> 
Yeah, regional transmission is always very difficult solution, but… 
Ronald Fischer 
But they have in Central America, so it’s not impossible. 
<K> 
Yeah, SIEPAC. 
Ronald Fischer 
No, here the distance is very long, so that’s a big problem.  This is a very narrow country and it’s… 
<M> 
Really narrow. 
Ronald Fischer 
It’s narrow like Japan, but not as great as much. 
<K> 
No, we have very similar problem that we don’t have much energy resources like oil, gas, coal.  We 
only have hydro, so that’s why we – not heavily but depends on nuclear power stations. 
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Ronald Fischer 
Right, but now you’re stopping no? 
<K> 
It stopped. 
Ronald Fischer 
That’s a folly.  I didn’t think it was a good idea. 
<M> 
But now you know, the oil and gas price is getting down, going down so… 
Ronald Fischer 
Yeah, but… 
<K> 
It’s not a long-term thing, it’s a short-term influence, but. 
Ronald Fischer 
I mean, Fukushima wasn’t so bad.  I mean. 
<K> 
But I think probably the electricity price in Japan will go up soon, definitely.  It’s very difficult to 
restart nuclear power station. 
Ronald Fischer 
I’ve been to Japan a couple of times, but a long time ago.  It was interesting, it was very nice.  I liked 
it.  No, besides I’m a great lover of history of Japan and I also read the history of Genji. 
<M> 
Genji, oh.  As a whole, what do you think the some influential or political factors in the, let’s say, 
partly successful privatization of Chilean power sector. 
Ronald Fischer 
My impression is that I think the fact that mainly people who understood the economics and weren’t – 
they didn’t have a lot of pressure from the political side, for a long time until recently basically 
manage the system, so those guys want to do things that are fairly good.  Sometimes they work for a 
company and they would bias things towards the company but they don’t want to get too far away 
from. 
Now, the fact, for instance, prices would have been lower if there had been more investment in water 
in the early ‘90s, for instance.  But the Endesa, which had all the water rights didn’t want to or most 
of the water rights.  Now, you can’t invest any more.  I don’t know how you manage to dam all your 
rivers, nobody complains? 
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<K> 
It’s very difficult. 
Ronald Fischer 
No, but you have more dams, I think, no? 
<K> 
Yeah, but we almost building dams about 20 years ago in Japan. 
Ronald Fischer 
But you’ve damed all your rivers right now so there is not much space to do anymore. 
<K> 
Right. 
Ronald Fischer 
Here they are doing the run of rivers things, I like dams better.  But nobody likes them. 
<K> 
Yes, they are difficult.  It’s difficult. 
Ronald Fischer 
Yeah.  But the other option that we have here is because now, apparently, we’re going to depend a lot 
on solar energy because it’s the – as you know, the installation levels here are huge, so it’s very – the 
cost of having solar is very low.  In a sense that the solar cells and the photovoltaic cells operate at 
very high levels and also the other systems.  And it doesn’t work at night, so but it compliments itself 
very well with water so what I would – my proposal is to have in every part where you have the run of 
rivers thing to have a small dam, very small, but enough to work for about 15 hours.  When at night, 
when this thing doesn’t work, you have the dam to. 
<K> 
Yeah, that kind of the micro-hydro power station is a new idea. 
Ronald Fischer 
Well, no.  This would even be the big ones, that you have a small pool for a few hours, doesn’t have to 
be a reservoir, but just… 
<K> 
For stabilization or to cover the night demand. 
Ronald Fischer 
Exactly. 
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<K> 
Yeah.  But I think you mentioned about the technocrats, so I think that technocrats would be one of 
the key factors. 
Ronald Fischer 
I think that was one of the key factors and for a long time in Chile, the technical and engineering, at 
least in these areas have been dominant, but I think now it might be changing, so I’m not so sure.  My 
impression is that I don’t know if it’s the same thing in Japan, but here the idea is that in a sense, 
everybody has the same right to have an opinion.  Even if the opinion is, let’s say, stupid, you still 
have the right to say it, and that is almost as valuable as the one of an expert.  We’re having that 
problem now.  I don’t know if that can be solved. 
<K> 
But until a few years ago, the economists and engineers were relatively independent of political 
interference. 
Ronald Fischer 
They could just build these things, work these things out. 
<K> 
Even after the Pinochet? 
Ronald Fischer 
At least until 5 years ago or 4 years ago or something like that and then they started losing power 
with it. 
<K> 
Is that because of some culture or…? 
Ronald Fischer 
A cultural thing.  I mean there has been a change in the way of which people perceive – people want a 
more democratic country in a sense, having people who know decide is not very democratic. Of course, 
it gives you good solutions, but people want to have a say. 
<K> 
But I think the role of export would be very big to… 
Ronald Fischer 
No, one thing is an experts panel, but that’s a very isolated thing, but in general, the experts in a 
sense help to design policy is I think becoming less and less important, which is not good.  I don’t 
know… 
<K> 
It used to be important in this country. 
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Ronald Fischer 
Yeah, all policies were basically tested by experts, so we didn’t do many stupid things.  Now, my 
impression is that yeah, because don’t want people that are experts deciding things, for them.  They 
want to decide themselves so they elect politicians, politicians will have a free run and that’s I’m not 
sure I think.  You have that too; politicians have a lot of power and so on. 
<K> 
Yeah.  That’s our problem.  Yes, any? 
<M> 
I think for me, for my impression, the balancing between technocrat and I mean the technologist or 
economist and the politician would be very appropriate in the process of Chilean power sector reform 
and privatization.  They continuously make independent system, independent body to regulate power 
up to now, so I think it could be one of the interesting things. 
Ronald Fischer 
Conclusions, one of your conclusions. 
<K> 
I am not sure about that. 
<K> 
Yeah.  Probably, I mean, I’m not... 
Ronald Fischer 
No, well, that’s my impression. 
<K> 
Just last question.  Do you know any article, or paper, or something in which the policy process of the 
establishment of creation of the Corta Uno is described, about 6 or 7 years policy process? 
Ronald Fischer 
I’m not sure there is a history.  You will have to research, but there are not many people who would 
have written it. 
<K> 
Maybe we should have asked about this to Mr. Jadresic yesterday. 
Ronald Fischer 
What’s important is, perhaps, let me see.  We wrote – let me see, because I wrote several years ago, 
just I remember. 
<M> 
Oh, you wrote? 
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Ronald Fischer 
No, I wrote something, but I’m not sure where that is.  I also have very bad memory about what I did. 
<K> 
Well, I think that policy process would be very interesting. 
Ronald Fischer 
Some years ago, we wrote something about – at some point I wanted to write a book about what 
happened in Chile history of all the regulated systems, so perhaps there’s something there, but I have 
to.  It’s like old stuff so I’d have to look at my old.  I don’t even know where it is, that’s the problem I 
have.  Let me see what… 
END 
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Bruno Philippi 
I decided to write down some of the experience we had, not in every detail, but in basic principle.  In 
Latin America, it’s very common, what you’re seeing there, and probably in Africa too, and in Europe 
some countries too.  It is a mixing of the role of the state as a regulator and the role of the state as an 
entrepreneur.  What happens when you do separate them, the entrepreneurial side captured the 
regulator in a minute.  At the end, the state company regulate, operate like É lectricité de France for 
many years.  Japan had some problem like that too… 
 
<M> 
Yeah, right. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
…as far as I remember.  But that’s the story.  Essentially here what it does is a description; simplify 
what we learned in Chile.  Some of the thing would be applied, some not.  But the political problem to 
try to implement this story and put it to work because essentially, you destroy the system that had 
been used for years and the bank don’t like it, the big engineering companies don’t like it, the 
equipment suppliers don’t like it because what we tried to do was to introduce more competition, and 
essentially deliberate the prices of the generation of electricity.  The system flourished and has been 
applying for the last – this is ‘91, and this was done in ’81.  This was written 10 years after.  Some 
modification has been done and probably many more could be introduced.  I have that in Spanish.  
Spanish is longer. 
 
<M> 
Longer. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
It’s longer because it’s more detailed.  But you can skip all the numbers, because the numbers doesn’t 
make any sense because they’re old.  Spanish version of the story.  I’m sure because I am 
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participating in a group, people in the United Nation on 9 November, and a few weeks ago.  I’m sure 
it’s here.  But this is in Spanish.  This is more detailed and essentially the same, but it is much more 
detailed. 
 
<M> 
Oh, thank you.  Spanish. 
 
<K> 
Is this published somewhere? 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Excuse me. 
 
<K> 
Is this published? 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Yeah, that was a long talk in the university and they did that – they took note and then actually 
corrected.  Alas, you will see [Unclear] and you’ll see the date is very similar.  Probably it was a few 
years after ‘92.  But this is an expanded measure of the story, a more detailed.  With the 
consideration that the numbers aren’t relevant today, but the system is the same.  How we proceed?  
How do we centralize? 
 
Essentially, the main task here was to make competitive a sector that was not competitive.  We were 
not aiming to privatization.  Privatization is a political decision and we were not political authority.  
What we did was to create a system fourth generation company to compete and what we are 
describing are the problems we encountered in doing that. 
 
When the system was working for 3 or 4 years, the government decided that it could be more 
advantageous to let the private sector participate, but then the government really had to provide all 
the money for the investment and the system regulated itself better. 
 
At that time, the pension fund system was created so there was an incipient capital market in Chile 
and you could raise money to sustain the investment.  The system now is 100% in the private hand.  
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The problem is over the years, the regulator has been introducing some changes, but not based on 
technical consideration, but on political.  In my opinion they destroyed part of the advantage of the 
story.  Because you know, private sector, particularly if they see the possibility to get something from 
the government, they grab it immediately.  The idea here was to keep the government out, only as a 
regulator, and be very strict with regulation.  That’s it. 
 
<K> 
You mentioned the state should have both roles of regulator and entrepreneur, but in Chile only 
regulator.  The entrepreneur… 
 
Bruno Philippi 
But when we started, both would meet together.  The company essentially was the regulator, so then 
they would regulate themselves, so you never knew what was happening inside.  Separating that, 
creating a framework for regulation, and applying that framework to the state companies – they were 
all state companies – and will run the system for 2 or 3 year, with a lot of fight with the companies.  
They went to the politician, and they put a lot of pressure, and everyone complained.  But at the end, 
we survived and they learned how to live in the system.  Once you start privatizing, the system 
sustained itself much better.  You create a different interest and conflicting objectives, that’s what you 
want, as long as no one can capture the other for free and that’s it. 
 
<K> 
First, you started from the establishment of CNE in 1978, and then started the privatization after three 
or four… 
 
Bruno Philippi 
No.  What we did in CNE was to organize a policy for the whole sector.  We never talk about 
privatization.  The decision was not done by CNE, it was done by the owner, and the owner is the 
government and the government runs his company through another organization.  CNE essentially is a 
regulator.  But once you impose the rules – well, the government had to apply the rules and they 
applied the rule and did end up in privatization.  It was the same for the oil and gas sector, and for 
the coal sector, and for the rest of the stuff. 
 
In oil and gas, we had one hurdle [ph], because we didn’t have much oil and the union thing there, 
small oil company we have, was strong.  Since they were not extremely relevant, because they had to 
buy the oil, no matter what, we concentrate on just forcing the state company to be competitive with 
import.  We liberate the import and apply exactly the same rules to the state company. 
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The distributions were private, most of them.  They started importing.  There was a fight and because 
they – easy to say they start importing, but all the big tanks, all the facilities, all the terminals 
belonged to the state.  We have to create the regulation to open up all those facilities under the 
ownership of the state, but put transfer prices the same to everyone, to the government company, 
and to the private company.  As long as they fulfill that, they complete the stuff. 
 
<K> 
As you said, probably, obviously stream regarding the more competitive power sector and another 
stream of privatization, so took at the same… 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Essential, the role was creating the regulation that allows the system to operate efficiently.  Once the 
system operates efficiently, a different decision done by different authority – I mean political authority 
– they say, well, this thing could be run without the government as long as government keeps their 
role as the regulators did that.  Then they start selling shares and that’s it. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, I understand it. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
They need to do that because as I said before, the government started the pension fund system and 
that created a capital market.  I mean, it doesn’t make any sense to privatize energy sector, if you 
don’t have a capital market.  Because at the end, you don’t have that, the government had to provide 
the money so what’s the difference.  Have to be something that a coherent macro system, with the 
risk you are facing.  Once, the pension system was created, probably you will have to look at that, too, 
the Chilean pension fund. 
 
The pension fund savings – personal savings of each of you, but they need to invest this money.  But 
at that time, obviously, most of the investment was done in Chile.  Now, they’re allowed to invest 
everywhere, or roughly.  But they didn’t have much to invest in Chile.  The big corporate company 
belonged to the state and they didn’t open it.  But the energy sector, particularly the electrical sector, 
is ideal for pension fund, long-term, single-firm, relatively small.  They need a lot of money for capital, 
bonds, so they started emitting bonds, and then they started floating shares.  The government had to 
transform the state companies in corporation and the government retained the control of those 
companies for many years. 
 
But again, the key story was to force them to operate as a company, not as a state company.  That 
was a big fight.  In the sense, that one we said okay, and that was done by the CNE.  This is now 
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corporation, even though in 95% or 100% owned by the government, the rules are the same that had 
to be applied to the small electrical companies that are private, but the state-owned were the biggest. 
 
We will request every year, as a government, as a main shareholder, a program what you intend to do 
during the year, a financial program, an investment program, and result.  We would like to know what 
do you expect from the result to get.  At the end, they thought that was very easy and they produced 
all sorts of numbers and they said, well, we will be able to have a profitability, I don’t know, of 8%.  
We will generate such and such and you lend us the money for the investment, great.  You say that 
the investment, they have to have rate of return, its okay. 
 
Obviously, in the middle of the year, they run out of money, they use all the money.  The project that 
should be costing 100 was over 200, so there was no way to recover the money, implying that there 
too.  One of the thing that was done, because this company goes to the government and say, look, 
you are the owner and we need the money, we don’t have money for electricity. 
 
We were going to do the same that the shareholder does in a normal company.  You produce a 
forecast of what are you go to do during the year.  You need so much money for investment and you 
say that with this thing, you will have a rate of return of that much, right?  This means so much 
money. 
 
Great.  Since the owner is the government, the owner decides to collect that money in advance.  The 
company is saying we don’t have the money.  No, we know that you don’t have the money but if what 
you’re saying is true, borrow money, not from the government, go to the banks and explain them. 
 
They have never done that they didn’t like it because from the government, they didn’t have to 
explain anything.  When they went to the bank, they realized that the bank would like to know all the 
little numbers in this project and how come they guarantee that they will generate that amount of 
money.  They start borrowing money with [Unclear] guarantee. 
 
They run out of money, they didn’t have enough money, so they said – the government said, through 
CNE, you don’t have the money, okay, get rid of some of the things that you have.  You are running a 
big company for transportation and you don’t need them.  You can secure them in the market at the 
fraction of the price.  They did that.  This one was supervised system for a few years.  This things was 
not automatically.  You have to be there to do that. 
 
When they realized that they could do it, they became pretty competitive and also they have to reduce 
the number of people.  Usually, you have all sorts of useless people.  They have very good competent 
professional.  But since they were public, the politicians keep sending people there to be hired, you 
see, people that run for the Senate and didn’t get to the Senate, so they have to be hired well in some 
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company.  They do this, it’s done everywhere in the world.  Well, you cannot sustain them, so decide 
what you intend to do. 
 
The key story to what we learned is that you let the system free too soon, collapse.  You keep an eye 
on them and control them, they hate you for that.  After a few years, the system was running on its 
own.  When it’s running, you can privatize it.  Before that, it’s an issue.  That was done in several 
countries.  They privatized without the framework that made sense.  At the end the government 
ended up transferring money to the private sector.  Does not exactly use it for the sector, they use it 
for other thing.  You didn’t give anything and they will say why the hell did you privatize this.  That’s 
the key idea. 
 
<M> 
When CNE established in 1978, how does the CNE organized?  Who designed the CNE and who are the 
main workers for the…? 
 
Bruno Philippi 
It is explained here. 
 
<M> 
You explained here. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
I mean, CNE when we started, was a very general framework and essentially we shape it, but we were 
– for most of this process, we were, trying to remember, six professional, two secretaries and one 
junior and that’s it. 
 
<M> 
Very small – started from very small. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Very small unit, with a lot of power.  We have money and we have a board controlling for the – CNE 
was under a board of ministers.  They were the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Economics, the 
Minister of Mining, the key ministers.  You could solve the internal problem relatively easily, all with 
the discussions. 
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<M> 
You are appointed by the…? 
 
Bruno Philippi 
I was appointed by the – I was at the university.  I was a professor in the Catholic University of Chile 
in the system engineering department.  I am civil engineer, but I have a Ph.D. from Stanford 
University in system engineering economic.  The government said, well, would you like to face it?  
Probably I didn’t have any idea about energy, probably was an advantage, they had misconception.  I 
formed a little group.  I tracked professional from the state-owned company and few of the private 
company and with that group of five or six, we started facing the problem.  It was very dynamic.  You 
will see that.  That also you try to describe in there. 
 
<M> 
Main compositions of the workers are technical expert. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Technical experts and let me say, the technical expert is key because in most of these companies – I 
am sure Japan has more than here, you may have useless people in some of the state-owned 
companies, but all of them have good technical people.  Maybe less than what they should have.  
They are taking up people, good technicians; they don’t have any other place to go.  This is the only 
area that they could do well on the job.  But once you recognize them and you start discussing at the 
technical level, with intelligent people and technically – even though you don’t agree in the general 
concept, philosophical concept of how the economy should be run, you can reach agreement very 
simple, because technical matters are technical matters.  That this doesn’t work this work.  They’ve 
tried this thing, they’ve tried this other. 
 
But once we designed the system and once we had very good [Unclear], but we look at why do we did 
that, not before, before passing the law, we look at what was the experience in other countries.  We 
look at the – where we had information we looked at France, England, the States, Belgium.  There are 
several.  I guess they are described in there.  I sent a group of five people, spent about 1.5 month or 
2 months, but they already had their own idea.  If you do that before thinking about your problem, 
you try to copy things.  It could be seen in every work and we realized that a substantial part that we 
are proposing was done in one way or another in different country, not in one complete coherent form. 
 
France and England was the inventor of the marginal system.  They designed the story, they started 
doing it, but they didn’t apply it, after a while probably because Électricité de France was state-owned 
and didn’t want to be controlled in such an efficient way.  It doesn’t make any sense but they did and 
that’s what we did, to apply the concept. 
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I mentioned some of the key papers there; there are a few on it.  One is what – the one that – you’re 
familiar with marginal tariffication, right?  One key paper, which is the basis of the coherence of the 
marginal tariffication system and that is the reason why it worked here, is that you charge the energy 
at the marginal price of energy in electricity.  You charge the power at the marginal price of power.  
You cover investment at operational cost, with some assumption. 
 
The problem is that the assumption had to be real.  The key assumption as far as, I remember – I’ve 
been out of this story for a year, is that the system doesn’t have real economies of scale.  
Government had the idea that you build the huge nuclear power plant is much more efficient than 
having several relatively small, is not true, you look at the number.  It is very similar.  It seems very 
similar, the adaptability of the system is relatively easy because you need to build huge thing for 
economies of scale, as it is complicated, with jumping steps. 
 
There are some complications with the transmission system.  The transmission system had that 
problem.  You have to move in chunks.  That’s why it’s usually solved in a different way.  But you can 
define the marginal criteria for that too.  That they did. 
 
Well, the system, roughly, was adopted later.  Its ‘91, right? 
 
<K> 
Yeah, ’91. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Yeah.  This was quite partially enrolled that because in Argentina, they ask us how we did that, the 
Senate and we tried to explain them what we did.  It doesn’t mean that you have to do the same.  But 
essentially, Argentina originally followed more of the same rule.  No doubt, now, Argentina, as I 
mentioned, they just don’t stay with it.  But Argentina went through the same route, knowing that it 
would work because they looked at here, and they follow more or less the same path in privatization.  
Peru, the Peruvian law was essentially done with Chilean consultant.  New Zealand, partially England 
and the States, when they understood the problem many year later.  That’s it. 
 
<K> 
Why do you think the result differs from country to country?  Chile, it could be said be successful but if 
you look at… 
 
Bruno Philippi 
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Why, because the political interference.  I’m sure that Tokyo Electric is extremely powerful.  You might 
be right to conceptually, and technically, and philosophically, what should be done, but they don’t like 
it.  They have to convince government officials that usually do not have the training, the knowledge, 
and arguments that are half argument because at the end that’s the real world.  You have to work 
with that. 
 
Right at the end of – hopefully the rule had to be simple.  Only marginal pricing, many countries apply 
it but not completely.  And as far as I remember, Japan has been doing always that story.  You look at 
the real marginal cost of generation at your facility, you organize and you order them in a proper way.  
In hydroelectric [ph] system like this, it is more complicated because you have to create an artificial 
marginal price for the water. 
 
In the case of Chile, it was not that difficult because we do have one big lake – big reservoir capacity 
and essentially you assimilate the water at that lake to a variable marginal price.  There is a lot of 
water and marginal price is very low and therefore the hydroelectric plant, and the low – inexpensive 
coal-fired plant or gas-fired are dispatched.  The water is scarce, you just are using units that are 
more expensive to operate and that’s it.  No more than that. 
 
<K> 
Why do you think the Chilean government or the power sector could avoid the political interference? 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Difficult, but we’ve got the bank, the company, the people, the user, when you have the government 
on their side that happened in Chile, and probably the same everywhere.  The big industrial sector, 
private or state-owned, they like that because they always complain to the world, we cannot be more 
efficient because the electricity you’re selling is expensive. 
 
<K> 
Mining companies. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Exactly.  You subsidize it.  At the end, the electrical company usually may not give enough to 
subsidize, it’s not their money.  They transform themselves into an engineering company.  What they 
want to contract or to build things.  The more electricity they make and the more subsidy they have, 
the easy it is, and it’s more difficult for the government to control what are they doing.  I think I saw 
that in many countries, in Colombia, in Europe, in several places.  German probably was a good 
example too because they decentralized the system.  They operate locally.  Once they start moving in 
this direction, they lower the price and it’s much more robust. 
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You need to coordinate this.  This is the other part of the story, this is the dispatching – economic 
dispatching center, which is assimilation of the market where everyone said instantly what can they 
offer at what prices and that the dispatching center independently hold that and who have the 
contract guaranteeing continuously that they dispatch at the minimum cost.  You have a run of the 
river plant, that you have a lot of water, you only dispatch first what is zero.  If I have a coal-fired 
plant, which is relatively old and you have one that is new, you are next [Unclear] at the end.  That’s 
it. 
 
With this story, probably there is a picture here.  With this story, in Chile, Chile is a small country, 
[Unclear] like, no comparison with Japan, but when we started in ‘78, we started in ‘80 but ’78, it was 
really.  There were two big state-owned electric companies.  Chilectra, that used to be private, but 
was set aside and Endesa.  They have distribution and the distribution buyer, each one.  Therefore, 
this was more thermal and this was more hydroelectric.  Another problem we had, [Unclear] with 
certain license situation.  Sometimes you have excess of water and this company generating is coal 
and you don’t need that.  But there is no incentive for this company to stop the generation, because 
stop generation doesn’t have an income. 
 
One thing that is very difficult is to try to coordinate state-owned companies.  Usually you don’t 
coordinate because they are sort of independent.  After the system was transformed, I remember 
there was a graphic here, not here because I haven’t, one second.  It’s also there.  I get, here it is. 
 
Now, what is the new system?  We’re separating the state-owned companies, big generation facility, 
hydroelectric and thermal, so you create several generation companies, all state-owned.  They don’t 
sell directly to anyone.  They are dispatched but this Economic Dispatching Center.  This is the guy 
who coordinates the demand from the end with the generation in every part. 
 
Here you have, let’s say, this generation company could have contract with this client and was 
independent, free client, but sometimes this is not the one who supply the electricity, it’s this one 
because it’s cheaper. 
 
What this center does is a clearinghouse.  At the end of the month, they said, great, you didn’t supply 
anything but it is your client.  The client is paying you, but you have to return the money to this guy.  
The money is the cost of the generation, plus the transmission – the use of the transmission line.  This 
is what the dispatching unit does.  I am absolutely sure that Japan does the same.  Most of the 
electrical systems uses dispatching center.  It’s a state [Unclear] but otherwise is a mess. 
 
What happened could be disturbed easily and you have another complication that we don’t have, but 
eventually we should, are the nuclear power plants.  Nuclear power is different because nuclear power 
you cannot stop and run them as you please.  Even a big coal-fired unit too is more flexible than 
nuclear.  Nuclear essentially you’re running for the whole year until you replenish the fuel and that’s it.  
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Coal-fired, you can stop them and run them and you have to wait sometimes 24 hours, but not a year.  
Therefore, you have [Unclear] nuclear power, essential in base. 
 
Fortunately, nuclear power, as far as I remember, the generation cost of nuclear power is very similar 
to the hydroelectric plant.  If you don’t count, which is a different story, the cost of disposal of the fuel, 
which at that time, no one really cares.  Considering, we didn’t have nuclear power, we didn’t you look 
at the problem.  That is true, but you can accommodate that.  The British did that.  They put the 
nuclear power as a baseload generation and you can do that too.  But that essentially is the problem. 
 
Now, with the marginal tariffication, there should be a graph.  That’s it.  Really, this is what’s 
happened in Chile.  You see, the prices are not flat.  This is the price of energy for several years.  This 
is the real price.  This is the marginal price.  This more rain, less rain, this is the hydroelectric system 
here, little rain, so the system gets stuck and you have to use more expensive unit deployed on top, 
then with very wet year, went down. 
 
Now, for the household, it is very difficult to understand that one day the price is here and the other 
day the price is here.  My wife would never accept that.  What we did for the regulated prices, which 
are the distribution company, you created a moving average that anticipate, I don’t remember 48 
month, 4 years. 
 
<M> 
Two years. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Just moves the whole story.  Therefore, this thing is moving, but more slowly.  On the other hand – 
well, probably you know that again, you have been looking at the system here, which have been key 
from the very beginning, you said, well, why do we need to regulate.  You need to regulate essentially 
the small consumers, the household, and the small industry. 
 
Let’s free the electricity price for the big company.  They didn’t like it a bit, you see, because they say 
they could not compete, there was no way to negotiate and so on, particularly the state-owned 
company were the one who play with the corporate company.  I would say no, you are big enough at 
the same time we open up the possibilities you want to build your own generation facility, build your 
own generation facility.  But it is not easy to run a generation facility.  You don’t have an idea to do 
that. 
 
Well, they did, probably but after a point they convinced themselves that they could negotiate because 
they have several generators.  They’re not forced to buy one.  They can negotiate with anyone of 
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them.  Once you did that – and today, I guess, today probably in the main interconnected system, 
50%, at least of the price of electricity are not regulated.  It is set by this. 
 
<K> 
Market. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
In the North, probably 90%.  Therefore, you have a reference, if the marginal prices start getting too 
far away from this, there is something wrong.  On the other hand, the companies frequently negotiate 
that price, so they look at the margin gap.  This is public information.  I think it would be public in the 
computer of the CNE or the regulator all the time.  They can negotiate with you a different criteria, a 
different price, but the right way.  But I keep that in mind. 
 
Sometimes companies negotiate directly, strict marginal price with up-and-down because they have 
their own backup system.  Others say, no.  I will negotiate and I will ask price.  We will like to update 
that price, not with your marginal system, but with the price of oil to mining company, because they 
use a lot of oil.  You set the system free and it adapts much better, and if a regulator tried to regulate 
all the story, in this country that is relatively small.  It’s difficult imagining under Japan, it is 
impossible.  With hundreds of generators big [Unclear] millions of companies, each one with a 
different criteria, with different needs.  One would like to operate at 2 o’clock in the morning, the 
other at 2 o’clock in the evening; you can do things with that.  Let them do it as they prefer, as long 
as no one gets a free ride.  I’m paid. 
 
<M> 
Maybe the transparency could be… 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Oh no, it’s essential and the information is always public.  Before we started, the main generation 
company in Chile, Endesa was the one who decided the expansion plan of the system.  They decided 
what should be built. 
 
Now, we took that away in the very beginning, and it was transferred to the National Energy 
Commission.  Essentially the planning was done independently of the company.  What we did was to 
[Unclear] what to say to the company, you have project in mind, sure.  Okay.  Present them with this 
standard to make the comparison.  Once you have them, you would put them in a classical 
optimization model and you say, according to this, with a criteria of minimum present value cost of 
the operation of the system for the next 30 year.  With this, this should be first, this should be second, 
and this should be third. 
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What the regulator does in Chile is an indicative plan.  It’s not obligatory, not mandatory.  The 
commission then he has [Unclear] when they run this story and they said, well, the more attractive 
generation facility, this new generation, look that should be this.  The owner is right probably, not 
your problem. 
 
But we also left open the possibility that if your company doesn’t agree with what the regulator did 
and you want to build your project, you just go ahead and build it.  What happens is that the 
information is right, you may lose money or at least not be as profitable as it should, because the 
system is optimized with all the information.  We’ve used convenient to participate in this story, 
because indirectly, you know what your competitors are doing.  The scale happened and some 
company decide to build the project because it’s not a huge project, but relatively large.  Because 
probably there is a huge mining consumption sector and they want to have a direct contract and they 
do it.  They can do it, no problem. 
 
What the planning unit does, take this all the data, include it as an offer that is for sure, run the model 
again and say, well, the system be delayed for a year because there is someone coming in between.  
That’s it. 
 
Now, I will come in and sign those contracts.  He is responsible for those contracts.  It happened that 
the same task will run and you have the contract because the mining company signed a contract with 
you, they need the electricity and they spend billions of dollars developing the mine.  When they need 
they electricity, they say, sorry.  The original system, that’s what they modified and it’s not precisely 
optimal in my opinion. 
 
The original system said, okay, while you have a contract as a free client to you.  But if there is no 
electricity, assume that the machine collapsed or it doesn’t rain, if I was selling electricity at 10, and I 
don’t have the electricity, the dispatching center keeps providing electricity to this consumer.  But 
they know that I am not supplying that and if there is none, I take it at the price at this marginal price 
at the instantaneous moment.  You are caught here and happen in Chile and I was selling you in the 
contract at this price.  At the end of the month, the dispatching sent me a huge bill taking me to 
bankruptcy.  I said, well, how come I have a contract for this price, but you don’t have electricity at 
that price.  The pricing [Unclear] for $100, but there are no [Unclear] for $100 in system, unless you 
provide them and we can see them.  This is what I had the discussion. 
 
One of the state-owned companies almost went bankruptcy and then the government then took a big 
hydro plant.  We thought that was very easy to contract for the future, but they didn’t realize that in 
hydro it’s not firm power.  The commission that is here has some criteria at the same in every 
hydroelectric plant in the world.  There are some ways statistically to compete what firm power in a 
hydro plant would mean.  But you can have a Hydro plant for 2000 megawatt and the firm power is 
500. 
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Firm power means that you can supply them in most of the situation, let’s say 90% of the case.  But 
you can supply the 2000 only two minutes every hundred year, it doesn’t mean anything, you have hit 
peak power and that’s an history.  You can sell it at peak power to back up someone and that’s why 
it’s important that tariffication system separates energy and power because sometimes you sell only 
power. 
 
Let’s say a guy doesn’t want to – you have an old plant, very expensive to operate.  You cannot 
compete with modern plant but you can generate electricity.  If there is a collapse or a storm or some 
of the nuclear power plant are out, they will call for your electricity, then you can recover the money 
because you can sell it at big price.  You have to keep the money, the company, the plant operating 
why they won’t pay you and that’s it. 
 
The system pays you for firm power and for energy.  While you’re participating in this system, that 
you’re forced to participate was very hard to sell, you get paid for power.  On the independent 
generation not, the system calculates what is your firm power and that’s it. 
 
That’s what you see sometime people that are buying diesel motors, expensive to operate and run, 
but those are for power.  Let’s say, a mining company, let’s say you’re going to buy electricity from 
the grid and the electricity of the grid is 100 and the power is so-and-so, but if the system is tight, if 
someone has a problem, the government convenient what is happening now to build new plant, I have 
to go to the system and pay a very high price for energy.  If I have my own back power, what I do is I 
disconnect from the system and supply part of the electricity I need from my own generation facility 
and the big industry does a lot. 
 
Most of the big industry has to have their own backup, independent of how the system is.  Mining 
companies have to ensure that you have huge backup system.  Because they cannot run the risk that 
the huge facilities stop for a day or two, immediately those machines start operating.  On the city, 
here we have earthquake just like you and [Unclear] and finally the system collapsed, and it had to 
claim force majeure and it was a real big earthquake.  Because the systems fail, because there are 
some maintenance, some small mill has a little problem, but they are up to you.  The system is not 
easy with that.  They force you to keep a very close eye to maintenance. 
 
Now, you have an old facility and you get paid for power.  No one called you because there are 
machines that are operating cheaper and you get money all the time.  That’s fine.  But in the event 
that you need it, and the machine is not working, then you have to pay the big price at that moment, 
then you have to pay them big.  This is more or less described in the information. 
 
With whom are you talking in Chile? 
 
<K> 
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We talked to, of course, Alejandro and then Professor Ronald Fischer in Universidad de Chile. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Ronald Fischer is probably not familiar with the technical details.  He has never been in the sector.  
You know, who you should talk to is Sebastián Bernstein.  Sebastián, what we mean the Comisión 
Nacional de Energía, what’s with the grid or [Unclear] the sector.  Also Dr. Hugh Rudnick. 
 
<K> 
Hugh? 
 
Bruno Philippi 
From the Electrical Engineering, Catholic University.  Hugh Rudnick. 
 
<K> 
Could you spell? 
 
Bruno Philippi 
R-U – I’ll write it down.  Engineering, Catholic University of Chile. 
 
<K> 
Is it different for Universidad Católica? 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Universidad Católica, it is.  I’m saying the name, I should say Universidad Católica, you are right.  
Hugh is very familiar with the system.  Having been a consultant in England, in the States, lecturer 
[Unclear].  Sebastián is the best source, you can talk with him.  Have you talked with Sebastián? 
 
<K> 
No.  Actually, we don’t have the contact of… 
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Bruno Philippi 
I can call him. 
 
<K> 
Oh, great. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Do you have the number? 
 
<K> 
No. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
How long are you going to stay in Chile? 
 
<M> 
Until next Wednesday. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Let me see.  [Foreign Language].  Hopefully, he’s in Chile, yeah. 
 
<K> 
Yeah. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
This is a bad time in Chile. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, it’s summer vacation. 
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Bruno Philippi 
Summer, people run away.  [Unclear]. 
 
<K> 
This guy is from Endesa? 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Now, no.  Now he’s from the consulting company run by Sebastián. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, but in the past. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Let me write down the name.  Sebastián. 
 
<K> 
Sebastián Bernstein, yeah. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Bernstein.  You have it? 
 
<M> 
Yeah, I heard his name from Alejandro. 
 
[Foreign Language] 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Esteban Skoknic and they are in this address.  This is address and this is telephone number. 
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<K> 
At 9:30 AM, Tuesday. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Málaga, where do you stay? 
 
<K> 
In close to Santa Lucia. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Yeah, further down.  You go all the way up in the subway – you use the subway. 
 
<K> 
Línea 1 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Right, Línea 1 and you get out in Escuela Militar.  You walk a block. 
 
<K> 
Walk back. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Back and you hit the Málaga. It’s in the street on the other side and you walk half of the block and this 
is the building. 
 
<K> 
Okay, great. 
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Bruno Philippi 
That’s it? 
 
<K> 
Yeah. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Hope, it is all right. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, thank you. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
This is general, but this guy can provide you many more details and update, we’ve been dealing with 
this story for many years. 
 
<K> 
I was very impressed by that you said, you called somebody, this guy from Endesa to CNE, hired that 
person. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Sebastián was from Endesa too.  I took Sebastián out of Endesa.  That’s where he worked.  I took 
Sebastián out of Endesa; I took another guy out of Chilectra that was the other electrical company.  I 
got a guy, very close to the state-owned oil company and the rest were young system engineers and 
that’s it. 
 
<K> 
No opposition from Endesa or Chilectra? 
 
Bruno Philippi 
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Always, but this doesn’t really matter.  This is a professional.  Some of the people I tried to hire from 
Endesa, they didn’t want to go because they feel much more secure in Endesa.  Now, Sebastián was 
very open and he was the first one to go to the commission, was key.  This is the guy who knows 
more about the whole system.  Whatever I learned, I learned from him. 
 
<K> 
Sebastián. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Bernstein. 
 
<K> 
Bernstein. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Unfortunately, he’s leaving Santiago today and he will be out for the next two weeks. 
 
<K> 
He is in some park, you said something. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
But Skoknic is the right hand.  He is the second guy he has in the group. 
 
<K> 
Esteban. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
The group is called Synex. 
 
<K> 
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Synex. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
This is his office. 
 
<K> 
His office. 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Because these things are general, remember I wrote this for the benefit of the country, I was dealing 
with the World Bank, right and I keep explaining the same story and was easier to use the Chilean 
example, but you don’t force to them to take it.  I told them, you cannot adapt this thing right away, 
you have to see what is your reality and there are good things, and there are things that are not that 
good, but we didn’t it.  You could do it better, that’s fine. 
 
<K> 
Okay.  Then, can we have your business card, if you have? 
 
Bruno Philippi 
Sure. 
 
<K> 
Maybe, she would like to send just one or two… 
 
END 
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Raimundo Soto 
I think it doesn’t provide the incentives for the companies to operate a little in advance.  In principle, 
it was supposed to have – we have this investment plan and the plan would determine the marginal 
cost of generation and the allocation of the different energy forms and the like.  But I think it’s weak 
in the sense that it can be manipulated, because basically what you have is you have an investment 
plan.  You are assuming that say 5 years down the road, a new power generation unit say 100 mega 
will come into operation.  But there is nothing guaranteed that the companies, which are private 
companies, in the end will do the investment and will be ready in 5 years down the road.  If they do 
that, the marginal cost of energy goes down today, in advance of what is going to happen 5 years 
down the road. 
 
The companies don’t have much of an incentive to be very truthful in their plans.  In that sense, the 
connection between future investment and short-term management, I don’t think it’s a very well-
designed thing.  The incentives are just not strong enough to produce the investment.  That’s one 
thing. 
 
The second thing, which I have the impression that is complicating things is that there was nothing in 
relationship to different stakeholders, particularly the ecological movements and the local population, 
so it was very good from an engineering, economic viewpoint, but it has encountered a lot of problems 
with the way in which you have to do the environmental assessment of the project and the like.  That 
is an area in which – so in that regard, the law fell a little short of what’s needed. 
 
If you look at it, this is one of the most expensive countries in the world in terms of power generation.  
I don’t know if that is the result of the law or not. 
 
<K> 
But I think, at least, compared to the other countries in South America or maybe in other countries, I 
think Chile would be rather better than – has a lot better result than other countries. 
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Raimundo Soto 
I think so.  In the amounts of subsidies that you will see in other countries, you cannot find it here, 
that’s true.  That’s why we’re separating between the management, which I think it’s fine.  You have 
this conflict resolution panel, which I think operates quite nicely.  That part is working well.  The 
investment part, I don’t think it’s properly managed.  I like the idea but I don’t think it works.  The 
idea allowing the private sector to have the strategic thinking in the sector that may not be very 
successful.  Oh, hi. 
 
<M> 
Buenos días.  Nice to meet you. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Thank you.  How are you? 
 
<M> 
Fine. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Shall we move one chair this. 
 
[Foreign Language] 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Gracias. 
 
<M> 
Gracias. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Hi. 
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<M> 
Hi, thank you. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
It was difficult meeting you. 
 
<M> 
Sorry. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
That’s fine.  You’re also at the University of Tokyo.  She’s also there engineering also. 
 
<K> 
Engineering.  She is more engineer than my.  Oh, by the way, this is my business card. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Oh, thank you very much.  I don’t think I have one.  I may have one, ah, my shirt.  All right. 
 
<M> 
Thank you. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
I known that the tradition is that you have to actually give the card like this. 
 
<K> 
You know well. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Yeah, I’ve been to Japan a couple of times.  Actually, I was there in November. 
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<K> 
Oh, really. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
There is this annual meeting between the University of Tokyo and two Chilean universities, the 
Catholic and the Universidad de Chile.  We have one meeting a year, one-time in Tokyo, one-time in 
Santiago. 
 
<K> 
Oh, really. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
It’s mostly engineering.  We’ve just started to participate in this so I went there and gave a seminar. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, I think.  Just 1 month ago or 2 month ago, I think the Chilean professors came to the University 
of Tokyo. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Yeah, we went there.  We were like maybe 70 or 60. 
 
<K> 
Oh, you also came? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Yeah, I was there. 
 
<K> 
We should have met in Japan. 
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Raimundo Soto 
It would have been cheaper for you guys.  But then this is really very nice.  How long are you going to 
be around? 
 
<K> 
Until Wednesday. 
 
<M> 
In Chile, until Wednesday. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
This is not a very good time to be here. 
 
<M> 
Why? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Because everybody is going on vacations.  February is just a dead month.  It’s very good to be in 
Santiago because it’s quiet, there’s no traffic, no traffic jam.  You go to a restaurant and you don’t 
have to wait for a table, it’s really nice, but it’s not very good for working. 
 
<K> 
Actually, I briefly explained our research to Mr. Soto we are now talking about some problems and 
some may be not yet benefit.  But some problems. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Basically what I think is that starting from your question of, is the reform successful, it depends on 
which level are you talking about.  If you’re talking about short-term management of the grid and 
power generation, I would say, yes, you have a system which is fairly transparent, it delivers so the 
number of outage, blackouts and I think is minimal, and we have a lot of trust in the system, so it 
works fine. 
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The conflict is also contained and controlled.  There is an opportunity for conflict in this sector because 
you have very large operators.  The Chilean grid, the distribution companies in Santiago is really very 
strong.  Then you have this transmission lines which are natural monopolies which are really very 
strong.  Then you have three or four major companies with a different mix between water and gas.  
There is space for a lot of conflict and I think that is controlled and maintained within the boundaries 
of the electricity resolution panel.  In that sense, it’s fine.  I would think it works much better than the 
rest of Latin America. 
 
<M> 
Yeah, like Argentina. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Or other countries in which blackouts are the norm and you are very running very close to the 
saturation of the grid, so, okay.  If you think in terms of the long term, I don’t think it is really very 
successful because it doesn’t provide incentives to be one step ahead of the demand curve and thus 
provide incentive to the companies to invest.  That part, the strategic planning and thinking is not 
there. 
 
<K> 
Actually, we met Mr. Bruno Philippi. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Oh, yeah.  Know him very well. 
 
<K> 
He mentioned about that the different things, long-term strategic planning and the short-term 
engineering decision-making and he put more emphasis on that, engineering decision-making 
probably. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
He’s an engineer. 
 
<K> 
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Yeah, well.  I think the good thing of Chilean system would be that strong independence and very high 
expertise of engineers and economists.  But on the other hand, that makes another problem of lack of 
long-term vision, maybe, and that long-term vision would be created by politician, maybe.  I’m not 
sure.  But I think decision would be made by different persons, so long-term and short-term. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Yeah, but you have to have a coordination mechanism so that whenever the authorities come up with 
a proposal to private sector, it has to either participate or you take whatever, but there has to be 
mechanism and I think the mechanism is not really very either formal or strong.  The fact that we are 
paying so much for electricity indicates that there is something there which is not really working, 
right?  It’s not an engineering problem that we have, okay. 
 
We put our trust in Argentinean gas for a while, that didn’t work, but then the ability to anticipate that 
kind of thing and diversify and it took too long.  It’s not just there.  See my point.  You have to be in 
advance of the demand for like 5 or 6 years, because building will take 5 years to have one of the 
plants operating so.  The mechanism in the law is very weak in my opinion. 
 
<K> 
You mean, either CNE or other law policies don’t – are not enough or don’t work for such a long-term. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
No, I don’t think so.  My concern is the following.  Suppose that you have the law and suppose that 
you have the Ministry of Energy, which is one of within one these other ministries.  Anyway, you have 
the Ministry of Energy, providing the guidelines for the long-term… 
 
<K> 
It’s coffee? 
 
<M> 
Oh, yes. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
There you have it. 
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<M> 
High calorie. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Well, you need a little bit of energy.  You have that.  Then the connection will be of a political kind and 
even if you have like this guy, which is the current Minister of Pacheco, Máximo Pacheco, is very 
articulated, but it will depend on the availabilities of the minister or the ministry and that cannot be 
done.  See my point?  As a politician, you have to have the strategic vision, but you cannot have 
enough power to change the situation or don’t do anything which is what happened for a long time.  
The ministers were really very weak.  Okay.  This guy could not provide long-term strategic planning 
according to me. 
 
For example, they put a lot of weight on this mega units – megapower units in the South, very South 
and you have a lot of environmental concerns there and there is a lot of money coming out from 
Europe to finance the opposition to the project.  You have to have an alternative, right? 
 
In the north, you are having the same problem.  All the environmental activity, which is a political 
kind of thing that you have to control, you have to – that part is not there.  In a sense, the private 
companies are reluctant to doing anything because they will pay a huge reputation cost.  My hunch is 
that the strategic political part has been really very weak.  My view is that it’s nowhere to be found in 
the law because the law operates on the managerial part and not the strategic part. 
 
<K> 
Yeah.  But, do you think is it because politicians like to avoid some, how to say, the political risk or the 
Chilean system strongly avoids the political interference of politicians which the politicians themselves 
try to avoid that. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
This country works in a very hypocritical way.  You have to be very careful with that.  We are proud of 
not having corruption, which is fine, so corruption is not widespread, but there is, okay. 
 
<M> 
There is? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
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There is.  Not at the levels which you can find in another places in Latin America.  But it’s not civil.  
Not corruption in the ordinary use of the word.  For example, capturing the regulator is possible, it’s 
not impossible.  For example, the authorities end up working for the companies or come from the 
companies and go to this regulator position that is not very good.  Even if the guy is really, really 
honest, there is a shadow which is not good for the system. 
 
You have to be very careful because they would tell you that this is a place where there is a lot of 
separation between the technical decision and the political decision, which in general is true.  But it’s 
not 100% true.  Sometimes you have this, this is not there.  Sometimes you have these ministers that 
have been there for a long time basically doing very little and avoiding the very complicated decisions 
with the thinking that well this is a short government.  In 4 years, we’ve not going to be around, so 
that’s not likely.  My hunch is that in energy, it happened most of the time, they didn’t make the 
decision beyond whatever the Ley Corta… 
 
<M> 
Ley Corta Uno? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Yeah.  Ley Corta means that we’re not going to discuss everything; we’re going to discuss a little part 
because if we try to discuss the whole thing, we will never pass it through the Parliament.  That’s why 
it’s Corta.  Corta means short and it’s a short law because we don’t want to discuss in open.  That’s 
because from a political point of view, that’s as far as you can go without compromising the entire 
administration. 
 
Yeah, so I agree with you that there is a separation between the two.  At the operational level, yes, at 
the strategic level, I am not really sure.  It’s very difficult to understand how it works so slowly from a 
decision-making point of view. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, that problem is same in Japan.  We have such, not hidden, but unclear kind of corruption and 
sometimes the past minister or past politician work in some board member of TEPCO, let’s say, that’s 
possible. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
what I think is possible in our case is that whenever there is some kind of scandal, then, regulation 
legislation is passed on to prevent that thing to happen again.  In a sense, you need to have one of 
the scandals to build up better and institutions.  But it also says that you have problems there like 
because you have to make adjustments.  In the case of energy, my main concern is not with the 
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operations which I think is fairly non-corrupt.  I don’t want to use the word corruption in the strategic 
part but the inability to make decision, is also a way of in a sense corrupt, because you do not 
undertake the difficult decisions that you have to make.  Basically, you say now, well, it’s not the right 
time. 
 
<M> 
How much the corruption affected strategic decisions in the Ministry of energy, or any part of the… 
 
Raimundo Soto 
I don’t think that corruption in a sense that the company is paying the authority, I don’t think so.  But 
you can capture the regulator without paying the regulator.  It’s basically because there is an implicit 
promise that in the future you will be working for us or.  One of this guy that was there for a long time 
was sensitive to being flattered, so the company heads will invite him for dinner, will take him out 
here and there and the guy was basically under the control of this big company’s CEO.  There was no 
money involved.  He just felt very good. 
 
<M> 
But the initial stage of power sector reform, when CNE was established, the initial member of CNE 
came from the main private companies like Endesa or Colbún or… 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Well, it was a monopoly.  Everything was under the control of Endesa, except for small companies 
here and there, but most of the regulation was actually done by Endesa so these guys were in the 
private sector, yes, but at the same time, it was the only operator, so it was self-regulated.  It’s more 
than reforms, its privatization and reform, so it’s two things in one go. 
 
You can privatize, if you have the relation there, you can privatize.  You can have private companies 
and then you impose the regulation.  Here you did two things, you privatize on one hand and you 
impose a regulation on the other.  The regulation was very unique at the time and to some extent 
advanced.  I know that it was a lot of trial and error in the beginning.  You have to talk to Bernstein.  
Do you know him? 
 
<M> 
Yeah. 
 
<K> 
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Actually, he’s now in vacation, so we are going to meet – according to Bruno Philippi, his right-hand. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Who’s right-hand of whom? 
 
<K> 
Mr. Bernstein. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Is the right-hand of Bruno? 
 
<K> 
Yeah.  Esteban Skoknic. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Skoknic, I think.  Rodrigo Agano [ph] is the other guy that you should talk to. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, Rodrigo.  I forgot. 
 
<M> 
Hugh Rudnick. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Oh, Hugh.  Yeah, Hugh Rudnick, yes. 
 
<M> 
Rodrigo Palma? 
 
  6-202 
Raimundo Soto 
Rudnick is maybe also on vacation.  You have to contact him.  This is a horrible month, because 
Rudnick, I think I’m not sure he was at the university and the university’s closing.  Rodrigo Palma.  
But anyway, Sebastián is really very… 
 
<M> 
Sebastián Bernstein. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
He actually was one of the… 
 
<M> 
Member of CNE. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
No, one of the guys that designed the regulation.  Bruno was also in that. 
 
<K> 
One thing I am interested in is the policy improvement or the policy learning and I’m studying the 
case of Colombia and the role of PPP and it’s often very difficult to improve policies so once it’s 
established because, you know, someone has some merit from the existing policy and private 
companies are some reluctant to change policies because they get some merit, usually. 
 
But in Colombia, somehow, we are still studying, but we don’t know how it may get but Colombia was 
not successful but gradually has improved its policy several times.  Now the PPP policy of Colombia is 
getting better and better.  I think in Chile, also the first energy power sector reform policy was okay, 
but let’s say 20 years until finally Colbún was privatized, I think in that 20 years, I think Chilean 
government or CNE tried to improve the policy.  What do you think the reason why the Chilean system 
could improve its policy of power sector, keep improving, maybe? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
I have no idea.  Let me be very honest.  You’re talking about PPP, which is public private partnership. 
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<K> 
No, but I just used example PPP in Colombia, but also in Chilean power sector, I think the government 
or CNE or someone keep improving. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Look, at this point I would think that the main issue is the environmental assessment system.  If you 
want to improve things in any kind of undertaking, in Chile you need to reform that unit.  I mean the 
entire environmental system, let us assume for a minute that it works okay, it works okay, but it’s 
extremely slow, okay.  Even if the assessment is well done and probably done, it is very slow.  That’s 
one thing. 
 
The second thing is that it’s sensitive to political pressure, okay so that at this point, if I were in the 
private sector, I would like to work on any of this big undertakings, I would be really very concerned 
not with the environmental assessment, but with the result of the process of environmental 
assessment because the process is sensitive to political pressure.  You may have a wonderful project, 
which is environmentally safe and clean and all that, but if there is an organized group that is, to 
some extent, winning something from opposition, they will go through that and that is I’ve often said 
that.  It may in the end not have any importance.  But that I think is far more important than 
anything else because there are a lot of these projects which are in different stages of environmental 
assessment.  Without any clearance, when this is going to end, how is this going to end, what kind of 
mitigation. 
 
For example, this Punta Alcalde, which is a coal unit that they would like to put in the north, in an area 
which basically no one lives, how far do you go with the mitigation measures, depends on how strong 
the political pressure is and that cannot be.  You have to have rules, you have to say, well, we are 
about to – this is how much politician we would like to take on this, you cannot continuously change 
the regulation to basically accommodate the environmental agenda.  At one point, you have to relax 
and up to here, you go beyond that, it’s just not worth doing it, but I would like to know in advance.  
This uncertainty plus long periods of Unclear] is far more important than anything else is my view. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, but what I meant is that, let’s say, in the early ‘90s or in the late ‘80s there was a problem of 
the lack or the problem of transmission lines and to solve that transmission line problem, I think 
finally, that expert panel was established.  Also, there was the anti-trust, no? 
 
<M> 
Anti-trust commission. 
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<K> 
Anti-trust commission and the CNE, I think they couldn’t solve the problem quickly, so I think finally 
expert panel was established to solve that kind of problems. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Fine.  But again, the expert panel is only going to work for the management of the system as is.  For 
any strategic long-term investment, the panel cannot do anything, can advise the government to have 
I don’t know. 
 
<M> 
They did just insistence, not inconsistent. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
But this is just… 
 
<K> 
They are working at the managerial level, not the… 
 
Raimundo Soto 
It’s basically a judiciary entity, there.  If there is a conflict, then they will jump in and they will 
manage the conflict, either by some kind of negotiation or by the judgment.  Say, look, you guys went 
overboard; this is your fine, that’s it.  But this is a group that beyond voicing an opinion doesn’t have 
a say, doesn’t have enough power to do the strategic plan. 
 
The strategic part is basically in the hands of the politicians.  That is, they may have a lot of 
supporting technical people saying, look, this is a good idea, this is not a very good idea.  But in the 
end, it is not – I understand the political aspect as the following.  We have two options and from a 
political point of view, we decide between the two options, once I have the options more or less clear 
from a technical point of view. 
 
Here what you have is a politician being pressured by different groups, so the policy is basically based 
on pressure, more than anything else.  That’s why we have all this, I’m not saying that the project 
should be done; I have no idea because I haven’t actually looked at it, but the inability to take the 
decision, that’s my point.  You say look this Punta Alcalde thing we’re never going to build it, period.  
But they keep on saying, well, if you pass on this mitigation role and you do this and you do that, we 
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are not very sure that coal is a good idea, pet coke, no pet coke never.  All this kind of discussions 
that lengthens the project is going to add uncertainty. 
 
<K> 
I have a thing, let’s say, two things.  One is that so you mean that expert panel may have solved the 
problem of dispute, but have not solved the problem of fundamental problem of lack of private 
investment, let’s say. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
It shouldn’t.  The role of the panel is to solve the conflict that will be it. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, but I think that will reduce the risk of country risk, so it will make Chile more attractive for 
private investments. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Oh, yeah, I’m not saying it doesn’t work, it works in the right direction, and it’s a good idea.  I would 
like to have it.  I would like to have it not only there but in other areas which you have this public-
private sector specific regulation and therefore specific measures.  We don’t want to have it for 
bakeries or cinemas right, but here you have a special regulation.  There is a lot of money in there, so 
you would like to have it.  Some of this work and some they don’t.  I’m going to tell you a story about 
the other thing that doesn’t work.  But these guys are for conflict, not for strategic thinking.  Just a 
second. 
 
<K> 
Yeah. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
There is another panel for highways, for the same thing, conflicts in highway.  As far as I know, it’s 
never worked.  Not because of the absence of conflict, there may be conflict, there also.  But for one 
reason or another, it doesn’t have enough power to actually solve conflict. 
 
This electricity thing maybe working fine, and it’s a very good idea and you have to look at the 
mechanics which make the things work.  I absolutely agree with you, but its role is not for the 
strategic part, it’s not for the long-term investments, it’s not for the industrial organization of the 
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sector, whether I would like to have three companies running transmission lines instead of one, 
because I don’t want to have this, that is not – the architecture is not what… 
 
<K> 
You mean the Ley Corta Uno was not created based on some strategic planning idea. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
I think it avoided.  But that’s my reading of the law, which is, you may get a different opinion from the 
guys that actually work on that. 
 
<K> 
How about the establishment of CNE itself, the initial stage of power sector reform, was that any 
strategic planning, like let’s say 20 or 30 years or more long-term vision? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
My hunch is that the guys that wrote the law at the beginning and did all the regulation thought that if 
you give the companies a set of rules which are very clear, may not be the optimal ones, but very 
clear and you take this decision away from the politicians into a technical area, the companies would, 
because these guys are profit seekers and maximizers, so would do the strategic planning for you. 
 
The company would say, look, the demand is growing at say 10%; we’re going to need say 500 
megawatts more in 5 years, so better start working now and do it.  That I think is the underlying 
notion of strategic planning in original thing and therefore you need the CNE, the National commission 
basically to give guidelines and the like.  But my reading is that it was left basically on the private 
sector to do that. 
 
<K> 
You mean the CNE or the guys who established the CNE just left strategic planning function to the 
private sector? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
I think so.  What they have is that they have the investment plan for all the companies and they 
would put that into the pricing mechanism for electricity and therefore they were expecting that 
whenever the future prices would go up enough then the companies would start investing.  If the price 
goes down, then the company would slow down investment and that you can actually model the 
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electricity demand and anticipate what’s going to happen if GDP grows at say, 10% then demand will 
grow in the future at 10%.  With the cities expanding fast, then we need a distribution grid, which is 
that kind of thing was to some extent or to a large extent passed on to the private sector, perhaps 
with good reason.  Also at that time there were no capabilities to do it in the private sector, I don’t 
know.  That’s my reading. 
 
Bernstein probably would have a very different take on this, but from a practical point of view, I think 
it was mainly the company saying look, we’re going to build this much here, this much there. 
 
<M> 
The CNE has the role of tariff setting like a price adjustment and the role of advising to the Minister of 
Energy, so in terms of price setting, they did… 
 
Raimundo Soto 
There is a thing called the CDEC, C-D-E-C and it’s a clearinghouse, a clearing mechanism.  They 
basically set the spot price for electricity and then you have – at the CNE you have a model, which 
actually the term is marginal cost, long-run marginal cost, based on the existing capacity a forecast of 
demand and the investment plan.  You basically say, look, the demand is growing at 5% per year, so 
we need an extra amount of megawatts of generation available for that 5.  This is the investment plan, 
so the investment plan would say we are having this much of hydro, water-based electricity, and then 
we have gas, and then we have coal, and then we have marginal units, whatever it is, and they would 
say, well, this is the long-run marginal cost, and that is part of the CNE work. 
 
<M> 
Yeah.  There is CNE and CDEC and Ministry of Energy? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Yeah. 
 
<M> 
I think the CNE advises on policy planning for Minister, and they care about the price and that sort of… 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Yes, this is basically spot price. 
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<M> 
Yes, spot price, and this is for the marginal price. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
But for the long-run, marginal price.  Unless they have changed it very – I was out of the country for a 
number of years, so they may have changed it in the meantime, I don’t know. 
 
<M> 
CNE could be more related to the long-term because they use marginal price and with – so I think 
CNE has more possibility to give advice to the Minister of Energy. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
No, this is short-term [ph]. 
 
<M> 
The collaboration between two institutions is very important to make long-term strategic plan for 
energy so in initial stage of the power sector reform, they did relatively very well, but after 20 years 
later, this relation would be less and less.  What was the main reason for this? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
For the first part, the connection was very fluent and strong, but I think two or three reasons.  One is 
that they were redoing the regulation of the sector.  So you need a lot of interaction between – I 
mean the CNE doesn’t have any power to pass a law or pass a regulation, it’s just an advisory kind of 
thing and that does some strategic thing.  These guys would actually pass on a new regulation law.  At 
the beginning when you’re doing the changes and the like, and starting, it’s very easy.  That’s one 
thing. 
 
The second thing is that, you had a military government.  That aligns very easy incentives for all 
people to okay and it was a relatively strong government so. 
 
The third thing is that in a military government, there is not much role for politics, so these ministries 
and these places were filled with technical people. 
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Then came the democratic government.  At the beginning, these guys were not going to do much of 
changes because they didn’t want to shape the entire economy at once.  For a rather long period of 
time, the Ministry of Energy was again technical kind of people so the communication was poor.  But 
the last I would say 12 years, since 2000 probably, increasingly these guys have far more politicians 
than technical people.  This guy here now, the last guy, Máximo Pacheco, he comes from a more 
technical private sector kind of upbringing.  But before that it was very political. 
 
<M> 
The change of this organization, Minister of Energy from the technical expert to the more political, 
more administrative workers, what was the background?  Does that have kind of cultural changes or 
what was the…? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
The Ministry of Energy is not more than an office.  At one point, you have the Ministry of the Economy 
and the Ministry of the Energy is the same guy. 
 
<M> 
Same guy? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Yeah.  For a long time that was the case.  Even telecommunications was also in there so it’s never 
been a very strong ministry anyway.  Alejandro Jadresic was the minister, and it was a small unit.  It’s 
not a powerful ministry.  Most of all, when you’re not running into blackouts, when you have blackouts, 
you have problems then the minister is a very important person.  Otherwise, I mean the main 
complaint now is that electricity is expensive, but apart from that, you see my point?  It’s not a very 
strong ministry anyway.  Also, it’s a noncontroversial one.  The Minister of Education is Rolf Lüders 
[ph], the Minister of Health, who, that guy is really important.  The Minister of Energy is relatively 
second level. 
 
Chilean Female Interviewee 
Wow, very contradicting point. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Yeah, I mean the ministers here are – if you think it was the President first and then there is like four 
ministers, which are really very important. 
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<K> 
Like finance. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Its finance, its foreign affairs, the Chancellor, then interior and what else, I don’t know exactly.  Then 
you have like a second here, these guys are on the frontline of the conflict, its education, health, 
eventually, housing, public works.  Then the other guys which are not really that much important, so 
Ministry of Mining, really very important, agriculture, not really very important, energy and two or 
three. 
 
There is this Sunday meeting.  Every Sunday, the President meets with the Ministers for dinner at her 
place and I would think the Minister of Energy is never invited to that kind of, unless, you have a 
really tremendous problem.  Probably, after the earthquake, when the power grid was nowhere to be 
found and then you say well, bring this guy in because we want to talk to him, no more than that. 
 
<K> 
Do you think the lack of strategic planning is true in any other areas in Chilean government, energy 
areas, education, healthcare, and public works? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
I don’t know.  What else do you think might be there? 
 
<K> 
I don’t know, maybe, let’s say, healthcare.  There should be some long-term vision. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
We are in the middle of the process of reform, very deep kind of reforms which requires strategic 
thinking.  I may not like it but there is some strategic thinking, wherein education and health.  Some 
other things have a strategic planning that’s been there for a long time, labor markets or housing or 
you have this kind of that every once in awhile.  Well, let’s take a look at this. 
 
What I think is important in the connection between the private sector investment on public policy is 
that you have to have a mechanism so that regulations and strategic planning comes in advance to 
the situation and not as a response of a situation.  In energy, I think it’s been the response more than 
plans for a long time, but that’s my reading of it. 
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For example, we have had this problem with the Argentinean gas that is no longer there, but it took a 
while to develop this natural gas plan to import from Indonesia or Jamaica, where they are bringing in 
the gas.  I would think that diversifying the energy matrix and the kind of things response to a 
situation more than in advance. 
 
We have been discussing nuclear energy for the last 20 years, without any serious attempt or making 
a decision.  I don’t mind if you say, look, I don’t want to have nuclear energy because we don’t want 
to have the same problems that Japan had during the tsunami and the earthquake.  Fine, I don’t mind 
that, just say it and make the decision that we’re not going to do that, and therefore our producers 
will have to be far more efficient than needed to compensate for the extra cost of energy, fine.  No 
problem, right.  But it’s that kind of policy is not there. 
 
<K> 
I don’t know how to say in English, but something policy or policy in advance is necessary. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Of course. 
 
<K> 
But my question is, can you see the examples of such a policy advance in other areas or in any areas 
in Chile that is working?  Only in energy or in…? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
No. Look, the ability to, you can, for example, think of telecommunications, right.  You say, well, these 
guys knows 4G technology is coming and you need to auction the spectrum and that you need to pass 
on the law for digital TV and whatever you want.  They know that, they can anticipate that this is 
coming but the speed at which you make the decision is too slow. 
 
We’ve been discussing the norm for digital TV for 10 years.  Is there any strategic thinking or what?  
They’re looking ahead and saying, well, okay.  But the speed at which it works makes it completely 
irrelevant because it’s so slow that by the time we make the decision on digital TV and the like, it’s 
going to be obsolete. 
 
<K> 
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The problem is that the speed of decision-making is very slow. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
In some cases, yeah.  We all know what’s coming; we just don’t react fast enough, that’s one way to 
put it.  Or the other way to put it is that these guys are waiting for the next crisis to have the political 
power to do the changes.  It’s very reactive kind of thing. 
 
In the case of energy, because we have this long-term marginal cost with, the politicians always know 
that if they don’t make the decision, that marginal cost will rise and you have like a mathematical 
model that actually solves the issue.  It’s going to increase by 10%.  These guys know in advance that 
things will be at this.  It’s just that they have to sort out the rest of the red tape to pass on new 
regulations, or to give the signal to the private sector to do whatever. 
 
That’s what I was saying that the environment impact assessment is really very important.  If you 
were to put money into this, I would put it there.  It’s clear that even if the criteria are crazy, but if 
you know that it’s going to take 6 months or 2 years, and the chances of passing it is only 5%, doesn’t 
matter to me.  You have a lot better situation than what you have now because what you have now is 
that no one knows, how long it’s going to take.  No one knows if the criteria are going to change as 
the process goes on and for electricity and for natural monopolies in general, this is really, really very 
complicated because that’s become very political, instead of very technical. 
 
This dam they want to build in the south, if you look at – add it as a project, it’s going to flood a very 
small area and the kind of opposition that you have is no dams in Patagonia, which is weird.  You can 
say no destruction of Patagonia fine, no dams; we don’t want to have dams there.  It may have 
whatever. 
 
<K> 
It’s same, no nuclear power plant. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Fine, I understand that.  But it’s against on type of logic, that’s a very strange thing.  It’s not keep 
Patagonia clean or whatever, I can understand. 
 
<K> 
That’s kind of more ideological or a… 
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Raimundo Soto 
Exactly, which means that the kind of opposition to this project that the private sector is facing has 
nothing to do with the quality of the project, it has to do with the political situation and that has not 
been solved by the government.  The strategic planning in that sense is not there. 
 
President Frei was in power ’94 to 2000, something like that was openly supporting this the dams on 
this site.  The next president was kind of, do it, right.  This guy was for 6 years.  The next president 
was for 4 years and basically she said, ah, I’m not going to talk about it.  For the companies, we 
started from a strong signal that we’d like you to invest, to a situation where, do what you want, 
something like that.  I don’t want to discuss the problem of dams in the South, which is basically 
what’s her approach to the dams.  That is very different. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, but it’s very difficult to keep certain governmental commitment to long-term policy.  Always, 
any conflict, even in Japan, it’s very difficult.  We also have a problem of construction of dams and the 
government almost abandoned the construction of hydropower anymore, so it’s almost finished. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Sure.  Now that you have this Fukushima incident, you may… 
 
<K> 
Yeah, the nuclear will be abandoned as well so. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
What are you going to do?  Use gas for everything? 
 
<K> 
Yeah.  Another thing is population of Japan is now decreasing. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
I know. 
 
<K> 
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Yeah, so I think the problem would be in this 20 or 30 years, so how to deal with the power sector in 
this 20 or 30 years and then after that we may have some very different style of power sector.  I think 
we are now in the transition time – transition period. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
I don’t know about how fast is the demand growing in your country, it may be growing at 2%, so you 
don’t face much of a restriction really, I don’t know. 
 
Coming back to your original question, was the reform successful?  Yes, in several dimensions, maybe 
in other things and definitely the political architecture of that.  The military government, they had this 
idea that all the politicians were crooks so they would like to take every single decision out of the 
politicians’ hands.  It works for a while, as long as you have consensus between the three different 
political groups that they would like to keep it like that.  When democracy came and all the groups 
were saying, look, we don’t care about the economy, let’s have the economy running as is.  We are 
going to care only about human rights violations, so they focus on that thing and they didn’t pay much 
attention to the economy and the economy was doing fine so why – if it ain’t broke don’t fix it, so that 
kind of thing. 
 
But later on when the political cohesion started to disappear, then these ministries became sort of 
prize to win then the political decision started to collide with the technical one.  That part of the reform 
was never actually designed properly.  Otherwise you cannot understand why. 
 
I mean, you can say that the demand grows like 10% or 11% in most of the time, 2 digits always.  If 
you know that your demand is going to grow 2 digits for the next 20 years, the private sector will be 
building like crazy.  It’s fantastic demand expansion, right, wow, man, whatever I did these guys are 
going to use it, right?  That’s the kind of market that you would see a lot of action and you don’t say it, 
so the price is going up. 
 
Even in with a flat price, the demand is going to present this over the business.  It’s a very nice return 
on your investment.  After this, the prices going up, basically what we’re seeing is that there is not 
enough investment and then you have to go back to why is there insufficient investment.  As you said, 
this is a very low-risk kind of country.  It has to be somewhere else and there the political aspect 
shows up.  I don’t know if it’s of any help, but… 
 
<K> 
Actually, she likes to compare the cases of Chile and Philippine. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
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Not very similar. 
 
<K> 
Very different.  But I think you should look at the policy of the army era again.  But anyway, I think in 
other countries of South America, I think Chile has at least political independence in managerial level.  
In other countries, I’m not sure about the political independence at the managerial level nor strategic 
level.  Do you think…? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
How do you make a scale for that? 
 
<K> 
That’s a very difficult question, but just my impression. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
I mean, let me put it this way, independence is good if you have accountability also.  Independence 
without accountability is very dangerous, right?  If you have 15-year-old children, you can give him or 
her a lot of independence, but you would like him or her to have accountability of what he or she is 
doing, because otherwise it becomes. 
 
I think it’s the same you would like to have independence on the technical side from the political part, 
on the managerial, on the medium-term management, and strategic long-term thing, we would like to 
have it, but we would like to have also accountability of what you’re doing.  Focusing only on 
independence maybe… 
 
<K> 
A bit dangerous, you mean. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
One-sided.  In the current situation, the environmental sensitivity is high, you need the political aspect 
to be controlled in a sense, and so we’d like to have independence, but also we’d like to have political 
accountability and that I think can only be managed through the government. 
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You don’t want to have a too technical kind of ministry because it will fall short on one side.  You don’t 
want to have two political ministers calling shot on the other side, and that’s a very difficult kind of 
environment.  Here it may be more independent than say in Argentina, I don’t doubt it, okay?  Or in 
Brazil.  But maybe, there are better examples to look at somewhere else.  Maybe Uruguay could be a 
country that I would take a look to see how they do.  Colombia is also very interesting case, Peru.  I 
mean the Peruvians are doing very, very well, unbelievably well, so. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, Peru has got, even in the other sectors like road, it’s good. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
The Peruvians have this very strong indigenous movement that the cases I know which are not very 
many but still.  They have managed to have a more constructive approach to private sector working in 
natural monopolies, either in mining or in electricity or in water so that the companies could go there 
and the opposition will be far more constructive than just basically saying no dams here. 
 
They figured out that they can get a lot out of the companies for the community if they don’t just 
simply oppose and say, well, we oppose under these conditions, so I saw that in mining.  I think it 
worked much better than here, so maybe there is something to learn from these guys on conflict 
resolution, community, and private sector relationships. 
 
<K> 
It’s very difficult to find the cause of the difference, how people react to such independent large-scale 
development of infrastructure. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
I have no idea about that.  I don’t know what makes some equilibrium to be better than others and 
how to choose one. 
 
<K> 
We are still thinking of what to study in the case of Chile. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Sure.  But you need to talk to more people.  It depends on what kind of research you would like to do. 
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<K> 
I think we are still seeking for the some good aspect to be compared between the Chilean case and 
the Filipino case probably. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
What’s the situation in Philippines? 
 
<K> 
The Filipino case would be a bit similar to Argentina.  It had good policy or, yeah, certainly good policy 
because – it was not because but it was supported by the World Bank and lessons learned from the 
other countries, actually, Argentina.  The policy itself was not bad, but it didn’t work probably because 
of the political interference and some hidden corruption.  It’s the strong tie between the politician and 
the huge private conglomerate and so on.  Regulatory bodies don’t have capacity to control such 
situation in the power sector. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
One alternative way to put it is you build up the institutions you want to have, so institutions doesn’t 
come before the working of the sector but after.  The Filipino side is not very powerful regulator 
precisely because you don’t want to have a very powerful regulator. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, that’s true. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
In the Chilean case, one would like to think that maybe at the beginning; we wanted to have a very 
strong institution on regulations.  After that, your strength is diminishing because you wanted to have 
that. 
 
I’m working on a similar idea for other countries, which we say, well, this cannot be a good idea 
because you’re looking at it from an optimal point of view and your optimal point, optimality there 
may be a little too narrow and then you say, look, what happens is that there is no way in which we 
can solve this conflict.  If you give too much power to this unit, it will end up with a huge conflict. 
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<K> 
Huge what? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Conflict – social conflict, right.  You give a lot of power to the technical guys they will start building 
dams all the way down from Santiago to Patagonia, right?  You will have a huge political problem 
because one of the stakeholder is just not being hard, is just not being so you basically say, no, these 
guys are too technical, lower little their power.  Instead of coming up with a regulation where all these 
aspects can be put together and come up with a better decision.  Most of the times the decisions are 
basically the same, don’t do anything, don’t step on the pedal, put the brakes on this. 
 
<K> 
You mean the strategic planning entities should have the balance of that political decision-making 
power or the political decision-making viewpoint and technical? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Allowing for different stakeholders to participate and I think the stakeholders have changed.  In the 
military government, your only stakeholder is the military, the army basically.  If these guys like to 
have that thing, fine and all the rest will either you comply or we shoot, that was it, right, that was 
the only.  The military were at the beginning very strong, and then they say, well, seems to us that 
this private sector is another stakeholder, so you basically have the government and the private sector. 
 
But over time, you have other people showing up from the indigenous communities that were nowhere 
in the decision before but you having to put it there somehow.  One way to put, say, let’s change a 
little the institutions. 
 
The other way is to say, nah, just make the institutions weak and weak and weak and weak right, the 
factor.  You have this to the institutions between the government and the private sector, then you 
have these groups here and then the president will say, you know what, although the technical aspect, 
says that we have to build a dam and the political community supports the building of the dam, these 
indigenous people or whatever, or environmentalist or foreign community, whatever it is they don’t 
want this to happen.  I’m going to stop the project for a while, which is the way of saying sorry, but 
this institution is no longer making the decisions, I am making it myself.  You actually weaken and 
weaken.  The institution basically goes; this institution is unable to hear all the stakeholders and 
should be heard this time. 
 
<K> 
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I understand that both technical side and the political side would be necessary, but for instance, let’s 
take the example of the tariff determination –the decision-making on tariffs and then decision-making 
on tariff also has both sides, political side and the technical side.  From the viewpoint of technical, 
tariff decision or tariff making, I think the tariff should be set so that at a certain level, so that the 
private company can make enough profit.  But in certain cases, let’s say the politicians try to interfere 
with the tariff making to reduce the public opposition, let’s say, or to get more support from the public.  
What do you think about that, does the tariff setting should be independent from the political 
interference or? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
I think so.  It works in electricity, so you, if you want to have subsidy, target it.  You want to give 
subsidy to the poor, for whatever reason, political reasons or for humanitarian reasons, whatever, just 
give the subsidies to them.  Don’t give it to me because I’m a rich guy, so I don’t get. 
 
In electricity, you don’t have much subsidies built in the price.  You don’t have much taxes either so 
the companies are not making huge profits anyway, fine. 
 
In fuels, oil, you have all these stupid mechanisms.  I think we learned from the that lesson that we 
don’t want to have that there or in water and the reason is that once you have any kind of this price 
supporting or price control there, it becomes too political and very difficult to manage. 
 
<K> 
But I think Chilean tariff setting would be… 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Short-term, yes, fine.  Short-term is separated from the politicians as much as you can.  There is 
some leeway also because if you put a lot of incoming units in your investment plan, then your long-
term marginal cost will go down and your sport price will also go down little so I can come up with, oh, 
there is a lot of megas coming into the system and lower the current prices.  But it backfires because 
once you discover that you’re not going to have these plants coming in, then you have to hike the 
long-term marginal cost, and you end up hiking the short-term one.  You can buy a little time, but if 
you have to raise it, you have to raise wholesale, in the case of fuel oils, petroleum and gas. 
 
<K> 
I think you have a meeting, yeah. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
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I have another meeting. 
 
<K> 
All right, so, thank you very much. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Let me know what you come up with after this. 
 
<K> 
Yeah.  We probably need some time to struggle. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
I thing that the first round of reforms that most of the country did in the ‘80s were basically to bring 
prices closer to marginal cost, because everything was so distorted that you need to sort of downsize 
the companies and reduce the losses and have some corporate governance in there and that kind of 
thing. 
 
The second round may have been something on which you put a little more weight into saying, okay, 
the companies are running fine now, or more or less okay, we need to improve productivity 
significantly.  We’re going to bring in more investments, new technologies and the likes so let’s make 
it really from a good company in the third world, let’s try to make it a good company in the first world, 
right, in the developed countries.  We would like to have the same kind of thing.  That’s the second 
round of reforms. 
 
But the third one is one in which you basically say, look, let’s make this sector be a part of the 
mechanism of the rest of the economy in which you have stakeholders, and politicians, and political 
decisions, and the like.  We have to bring the sector back into the political life because political life is 
what we do.  For like from the 1930s to the mid-‘80s politicians run everything and make a complete 
mess of this country. 
 
You take them out okay, you improve the situation, you open the economy make it competitive, or 
whatever it is you do all that kind of.  Now you need to take the sectors back into the political life, and 
I think that part is still in transit. 
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In the Philippine’s case, which I don’t know nothing there, that I don’t know much about the country, 
the political fabric, the landscape of the political sector may be very, very different than the Chilean.  I 
would be very careful of the institutional comparisons between the two countries. 
 
<K> 
But you mentioned a gradual improvement – a gradual change, step-by-step would be very important.  
I think in Philippines, it’s something mixed up so try to do the whole thing involving a foreign 
investment and… 
 
Raimundo Soto 
I like evolutions, I don’t like revolutions.  I think that at one point, you may need revolution or 
something like that but most of the time it’s too costly.  Let’s make it step-by-step.  Don’t be shy do it, 
but step-by-step, this evolution thing makes a lot of sense to me.  The revolution thing doesn’t make 
any sense. 
 
<M> 
Only transition period just. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Exactly.  But make sure that you move because if in evolutionary terms if you don’t move, you 
disappear.  You have to keep up working.  I don’t know much about the except that what you get from 
the news is basically that the political system in the Philippines is much more complicated, like the 
Chilean case and the decision-making might have different dimensions like here. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, that’s true. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
I mean the military there is still very important, very powerful.  I don’t know what the agenda of these 
guys is; I don’t know what they want.  That’s one thing. 
 
The second thing is that corruption there seems to be more tolerated than here.  I don’t know if 
higher or lower.  The problem seems to be far more complicated.  It’s a country where civil war 
running in the South until 2 years ago.  Civil war is a civil war anyway.  It might be low-level conflict, 
but it’s a conflict there continuously so it’s not exactly what’s going on. 
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<K> 
Yeah.  No, we just wanted to try to get some insight from the comparison of two different totally 
different cases. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
You have to define on what dimensions are you going to make the comparison? 
 
<M> 
What’s that? 
 
Raimundo Soto 
You have to find out what dimensions you would like to make the comparison, right?  If you go only 
for the short-term management of a thing, then the answer is going to be probably very simple and 
not very interesting.  If you have one too many dimensions, it’s going to be unmanageable so it’s very 
difficult to. 
 
<M> 
Choose the period, what to… 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Choose a period.  This reform was trying to answer what kind of problem, right?  If the two reforms 
were addressing different problems, it’s going to be very difficult to learn.  I don’t know. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, you’re right. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Okay guys, I really have to go. 
 
<M> 
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Thank you. 
 
<K> 
Yeah.  Thank you very much for your time. 
 
Raimundo Soto 
Thank you. 
 
END 
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<M> 
…research is about power sector reform. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Power sector reform. 
 
<M> 
Little bit, past things, yeah, relatively to innovation or something.  But, I am doing a comparison study 
on the Philippines power sector reform conducted in 2000, 2001, and I want to compare the Chilean 
case and the Philippines case. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Excellent. 
 
<M> 
Now, I am trying to find what to compare, what can be compared in two countries.  How was the new 
policy designed and how was the new act or new law was enacted at the time?  How was the new 
regulatory body organized and created at the time?  That’s one of the topic about what I want to know 
in Chile. 
 
<K> 
I think we want to start from the question about how has IDB supported the Chilean power sector?  
What activity has the IDB done in the power sector in Chile? 
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Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Ah, okay.  Because there are two questions, one is from the past the privatization… 
 
<M> 
Past and now, current situation. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
…and the second is basically the… 
 
<K> 
Or from the past to now, the history. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Okay, the history.  Yeah, basically, I’m just working for the IDB since last year, 1 year, so I don’t 
know too much about the past support of IDB to the country.  But I can tell you about this bit of the 
country without considering the IDB support.  At the end, I can tell you what is happening now in the 
sector in the last year. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, great. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah.  In the ‘80s, because the privatization reform was in the 1990… 
 
<M> 
‘78? 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
1990s something.  Basically Chile was trying to privatize public state-owned companies.  Those state-
owned companies were basically in the transport sector, it was the airlines, utility sector where 
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basically the first utility sector was electricity.  Water was just; I think in the year 1999, 2000, water 
was the last one to be privatized by the Chilean government. 
 
I can say that electricity was one of the first – was the first because – yeah it was the first because 
telecommunications basically, telephones, telecommunications, I think it was 1990s, so electricity was 
the first one 1990s. 
 
Well, basically, they established – they normally have the sector divided in three in Chile, you know, 
the power generation, the transmission, and distribution.  Then, basically, they say, okay, we’re going 
to privatize distribution, first distribution and then they also privatized power generation.  In some 
cases, the transmission was basically done by the distribution or the power generation areas of the 
companies. 
 
At the beginning, they privatized one, or two, or three companies and then basically in power 
generation, the Chilean system allowed to participate any company that can do – that can make 
electricity today.  This is the basic characteristics of the system. 
 
Second, they established Superintendencia, in Spanish, a regulator and the regulator worry about, not 
the quality, but the area of the service and then the tariff.  In order to establish the area of the service, 
they respect the current incumbent companies in those areas.  In order to establish tariff, sustainable 
tariff, they used a model called, let me remember, energy is not my main sector of focus, but I need 
to remember. 
 
<K> 
Maybe in Spanish? 
 
<M> 
Marginal cost. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah, I don’t remember even in Spanish but I need to remember the models.  It’s basically the 
benchmarking over the optimum or the most efficient company. 
 
<M> 
Marginal cost return, MOB [ph]. 
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Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
It’s basically, you know, the best efficient company, you establish the parameters for the most 
efficient company and then depending on the parameters that you have in cost investment and period 
that the regulator is going to allocate the private company to maybe the investment return you’re 
going to have a different tariff.  Okay, this is very bad because I don’t remember.  Impress [ph] 
efficient basically, efficient company is the model, efficient company. 
 
They established the tariff.  They have a regulator.  They have the company.  The company is 
basically regulated by the regulator and reviews the tariff time to time and in Chile, the situation was 
not critical in the last 15 years, but in the first 15 years.  But now, what is happening is basically that 
we have problems in order to produce the electricity for the demand that we are predicting in the next 
couple of years.  That is what is happening. 
 
In fact, today there are several projects in hydro and face some problems with the communities and 
some companies have stopped basically those investment.  Why?  Because the government has 
working environmental policy that includes several mitigation measures that company need to follow.  
Sometimes, what happen is basically that those measures are not clear or are too expensive.  That 
was happening.  Basically, we are working with competition in power generation, also in transmission, 
and distribution.  Basically, that is the main model today in Chile. 
 
How the IDB is supporting the system today, I need to explain to you little more about things outside 
the energy or the power sector.  You need to understand why we are doing so little in this area, in 
Chile.  Basically, Chile was starting to grow in economic terms.  Then basically in the last 10, 15 years 
donations coming from several countries around the world are decreasing in this country.  Then, 
Chilean knows that sometime basically the loans that they can get from the capital market, sometimes 
could be cheaper that getting those credit from the World Bank or us.  Therefore, the homework [ph] 
for the multilateral institutions is very high because we need to bring high value-added for Chile in 
order that they can take loan.  Therefore, in the last 6 years, 7 years, we didn’t face too much 
demand for financial resources from Chile. 
 
This government, Bachelet, is the new president; we have an informal agreement in order to make 
loans for around $500 million, $600 million in Chile.  But this amount is basically in 90% of the 
resources is going to be allocated to the social sector.  It means education, health, state 
modernization, what else, pension reform, tax reform, and others.  Basically, in the transport sector 
infrastructure, we are doing some technical co-operations, it’s [Unclear] co-operations at this point of 
time. 
 
Specifically in the power sector, we tried to enter to the power sector with the new Ministry of Energy 
that Chile created in the year 2010, 2009 something like that.  At the beginning, the government 
suggests but in the last 4, 5 months, they said, no, we have the money.  We don’t need the bank for 
this activity. 
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Therefore, today, they are demanding basically some work in energy efficiency, renewable sector and 
I think that they are trying to modernize the petroleum company, which is located basically in the 
south Chile, in the city that is called Cantarrana.  Yeah, it was famous company because they 
established the company in 1950, when oil was just discovered in this area of the Magellan Strait.  
Then they established some branches in Concepción-Talcahuano and then here [Unclear] in the close 
to Valparaíso region.  Those are the branch of this company.  Basically, they are trying to modernize 
this company, be more efficient and in order to recover this company, because normally every year 
this company is accumulating losses. 
 
Given that basically, oil, I think that the reserve for oil is for 2, 3, 4, 5 more years, that’s it.  But we 
produce so little, we import 85%, 90% of the total demand for oil.  Basically, in Chile, at this point of 
time, in the power sector, the IDB is working just in those areas. 
 
You know that we have 2 windows at the bank; we have the public window and the private window.  
That are activities from the public window, but from the private window, I can introduce my colleague.  
I don’t know if she’s available to receive you, but I can talk with her.  I don’t know if she’s – she 
knows a little more, but the bank is giving loans to the private sector in order to develop new projects 
in renewable energy, solar and wind.  There are two famous projects in the north of Chile that was 
supported by the IDB.  But still, those projects are small in terms of investment, no more than $75 
million, $80 million.  This is small amount for those investments. 
 
Yeah, basically, this is the system today and what is important to recognize is that Chile has stopped 
completely the studies that at one time the country wants to pursue in the nuclear area, given that we 
have a strong headway in 2010.  Then the country said, okay, those studies were paralyzed.  I don’t 
know what is happening with those kinds of studies today, but we know that Bolivia is starting doing 
something in nuclear power, but Chile stopped totally this discussion. 
 
<K> 
Bolivia? 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah, Bolivia is starting doing something in the power. 
 
<K> 
Really? 
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Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
For that, the reason normally here in Chile, they say, okay, why don’t we start talking about nuclear 
energy because I don’t know who is lending the money to Bolivia, maybe China?  Maybe China is 
lending the money to Bolivia.  China is starting to be very active in order to donations or lending 
money in Latin America.  Venezuela, Ecuador… 
 
<K> 
Nicaragua as well. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah. 
 
<K> 
New canal. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
yeah, the new canal, but I don’t know if the government is involved in this.  I don’t know if this is a 
totally private company, but I don’t know if it is. 
 
<K> 
No pure private company in China. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Okay.  Yeah, nuclear energy is not an area that is.  But, recently I read the newspapers here in Chile 
and we have an objective to reach, I don’t remember, is it 10%, 20%.  I think that it’s 20% of the 
total market production in renewable energy. 
 
<K> 
That is the target for 2050, right? 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
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For 2025, and then I read that basically we are going to be able to reach this objective in 2020.  They 
are working in a new and try to establish a new parameters, new objectives for the future.  Yeah. 
 
<M> 
You just said in the private sector, in the new – to develop new renewable energy generation, but 
there is small investment rather than expected, so what? 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Oh, the kind of projects.  The projects normally are – they have a small investment, $75 million, $50 
million, and $45 million. 
 
<M> 
Yeah, you mean small projects. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Small projects, yeah.  Several areas, normally in the north of Chile.  Still, we don’t have the system 
that is implemented – it’s already implemented in the United States.  I don’t know what is happening 
in Japan, but United States, I don’t recall the system, but basically is that when you put your solar 
panels in your house, you are able to save energy.  Also, if you have more – you have access of 
production of energy with solar, you can sell this excess to the network.  I don’t know what is 
happening in Japan, but in United States, it is already to do that. 
 
In Chile, we’re just starting.  We don’t have the system yet.  People just can have, save energy and 
they can pay small amount of bills at the end of the month, but we don’t have the opportunity to sell, 
the excess to the network.  It’s not happening yet. 
 
<K> 
That’s another very difficult policy question.  In Japan, we have only – we employ the single buyer 
system, so only the distribution company is monopoly in Japan, regional monopoly.  Each region has 
its own distribution company so we can sell.  We sell the electricity surplus of produced from the solar 
panel on our home to that single buyer, so it’s very safe. 
 
But, in different countries like probably Germany or in UK, its electricity market there, so we have to 
sell to the market and then the price will differ from time to time.  That is determined at the market.  
It’s more risky project, but I don’t know which is better, but those questions are very difficult to ask, 
to answer in any country.  I think Chile will struggle to find a way to… 
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Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah, it seems to me that we have the same system basically, I don't know.  But because I don't 
know about the Japanese system, but Chile has economic dispatch center, which is basically, these 
are couple of people that is trying to regulate… 
 
<K> 
Yeah, CDEC. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah.  They are trying to fix, establish, determine the marginal cost, and then the obligation of the 
producers is basically that they are facing, small bidding or auctions anytime and it’s entering the 
energy which is cheapest – the cheapest energy anytime. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, so they always are related to renewable energy.  The problem would be that buyers – which 
buyer system would be preferable.  Another thing is the stabilization of the system. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah, that’s right.  Basically, you know better than me that basically that when the electricity – 
production of electricity of energy in one country is more expensive than others, which in the case of 
Chile in comparison with other countries in South America, renewable energy is going to be expensive 
– well, is a little more I can say easier to enter with renewable energy because the tariff is more 
expensive.  When you compare with Colombia, for example, which has lowest marginal cost of 
production because they have hydro system and they tried to enter with other kind of wind or solar 
energy, the difference is big because it’s too cheap.  But, you know, at this point of time we are happy 
because oil price, oil tariffs are going to go down and then 40%, 45% of our market, we are benefiting 
by this situation of oil market. 
 
<K> 
But I think for Chile our student done a [ph] study, but the interconnection of power between other 
countries, like Argentina – Argentina would be very difficult.  Peru, also difficult, but Peru Argentina 
and those I think interconnection of transmission line between with surrounding countries would be 
very crucial to Chile. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
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Yeah, you’re totally right, because in Central America, they have a system that is basically… 
 
<K> 
Yeah, SIEPAC. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
SIEPAC.  For South America, I don’t remember the name, but we are working – not we, we are just 
supporting the discussion among the countries, the IDB is entering into the table to support. 
 
<K> 
Pacific something. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
SIEPAC and I don’t remember the name here in, but I can say that it still in papers [ph], they are just 
starting to discuss. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, and also probably they are very difficult to connect between Chile and Peru, for instance. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
I don’t think it’s too difficult.  You say it for political reasons?  Yeah, because technically, it is easy, 
this is political reason.  I think that the, once country can advance, be more developed in a couple of 
years, I think that’s going to be totally normal, that Peru can sell energy to Chile.  It’s just a matter of 
time. 
 
<K> 
Yeah.  Peru does have cheaper electricity. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah, sure. 
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<K> 
I think that they are very happy to sell electricity to Chile.  Also then Colombia, Ecuador. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah.  In fact, there is – I don’t know the name, but they are starting to sell to Chile from Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Peru. 
 
<K> 
But actually one of the problems would be that Chile is the only country which would like to buy 
electricity, maybe.  In other countries, they have, Ecuador may not be, but Colombia has hydro, Peru 
make hydro and thermal plants. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah, we have power, thermal and hydro. 
 
<K> 
But the tariff is high. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Sure. 
 
<K> 
I think the Chilean government would like to reduce the tariff by regional cooperation. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
That’s the main objective of the Ministry of Energy, yeah.  That’s the main objective.  Are you going to 
have some meeting with the Ministry of Energy? 
 
<K> 
No.  But, it would be good to have an interview with someone in the Ministry.  But I’m not sure if they 
know something about the past.  They know about the current situation.  Yeah, that’s good to hear 
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about because Daniel [ph] is going to – is still studying the some power interconnection in various 
countries in the world.  Updated information would be very important to him.  That’s good chance to 
get the information from the Ministry of Energy.  I’m not sure for her, that’s about the past, so I think 
no one who experienced the power sector reform would remain in the Ministry of Energy.  They have 
already left the Ministry of Energy. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yes, you’re right.  But how many days you’re going to be here? 
 
<K> 
Actually, unfortunately, we are going to leave here on the evening of Wednesday. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Oh, on the evening of Wednesday. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, so only tomorrow and Wednesday. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah.  The point is also, what is happening, we have probably difficulty to find the people here but I 
can – if I remember someone today and if I can stay in touch with them… 
 
<K> 
Yeah, that’s really appreciated. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
…I can pass you the name because it was difficult for me to set up a couple of additional meeting with 
people here because there was in several activities.  Yeah, someone from the university would be… 
 
<K> 
Yeah, we have already met some professors.  Universidad de Chile and Universidad Católica de Chile. 
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Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Okay, perfect.  Yeah. 
 
<K> 
But we haven’t seen some… 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Who in the Católica University or Universidad de Chile? 
 
<K> 
Raimundo Soto. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Ah, Raimundo, yes. 
 
<M> 
We met Jadresic and Adolfo Ibañez University. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
In the Católica University? 
 
<K> 
No.  Alejandro Jadresic was at Adolfo Ibañez. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Ah, perfect.  Yeah, and Raimundo, Católica. 
 
<K> 
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Católica.  Ronald Fischer in Universidad de Chile. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Ah, Ronald Fischer, okay.  Yeah, perfect, no, excellent. 
 
<K> 
The only guy, we haven’t met would be the – I forgot his name, 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Pablo Serra? 
 
<K> 
Pablo Serra is another guy, we haven’t met.  Pablo Serra, where is he? 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
I don’t know, but Pablo Serra has an interesting story.  Maybe you need to ask him.  I’m not sure if 
it’s the same Pablo Serra, but what I remember is Pablo Serra was in the Ministry of Energy, or in the 
Superintendencia some time and I don’t remember if he was part of the team that made a mistake 
when they published new tariff system for electricity sector. 
 
<M> 
Which system, when? 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
I don’t know.  But talking about electricity, I remember as a funny case.  Yeah, because I’m not sure if 
it’s the same person.  Pablo Serra.  Oh, yes, 2006, Pablo Serra, was laid off. 
 
<M> 
From the ministry of energy? 
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Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
In 2 months, the National Commission of Energy made two mistakes in the calculation of the tariff.  
Yeah, it was in 2006.  I remember.  But he’s a good guy.  He’s an expert in the sector.  He was 
working here for 12 year.  Twelve years he was working in the National Commission of Energy. 
 
<K> 
CNE. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
CNE, when I remember Serra, oh, yes. 
 
<M> 
Why do you think those CNE’s working condition, working score was decreased since ever since power 
sector reform?  At least just after the power sector reform, the tariff setting and technical issues were 
well done, I think.  But recently after 2000, after all, companies were privatized the CNE’s working 
efficiency was little bit lower, I think.  Why those kind of things happened in those institution? 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Okay.  No, I understand.  I think that this case is a particular case.  It does not reflect the real 
situation of electricity market or the capacity of the people.  People capacity is very good.  But 
sometimes, we’re discovering not all in the electric sectors, you know, not only in the electric sector 
but also in other sector in the public area is that, you know, in the academy, when you are in the 
academy, you are a professor, Mr. Komatsuzaki [ph]. 
 
<M> 
Komatsuzaki, yeah. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Ms. Umi [ph], yeah, when you are a professor there, basically you have time, which is one variable, 
you have several opinions from the rest of the people that they are going to need your opinion in 
objective terms.  But when you are in this kind of sector in the public sector, you need to deal with 
people that is not giving the real opinion, or the real calculation, because they are basically member of 
some political party or you know, is a political party, at one point. 
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Second, you are against the time.  Sometimes you need to make decisions in short period of time and 
you can make.  But basically your question, is that we in Chile, we have very good professionals.  We 
have very good universities, we have very good professionals, and public sector receive those kinds of 
professionals as important authorities normally have Ph.D., Master degree, but we have a second level 
that basically need the improvement, courses or strengthen the capacities time to time in that. 
 
Third one is basically that when we are a country that is believing in some area that the knowledge in 
the public sector, it’s difficult to find, to have benchmarking.  In some areas, you can find the system 
is unique, the system is working, and sometimes you know the authorities have some – are afraid that 
make some changes can provoke some mistakes in the system.  But I think that now Chile is facing 
three reforms, taxes, education, and the third one is I don’t remember.  The third one is the electoral 
system. 
 
<M> 
Pension. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah, pension is still in… 
 
<K> 
Election. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
The electoral system – the elections.  Yeah, Chile is starting to play new paradigms in those areas.  I 
think that in the energy system – the energy sector all the community, all the country is conscious 
that we need more investment.  We need more investment.  Because our tariffs are very high that’s 
the main point. 
 
The agenda of this minister is good because they are considering the necessities of investment, in this 
period of time.  The point is basically how to accelerate those investments in the country and second, 
how to flexibilize or how to convince communities that are against big projects of electricity, hydro 
basically that, the mitigation issues are going to be valid, are going to be banned in the future.  That’s 
the main point. 
 
Maybe in some point of time, Chile needs also to start the discussion at least or continue the 
discussion for nuclear energy.  It doesn’t mean that the society is going to accept the investment in 
nuclear energy, given the risk of the system, but it’s important to start the discussion.  Because in 
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some countries, like your country, United States, you have those nuclear energy plants, well, 
sometimes these are risk.  Chernobyl and I don’t know, well I remember the city over there. 
 
<K> 
Fukushima. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Fukushima. 
 
<M> 
Compared to the past, the investment environment for private company has been changed a little or 
still in the past, the environment of investment is attractive. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
just one second.  [Foreign Language].  Yeah, sorry. 
 
<M> 
How is the current situation for the new investment like may be the government community confirm 
or supports the construction of nuclear power plant in Chile, many private company or many private 
sector wants to join the new invest, but can you tell me the differences between the past and now? 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Okay, yeah, of course.  I think that when Chile started privatization system, was 30, 40 years ago, it 
was difficult for our country to attract Japanese, European, American investment, but today it’s easier 
than before for our country.  However, you will face the competition from other countries in Latin 
America that are starting to do well also and they are attractive. 
 
But we recognize that basically still Chile is an old country for investors because they felt here is that 
nobody is going to excoriate or to take over the company, the private sector.  It’s impossible that this 
happen in Chile.  No political party, no citizen, no community in Chile is going to understand if a 
Japanese investor is going to be excoriated, is not going to happen in Chile.  We know that in other 
Latin American countries, still investors can face this risk. 
 
<K> 
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Yeah, that’s possible. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
This is one point.  Second is basically that the market is the king in the sector in Chile.  The market is 
basically going down in the outside rest of the world, we’re going to be affected, but at the end market 
is going to determine tariff, quality, and demand, you see and everybody knows about that. 
 
We have some collusions problems in several industries in Chile that the Fiscalía Económica Nacional 
auditing is working recently, I don’t know if you read the newspaper in English, but recently the last 
week, we know about the collusions between the shippers – the shipping companies, the maritime 
shipping companies between Korean, Japanese, Chilean companies.  They say, hey, we are colluding 
in order to charge a higher price for the shipping to the car companies, Toyota, Mazda Japanese 
companies. 
 
But we are working on that, we are working on those kinds of collusion, but at the end it’s the market 
that is facing it.  There is no country that will say, okay, we are going to establish the price of the dolls 
received for Christmas.  No, we are not going to establish tariff unless we discover that the market is 
a monopoly, second. 
 
Third one is basically that our professionalism of the public sector and private sector is, I think, we 
have a very high level of professionalism and the level of corruption in our country is low – is very low.  
We still have, but it is low.  Therefore, investors can say, okay, if I need to create a company, yeah, 
we’re going to break the company.  We don’t need to pay extra for your company.  If we’re going to 
sell Toyota’s here in Chile, we’re going to sell Toyota’s at the price, concession of Toyota.  You don’t 
need to pay extra in our country.  This is well-received by the investors around the world, you see. 
 
Another important thing is that Chile has more than 50 or 60 free trade agreements with several 
countries around the world.  I think that is one of the lead around the world in free trade agreements.  
Therefore, it is important, because if you have a Japanese company, or Korean company, or any other 
company, they say, okay go to Chile because we can take advantage of the free trade agreement that, 
we, as a country don’t have in our country. 
 
You see, we have free trade agreement and then we attract those companies who are coming from 
those countries that don’t have free trade agreement with several others.  They establish companies 
here in Chile.  As a Chilean company, we need to take advantage of those. 
 
I think that our country is powerful in order to establish the soft area of regulation of the market and 
facilities for the private investment.  It is better than in the past because we are improving, every 
time we are improving. 
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<K> 
I think you said you have a videoconference… 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah.  Teleconference.  Hori is going to call me.  I can say that I’m going with you, you can have the 
opportunity to say hello to him, if you want.  Is it okay for you? 
 
<K> 
Yeah.  Let’s say, it would be greatly appreciated if we can have – you could introduce us to someone 
in Ministry of Energy.  But I know that it’s probably very difficult to find someone but if anybody… 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah. 
 
<K> 
Until in our stay in Santiago. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Sure. 
 
<K> 
Maybe, again, I will come back, but… 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah, no, it will be wonderful.  As I told you, if we have the opportunity to work with you in Chile for a 
pilot project, in the transportation area, which is my area here, we could do some beautiful work. 
 
<K> 
Transportation. 
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Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah. 
 
<K> 
To have a new transport system, you said some… 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah, maybe we could establish some videoconference or teleconference, to establish which kind of 
study we can do, in innovation.  Maybe you people, what you normally see is talking with our division 
there, maybe we can say in Chile, we have a wonderful relationship, and we can start a pilot.  Then 
we can introduce you to the authorities, the Ministry of Transport and we can start working. 
 
<K> 
Actually, one of the professors in our laboratory is specialized in transport policy, or on the transport 
engineering.  I am going to talk to him. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah, fantastic.  We can establish some conference and yeah. 
 
<K> 
Just one question.  Do you find any difference from – do you have any difference between the energy 
sector, power sector and other sectors like, for instance, transport sectors in Chile? 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Yeah, in which characteristics? 
 
<K> 
Yeah, like public policy-making or regulation and human resource and so on. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
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Yeah, the energy sector is I think the most intellectual sector in Chile because the people need to be 
more specialized in order to establish those regulation models.  Just one second.  [Foreign Language]  
I need to talk in English with you for just 5 minutes, okay? 
 
Hori Tsuneki 
Okay. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Can you talk in English?  I have you in open conference, because I am finishing right now, an 
important meeting with two of your – how can I say… 
 
<K> 
University of Tokyo. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Important professor, University of Tokyo, Mr. Shunsaku Komatsuzaki and Ms. Minju Kim [ph] that 
they can say hello to you, just for 5 minutes, you can speak in Japanese, if you want to say hello to 
Hori Tsuneki. 
 
<K> 
Okay.  Hori-san [Japanese].  Yeah, thank you, Patricio. 
 
Patricio Mansilla-Caro 
Okay, Hori.  You know Hori that we… 
 
END 
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Meeting Note #7 
Date: 20150203 
Time: 12:00~13:30 
Place: Santiago,Chile 
Interviewee: Esteban Skoknick(S) 
Interviewer: Minju Kim(M) , Shunsaku Komatsuzaki(K) 
 
Skoknick(S)    
Well, I for most of that time when the CNE was Bruno and Sebastián Bernstein.  I was not at that time 
there.  At that time, I worked for Endesa.  But I know what happened in those years, so I would try to 
answer your questions. 
 
<K> 
Thank you. 
 
<M> 
Thank you very much.  Oh, you were working at Endesa? 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah, at that time, yes. 
 
<M> 
I heard many workers in Endesa went to CNE when they established. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yes, Sebastián, we worked together at Endesa and then he went to work with Bruno and 
to CNE at that time. 
 
<M> 
But real proposal of the establishment of CNE is to make transparent and independent regulation. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yes, of course. 
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<M> 
But they are from private sector – private company to regulate those companies. 
 
Skoknick(S) No.  Endesa, in ‘78, there were the generation was almost 100% public.  Endesa was a 
public company belonging to the state and also Chilectra at that time, that was a distribution and 
generation company, also was state-owned.  There were these usual companies that correspond to 
the existing CGE that was a private one.  But all generation and transmission was state-owned and 
most of the distribution also. 
 
<K> 
How was the policy of power sector reform at that time considered in Endesa?  I think Endesa was 
opposing to such concept of reform? 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah, especially the initial idea was to – CNE was not talking about privatization at the 
beginning, they were just organizing the sector and the rules to make transaction between generator 
and to set a price to distribution companies.  But when the CNE began to talk about to split the 
generation of Endesa, first privatize the distribution companies, that was the first step, then to split 
the big state-owned company in several generation units.  That was opposed by Endesa because the 
idea apart from the fact that you split the company is that the sector, it was at that time the general 
idea, you should not split several generation unit, would operate better in a centralized way.  The idea 
was that you could not split one thermal unit and one hydro, but rather have a complete mix of all 
that in one hand and that was the opinion of the Endesa – the majority of Endesa and tried to oppose 
as far as Endesa could because at that time there was not too much room to oppose. 
 
<K> 
Because of the military government? 
 
Skoknick(S) Yes.  But there were conceptual discussion about the possibility of building such a 
regulatory framework with the idea that was not going to work.  You see, it was not possible to set 
such kind of rules and to make such spot market in order to make individual units – generation units.  
I think that is why also there was – that is why probably because Endesa was not divided more.  
Endesa was only splitted in one of the units that were Colbún.  But the generation apart from two 
small units were the first one to be privatized [Unclear], is one of 40 megawatt. 
 
The rest of Endesa was maintained as one unit.  Even transmission was not split for generation, 
because one reason was the force of people from Endesa, the ideas, but also, mainly that, but I’m not 
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sure if the people from CNE was absolutely convinced that they should have – they were convinced 
that they should have to do that, but they could not compromise to give Endesa it was. 
 
The distribution was splitted but not integrated, but the generation was not and that is why also 
Endesa kept most of the water rights.  Endesa was state-owned, has a lot of water rights because 
most of the hydropower plant studies were made by Endesa and when it was privatized, all the water 
rights were belonging to Endesa were kept at Endesa and were not taken out and privatized.  That is 
why Endesa has been all this time around 50% of the market, maybe now it is 40 but really… 
 
<K> 
Anyway, somehow Endesa avoided the CNE’s interference in terms of splitting… 
 
Skoknick(S) Splitting yes, not in the other regulation but in splitting yes. 
 
<K> 
It remained in one company and also maintained the water rights. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah. 
 
<M> 
What kind of influencing power the Endesa had at that time?  I mean, there was a real influencing 
something to the market or CNE or…? 
 
Skoknick(S) No, the CNE was convinced what they had to do, but in the government, there was also 
a group of more – maybe not most of the economist but some may be military group that were not so 
Chicago Boys.  They have some power in the government and there were some difference on what to 
do with that privatizations things like that so that the economists has the clear idea, especially Bruno, 
of course, was the leader at that time. 
 
But there were another group probably more in the area of military than were also working in the 
economic area that were not so convinced that that was the right thing to do.  There were some 
differences, and that is why they didn’t do all they should have liked to do with the guy of CNE. 
 
<K> 
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Do you know how or who actually developed or created the initial idea of this power sector reform, 
before the separate kind of CNE? 
 
Skoknick(S) I think the idea was the guys created this were Bruno Philippi and then with him in the 
power sector also, Sebastián Bernstein those were the – they had the idea. 
 
<K> 
Bruno was at that time the professor at the…? 
 
Skoknick(S) Before going to the CNE, he was professor at the Catholic University.  He had made 
master, I think a Ph.D. in Stanford and came back to the university and then went to the CNE.  He 
was the first executive secretary of the CNE. 
 
<K> 
He somehow put the idea to the government? 
 
Skoknick(S) Yep.  Also, of course, there were a group of economists that were leading the general 
economic reform. 
 
<M> 
The water plant? 
 
Skoknick(S) Were mainly in the Sergio de Castro, Hernán Büchi after that, but they were in the area 
of – they were mainly in the Ministry of Finance and they had the general idea that this should be 
done, but the specific implementation to the power sector was mainly I think Bruno and Sebastián. 
 
<K> 
Probably Ministry of Finance of that group had general idea of reform or privatization of the public 
utility. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah, in general, yeah, but not the detailed way to do that, create spot market with 
marginal cost.  All that was based on economic knowledge of the power sector, Bruno and Sebastián.  
Sebastián had worked couple of year at the É lectricité de France, Sebastián Bernstein, so he had clear 
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knowledge of the economy of the power sector and also had been in the planning department of 
Endesa so… 
 
<M> 
Endesa, Sebastián? 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah.  Sebastián studied engineering in France and then he worked for a couple of years 
in É lectricité de France and then he came to Chile, back to Endesa. 
 
<M> 
We can say he is technical expert in the economics? 
 
Skoknick(S) What does it mean? 
 
<M> 
I mean, he is the technocrat. 
 
<K> 
Is he a civil engineer or economist? 
 
Skoknick(S) He is a civil engineer, but related to economy of the power sector, not too technical 
details. 
 
<K> 
Actually, someone whom we have already interviewed mentioned some factor related to the mining 
industry in Chile and I think mining is very crucial industry in Chile but mining industry kind of suffer 
from the high electricity tariff because mining needs lot of electricity.  In the ‘70s, I think there was 
some pressure or some influence from the mining industry to reduce electricity tariff, is that true? 
 
Skoknick(S) I don’t think so.  No, there was not really.  Because in the ‘70s, the main production of 
copper was in the hand of the state.  Codelco had been privatized, Chuqui, El Teniente, Andina were 
privatized and there was only one big private company here, so I think that was not a real issue, 
pressure to the power sector. 
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<K> 
The government didn’t think about the improvement of the competitiveness of such mining industry in 
Chile by reducing… 
 
Skoknick(S) Probably, yes, but not related with the power sector, no. 
 
<K> 
I got it. 
 
<M> 
Do you think there was external support? 
 
Skoknick(S) Not at all, no.  There was nobody thinking about this kind of reporting, there wasn’t at 
that time.  Even people from the – I remember talking with people with the World Bank at that time 
that came from time to time, I think they were not sure that this was a good idea.  They doubt about 
this, and afterwards they were expanding the idea all over the world, but at the beginning some of 
them at least were not so sure that was a good idea.  There were not at all – not at all – there was no 
influence. 
 
There was the idea of a market, especially in a market, where you can set margin cost, you can easily 
calculate that and you can implement that and the general idea.  But nobody, even in I think in France, 
where the idea of economics in the power sector, calculating marginal cost, economics of power plant, 
I think it was a modest economic application in the power sector.  They didn’t think at all in single 
really splitting the market with several competition in the generation market, not at all. 
 
Even in the idea of generation, but even the idea of model of to set tariffs in distribution companies, 
not with the historical account values, like in the state is that historical rate of return, but in 
theoretical model system was not something that were applied anywhere.  They apart from the 
generation sector, the distribution setting the tariff were also a complete new idea at that time. 
 
<K> 
I have two questions. One is about the influence of democratization of the country, so, in the late ‘70s, 
military government had dominated the country, so CNE didn’t have any – could avoid some 
opposition from Endesa.  But after the democratization, I think CNE may lost some authority because 
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there should be some competition is trying to influence the power policy, no, but still had 
independence from the political influence, even after democratization? 
 
Skoknick(S) I think the CNE, of course, the head of the CNE was also set there by the government, 
no, first by the military government and then by the democratic government.  But, the people that 
continued the CNE in the ‘90s, was convinced of the ideas that were applied in the power sector.  They 
didn’t, in the last 30 years, nobody has tried to modify the principles, the main concept there has been 
some reform, of course, but not in the heart, in the core of the regulation. 
 
<K> 
Actually, someone also, the other one professor said that the Chilean power sector actually lacks some 
stability at the political level to have long-term view of power sector and just the Chile left the function 
to the market, everything left the market. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah. 
 
<K> 
For instance, in the late ‘90s or in the middle ‘90s, I think Chile had some dispute regarding the 
transmission? 
 
Chilean Male Interviewee 
Yeah. 
 
<K> 
Also currently Chile has a problem related to environment protection maybe so consensus-building 
with the opposing residents in certain area, maybe, so opposing to the development of hydroelectric 
power stations.  In order to avoid those problems, he said that there should be some national level or 
political level, so a long-term strategic plan, but because the Chile left everything to the market, so 
it’s very difficult to solve those problems.  That’s what he meant.  Probably in the beginning the CNE 
was very independent of political influence because of the existence of military government, but after 
the democratization, no one tried to have such a political influence on CNE.  That’s actually what I’m 
trying to ask. 
 
Skoknick(S) No.  I think what happened is that there was not such a political view to change the 
regulation.  There was no such pressure.  People that were, that knew about the sector, that there 
was not a political discussion about changing the regulation, the idea.  Of course, now there are some 
– the current Ministry of Energy and CNE are making some studies long-term generation expansion 
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studies, but I don’t think that they are really changing the fact that most of the – or all the generation 
will continue to be private, also the distribution companies and so on. 
 
There was no such – I think that the people were opposed to the regulatory framework set in the ‘80s, 
was the minority.  All the people, even people that were, for their political ideas in general, not 
specific opposed to this kind of market, were not opposed to this market in Chile, you mean in the 
power sector, I mean.  There was no such political but because we had some CNE secretary that were 
Socialist, another Christian Democrat and nobody tried to, even one of them that when the California 
reform was in at the beginning and was thought that’s a good idea, proposed here to make something 
like in California, much more liberalized than we had.  He was a Socialist because, of course, that was 
not done.  But I mean that most of the people, except the few bought the idea, they bought the idea 
that it was – that worked well, the regulatory reform worked well. 
 
<K> 
I think you mean that the Chilean people are really strongly convinced that Chile is running on the 
really right track so it’s going to the right direction, the power sector reforms.  There is not a big need 
for long-term vision, because they are on the right track. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah.  There were two – one important change was in 2004, when there was a change 
in the transmission regulation because really the transmission regulation never worked.  The idea of 
having a market or private construction, or private expansion of – private planning didn’t work, that 
really didn’t work, and that that was changed in 2004. 
 
<K> 
Also Ley Corta Uno. 
 
<M> 
Ley Corta. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yes, Ley Corta.  That was, one important thing that changed all the regulation of 
transmission that really did not work.  Even if you look at the rules, the regulation of power 
transmission was written in the last months of the military government.  It were approved, at the end, 
why because, even the CNE had no, a good proposal.  They didn’t make a proposal, revolutionary 
proposal at the beginning and because this is a very hard area to regulate, the transmission, it’s very 
difficult.  In 2004 or 2004 that was a big change and that would get the approval of everyone.  But it 
took 10 years to make the reform, to see the real problem. 
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The second one was, to move from was – in the same law, the tariff to the distribution company that 
were regulated, to transform that in an auction, more market, instead of regulated value for the 
generation projects to distribution companies.  That I think were the big change in to the regulation. 
 
You will see that even when the discussion appears about the renewable unconventional – the 
renewable, the idea of subsidies was not applied.  There was a discussion that there should be, as like 
in Europe, subsidize the renewable, but because that was not applied and the supply, and obligation to 
have percentage, but more micro-oriented at the subsidies.  Even that reform was not applied in the 
sense of most of the more nonmarket communication like in Spain or in Germany and so on. 
 
<K> 
We would also like to ask the process related to the Ley Corta Uno, but before that I want to ask the 
second question.  The second question is about the initial goal of the power sector reform, so what 
was seeked for in the beginning.  Sometimes, some country try to privatize everything and unbundle 
everything and split the companies into many companies and try to make the best competitiveness.  
Then, other countries just try to introduce IBPs and try to, deregulate the only generation sector, to 
improve the efficiency, or to improve the energy price maybe.  I think the policy goal differ from 
country to country.  In Chile, what was the initial idea about the policy board of the power sector 
reform? 
 
Skoknick(S) I think that it was not so explicit at the beginning, but it finally was to privatize the 
sector, but in a way that it worked not like it is IBPs, but work more like a market, a real market.  
Stimulate the market in a – the operation and the spot market that could be simulated like the real 
market and competition among generators, that was the idea.  But the framework is not like you say 
IBPs and things like that.  Not oriented by this type, but really open, really market. 
 
<K> 
Because I think CNE didn’t and CNE actually made some compromise with Endesa.  Endesa stayed to 
remain in one company and also the water rights also left to the Endesa and also transmission 
regulation was – can just maintain for about 20 years.  I think if the CNE tried to realize the real 
competitive market, then I think they tried to realize, because they had tried to realize it in the 
military government and Endesa didn’t have much room for opposition.  I think they could do it, but 
finally they made a compromise, so I doubt that they or I had some question about the real obviously 
goal for CNE, but you mentioned that it’s a… 
 
Skoknick(S) No, but for instance, I don’t know if Bruno told you that there was a power plant Colbún, 
that was built at that time by Endesa and what is pleaded from Endesa and the Endesa didn’t want 
that.  Pressured, convinced some ministries of the government, the military government, maybe 
Pinochet or some of these people that should Colbún be built and belong to Endesa and not privatized.  
The same with [Unclear] that was going to be privatized, finally Endesa brought it.  The CNE wanted 
Colbún splitted from Endesa and Endesa didn’t want that.  They convinced the government – Endesa 
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convinced the Pinochet to maintain that in Endesa and that is why Bruno resigned from the CNE 
because he was defeated in that small battle.  It was something like that, you know. 
 
There was two really – not all the government, in that aspect, not in the regulation, but there was a 
group in the government, even the Ministry of Interior, it was called Interior, was convinced that there 
should be one single tariff in all the country.  The CNE thought that there would be one tariff by 
distribution company and by reason saw some area the final tariff should be at higher price and 
according to the cost.  There was really a fight, I can’t even say fight, I don’t know exactly, maybe 
strong but within the government, between CNE ideas and some part of the government that were 
more – they were liberal politics, but more in the sense that there should be, for instance, single tariff 
and there was a fight and that fight was won by the CNE. 
 
But they had always the pressure of some of the ministries – the political ministries, not the 
economists, that wanted to have a single tariff.  Within the government, there was the idea of CNE 
and Ministry of Finance; they were very liberal, very Chicago.  Another group is made with some 
political and some military delegated column that were more centralized people.  In general, the idea 
was imposed by the CNE, but some of this idea had to be fight.  They were discussed within the 
government and Endesa used that people that knew that were not in the idea little to convince and 
finally Pinochet or some of the assistant or counselors too.  There was… 
 
<K> 
Finally, you’re… 
 
Skoknick(S) As I did not belong to the CNE, I had that vision, but probably Bruno, wouldn’t say that.  
I’m sorry. 
 
<K> 
So far I think that kind of interference from that another group in the government may be Endesa 
remaining in the big company and I think their dominance or the huge share in the electricity market 
of Endesa still have influence on the, I think, Chilean power sector.  I think it sometimes hinders the 
competitiveness or the entry of new players into the generation market. 
 
Skoknick(S) I think there are two things; one is that the even they are aware that there are still a 
small amount of big unit, big companies like Endesa, Colbún, and Gener.  It has been from the point 
of view of economic decision in the sector, very competitive.  For instance, some competition was 
crazy, for instance. 
 
<M> 
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For generation? 
 
Skoknick(S) In generation sector, for instance, they built three gas pipe in the northern grid, one by 
Endesa, one what it is Gener, that is a transmission line, and another by what it is now the French 
group, ECL and there was the need only of one of them, but they didn’t agree to build one and they 
built three, and the three are of no use now.  Interconnection, electric connection with that thing is 
not working. 
 
That means that does have an extreme of competition, I mean also they were small amount.  They 
were not in – they were fighting for the market, they didn’t agree to and also subsequently have been 
hearing that in the Santos [ph] grid, they arrived agreed to one gas pipeline but each one built one 
combined cycle unit simultaneous that could be really was not necessary to build, although, there 
simultaneous but they were fighting for the market.  Also, there was a small amount of unit 
generation companies.  There was not really competition. 
 
The other thing that in a market like this is difficult to get into the market.  I think is difficult, 
newcomers is not easy, especially with big power plants to get the water rides in the case of most of 
any kind of Endesa and Gener or to get site to build the thermal.  There were some of them that tried 
to get into by buying the companies and EDF was trying to buy Colbún in the ‘90s.  Finally, they didn’t 
formulate an offer and so it is not so easy to get into – a newcomer to get into the market. 
 
<K> 
Especially, I think Endesa held the water rights. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah, that’s an important thing. 
 
<K> 
I think Endesa has a very strong competitive price. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah. 
 
<K> 
I think that, I would say distortion of initial plan by CNE may have caused some problems currently.  I 
think the – yeah, another thing is – another thing about the political independence of the planning 
body and CNE, I think that political independence made Chilean system much better than many other 
countries like let’s say Argentina.  But still, even in Chile there were some, not political, but partly 
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political interference on the power sector reform by the other group like the Ministry of Interior or 
some military people. 
 
Skoknick(S) Even earlier, this was this discussion.  I think most of them were won by the CNE, but 
was not always easy. 
 
<K> 
Then I think that some area in which CNE lost in the dispute. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah. 
 
<K> 
Still won’t have some impact on Chilean power sector now. 
 
Skoknick(S) I think they only – they didn’t lose in the regulatory framework, not at all.  They won 
everything they fought, but maybe in the way that the power companies were privatized maybe, 
probably the CNE would have liked more – a big number of generation companies, maybe division of 
some distribution in Santiago, that was made after in Argentina and Peru the main distribution, this 
was split in two.  At that time, I don’t know if there were [Unclear] but for generation for sure, they 
would’ve liked to have more. 
 
<K> 
Yeah.  I think [Unclear] that Bruno lost the dispute regarding Colbún’s privatization and then actually 
after about 10 years, I think finally Colbún was privatized. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah, in ’96 it was privatized.  But the idea was belonged to Endesa.  That was the first.  
Finally, it did not belong to Endesa.  It was privatized because it did not belong to Endesa, but to the 
CORFO.  That has kept Colbún.  But in one of this discussion, he lost, and he resigned.  Then 
Sebastián became the secretary. 
 
<K> 
Oh, Sebastián became the secretary.  Sebastián, so I think after that Bruno became the President of 
Gener? 
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Skoknick(S) In the ‘90s, he became the President, after the privatization of Gener. 
 
<K> 
Okay.  Shall we move onto the question about policy process, about Ley Corta Uno? 
 
<M> 
Yeah. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah. 
 
<K> 
I think you said it took about 10 years to realize, to create the law-related, regarding the transmission 
regulation and the tariff system for distribution and also something about renewables? 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah. 
 
<K> 
It took 10 years. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah. 
 
<K> 
What do you think is the main reason why it took 10 years? 
 
Skoknick(S) Because at the beginning, they didn’t have bigger problems, that there were no 
problems with the – for instance, with the offer from generator or distribution companies and paid by 
the – what it was known as in old prices, but the gas crisis create a problem.  We had no gas and that 
created a problem. 
 
<K> 
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[Unclear]. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah.  Distribution companies and generators were not willing to supply the distribution 
companies that created the problem and that’s the law in 2006.  At the beginning also there were no 
problem with the transmission because there were not too many need to make expansion.  It worked 
without discussion, but when there was the need to make expansion and to and it happened that 
Colbún created its own transmission line instead of using Endesa because Endesa didn’t accept to 
transmit.  That was the first problem and then the expansion were – nobody was interested in 
expanding the transmission network, it was not sure to be paid.  When the problems appeared there 
was a need to change it.  There was the problem, were not in the beginning of the ‘90s.  There was 
not such discussion. 
 
<M> 
The blackout in 1999 was one of the reasons for the establishment of Ley Corta Uno, because Chile 
had several types of blackout in the city so it may cause the discussion under the new Ley Corta Uno? 
 
Skoknick(S) There was no crisis or blackout. 
 
<K> 
I think in 1998 I think Chile had severe drought. 
 
Skoknick(S) The drought, yes, because of the drought, yes. 
 
<K> 
I think in 1998, there was severe drought and in 2001, there was the gas crisis or the… 
 
Skoknick(S) No, the gas crisis began in 2004. 
 
<K> 
Yes, I think in 2001 Argentina had serious economic crisis, I think in 2001, and finally they stopped 
the gas export. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah, in 2004 they began and in 2007 the export was zero. 
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<K> 
Both crisis triggered the change of law of or the discussion about the change? 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah. 
 
<K> 
Okay.  Another thing that you mentioned here. 
 
Skoknick(S) Now it’s something similar, I think because we have suffered in the last 10 years the 
crisis of – to get permits to build power plants and to get permits to build transmission lines, because 
people oppose, social opposition and nobody want to have a risk of building a plant without a contract.  
On the other side, you cannot have a contract, if you don’t have the plant.  There was I think there 
has been a significant change, not the law, but in the regulation of the auction to supply the 
distribution companies, that generator could apply with power plant that were not built yet.  If they 
had some problem with the – not due to them they are building but due to the permits or force 
majeure, they could postpone the beginning of the supply in a couple of years and that made a lot of 
companies, new companies less risk, get into the – went to the auction and they won. 
 
We have not for the last 5 years to get new power plants to supply the distribution companies with the 
last December auction and that’s a change that has been imposed by the fact that we had problem to 
build power plant and to have any operation due to the mainly to environmental problems and social 
opposition.  That is not in the law, but there has been a significant change in the – and the result, new 
entrant, and like EDF and ECL in the… 
 
<M> 
It is driven by the slow decision-making process by the Ministry of Energy? 
 
Skoknick(S) The law? 
 
<M> 
Yeah, no, no, no.  Building a new power plant in new area is caused by the decision-making process of 
the Ministry of Energy? 
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Skoknick(S) Yes, in the rules of, to supply the contract, in the auction they make to, all the 
institution companies that make an important change. 
 
<M> 
We can say until 1999, we can say the Chilean power sector reform is relatively successful before the 
power crisis and before the new act, establishment of new act.  How do you think, what was the main 
reason for, main reason to make the reform process successful historically? 
 
Skoknick(S) I think that the reason is that it is very logic economically and it is very maybe orthodox 
but very dynamic, has been kept like that.  Because some countries, if you look at other countries like 
Argentina or Peru that began to do this reform, in the case of Peru every time they have a problem, 
they solve it by modifying the rules.  For instance, when the prices are too high because due to the 
mission constraints, they say, well, we’ve calculated the price without the mission constraints.  Then, 
when the price began to be very high because of lack of gas – the spot price and they have to use 
diesel, they decided to use [Unclear] to set the price.  They were solving the problem, eliminating the 
problem but not suffering the result of the… 
 
<K> 
No fundamental resolution. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah.  Here we have been – we have accepted the high price, we have had last 4 years, 
spot price very, very high and we had increase in price tremendous from three times due to 
Argentinean crisis.  The political sector have accepted that because – they have accepted that this 
economic rules have sense.  They think that that’s the main thing that we have kept the fundamental 
of the rules changing when there has been, of course, crisis or problems.  That has been part of the – 
you call success.  There have been agreements to solve that – to solve the problem to make an 
agreement to continue with the economic idea without distorting the economic sense of the rules.  I 
think that has been important. 
 
<M> 
The effort to improve and solve the problem continued, I think so the expert panel… 
 
Skoknick(S) The expert panel was one of the result of that.  There was a lot of discussion among the 
– in that time it was mainly among the generators and that had to be solved by the Ministry of 
Economy.  They were never solved and there were pressure and finally, there was a good solution that 
reduced the number of discussions and solve a lot of problems with most of the time with trying to 
maintain the economic rules, the economic ideas that is under the regulations, so that was a good 
result. 
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<K> 
I have one question about those policy changes, who actually start discussing about the possible 
policy change?  Is it CNE or the Ministry of Energy, or Ministry of Economy?  I am asking the – who is 
actually designing policy? 
 
Skoknick(S) Well, the Ministry of Energy is very new.  It began in 2010 so before that all the reform, 
all the discussion where proposed and discussed with by the CNE.  They have kept some of the ideas 
but now that belong formally to the Ministry of Energy, but where the people has more experience in 
the power sector are in the CNE, so they are working very, very together.  But until 2010, it was only 
CNE because there was no such Ministry of Energy. 
 
<K> 
CNE had the function of the policy maker? 
 
Skoknick(S) Yes. 
 
<K> 
Then, I think CNE was very small organization? 
 
Skoknick(S) At the beginning, it was very, very small.  Now, it is not so small, but in the beginning 
they were affecting people during the 10 years and they wanted to keep like that and if you listen to 
Bruno or Sebastián, they say, they have increased bureaucracy.  They should like to be, a group of 
people of 10 or 15, no more than that, but, of course, when you begin, a lot of roles in the beginning 
were very simple.  The idea was to have two very simple rules, even not so detailed, not so fine, but 
with logic and very good sense. 
 
But when you begin – at the beginning, when all the companies were state-owned, no problem.  When 
you privatize at the beginning, also not so problem.  But then you have people in the company trying 
to get one more to that anyway because there is more competition, I can get, something more for my 
company.  I will get some benefit.  I tried to fight for that and then they try to put details, some more 
details, some more details, and that made the necessity to increase the studies. 
 
At the beginning, for instance, the studies of distribution companies, setting price was very simple.  
There was no mathematical model.  Even at that time they were not possible, we have such a 
mathematical model and the rules were very general.  But now you have detailed mathematical model 
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to build a model company and very detailed, something similar for the rules in the CDEC, because 
their company peers that they want detail, you need more people to do that. 
 
Also, the dispatch center at the beginning was clubbed.  There was no physical point.  But now you 
need that.  You have 100 people, because you need to be sure of the – where you make to calculate 
the marginal cost at every point, etcetera.  There is something necessary complication.  But at the 
beginning, the idea was to have few rules very simple, very clear with economic sound.  That 
happened at the beginning.  It was possible to do that, but with the time that began to require more 
detailed, more mathematical, more economical regulations. 
 
<M> 
In order to build their capacity for the regulation, they started themselves, but in developing countries, 
actually, I’m doing comparison study with Chilean case and the Philippines case.  In the Philippines, in 
order to build their capacity on regulation and regulatory body, they were supported by the World 
Bank or USAID.  In the Chile case, no? 
 
Skoknick(S) No, not at all.  They were not supporting the reform activity. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, you said so. 
 
<M> 
Yeah, so Chile learned the trial and errors. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah.  But maybe because they’re all conceptual model behind that, the idea of the – 
not the technical one, but economic model, the way the market should work and the way you can 
apply that in the power sector that was the, amazing, the generation and distribution.  Finally, we 
arrived at something reasonable in transmission, but that was the last one. 
 
<K> 
About the policy-making function of CNE, I think you mentioned that the triggers of obviously change 
in 2004 was the – first is the ‘98 drought and another one would be the gas crisis in 2004.  But once 
Chile initiated the policy change in 2004 or other politicians because the drought and gas crisis were 
pretty paid – so much attention was paid to that, those crisis from the public I think.  The politicians 
also recognize the problems, but basically CNE… 
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Skoknick(S) Yeah, CNE began the all the analysis and proposals and they were discussing a lot 
among the government and the opposition at that time, and they arrived at an agreement.  There was, 
I would say political discussion in the sense of political view of the sector, not political in the broad, 
but from view of the sector.  The position was worry about not changing too much the regulations, to 
keep the general framework, general concept of market of liberalism and then they saw that they 
arrived to a compromise and the reform that were applied. 
 
<K> 
It is amazing that how big authority the CNE has.  It has very strong authority. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yes. 
 
<K> 
It is not elected by the democratic way and it is just kind of ministry in the government. 
 
Skoknick(S) At that time, when it was created, it had – I think that was the idea of the energy crisis 
in the world that was something, in the ‘78 with the crisis of oil and at that time that was.  They had a 
committee of seven ministers, so it means it was the idea that it was no multi-faction – there was 
involved the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Economy and the Policy Ministry, of course, and so there 
were a lot of ministers that sat on the CNE council, how do you say, board, there was a board.  The 
idea was something important, multifunction. 
 
<K> 
Was it created from the oil crisis in? 
 
Skoknick(S) I think that was created in ’78.  In the world, in most of the countries, energy 
commission was created because of the crisis but here it was additional, the idea of making 
something… 
 
<K> 
Multipurpose or multifunctional. 
 
Skoknick(S) 
Yeah, and the idea of making reform, but that coincided with the oil crisis also. 
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<K> 
Just coincided? 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah. 
 
<K> 
Such recognition of crisis always triggers some policy change? 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah. 
 
<K> 
Some joint action, different actors in the government. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah. 
 
<K> 
That committee of seven ministers became the board of CNE? 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah.  That was created with seven ministry, made the board and then that was not 
ministry, secretary of that board. 
 
<K> 
Finally, turned to be the board, okay.  I think one or two questions. 
 
Skoknick(S) Did you meet Hernán Büchi? 
 
<K> 
No. 
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Chilean Male Interviewee 
You should. 
 
<K> 
Who is he? 
 
Chilean Male Interviewee 
He was… 
 
<K> 
Yeah, what’s his name?  Hernán Büchi. 
 
Skoknick(S) You can find him.  He is a think tank of the Right.  He was the Finance Minister after the 
crisis of ’82 – the economic crisis.  He was from ‘85 to ‘90 and he participated a lot in the privatization.  
I’m not saying that he was the leader in that area.  He’s a political leader also of the Right.  He had a 
lot to do with the energy policy in the second half of the ‘80s.  Because the energy commission had a 
lot to do with the finance minister at the time also.  Did you talk to Rolf Lüders? 
 
<K> 
Who? 
 
Skoknick(S) Rolf Lüders? 
 
<K> 
No. 
 
Skoknick(S) He was a former… 
 
<K> 
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Hernán Büchi 
 
Skoknick(S) You call Büchi because… 
 
<K> 
Ah, that’s kind of German style. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yes, I think it is Croatian, but it is like German, yeah.  Then you have Rolf Lüders. 
 
<K> 
[Unclear]. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah.  He’s a professor at Universidad Católica. 
 
<K> 
Rolf. 
 
Skoknick(S) Lüders and he was also former Minister of finance.  Before the crisis of ‘82, or maybe 
the first Minister in the crisis of ‘82, the economic crisis.  He wrote a paper about the policy of the 
change in, I think he was the author, I don’t know.  He wrote a book.  He was the editor of a book 
about the economic change and policy change in Chile in the ’70s and ‘80s.  In that book, there is a 
chapter about the electricity.  I think he was the author of that chapter, not sure but I think so.  He 
also is post Minister of Finance of military government and… 
 
<K> 
Written in English or in Spanish? 
 
Skoknick(S) I read it in Spanish; I don’t know if there is an English version. 
 
<K> 
Is it Rolf? 
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Skoknick(S) Lüders. 
 
<M> 
Lüders. 
 
Skoknick(S) Also German.  That’s German, leaders.  But they both are political and economists, but 
very involved in the political – in the politics in the, much more Hernán Büchi, of course, than the 
other one.  The other one is mainly oriented to the – but they were involved in the ‘80s as Minister of 
Finance in all this, so they may have a different vision, a wider vision of this also. 
 
<M> 
Now the CNE’s chairperson is appointed by or voted by the member of the CNE, how they are 
appointed? 
 
Skoknick(S) The CNE, the secretary is named by the government and they depend mainly on the 
Ministry of Finance.  They are in theory independent, but in practice they depend on the Ministry of 
Finance. 
 
<K> 
Because I think the Ministry of Finance gives… 
 
Skoknick(S) Ministry of Energy, sorry.  But it depends on people.  In the last government, the Piñera 
government, the CNE secretary a very strong guy, good ideas and fighting and the Ministry of Energy 
was not very, was not fighting, and was not so they had much more initiative the CNE. 
 
In this government, Pacheco, I don’t know if you have been with him is a very strong guy with new 
ideas, a very active, doesn’t stay.  The secretary of CNE is technical people, but so the strong guy is 
ministry now.  It has to be with people more than with – logical idea is the policy-making is the 
ministry, so they should take it and that has been in this government.  But in the last one was not so 
because the Ministry was the first time there was a ministry because this did not exist before.  They 
had not too much people and so they were rather weak, but now they are very strong.  The guy is 
very strong and so I think that mean that the ministry is more stronger now than the CNE.  That 
should continue I think because the policy-making is the ministry. 
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<M> 
Very dependent on the characteristics of the person. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah.  And that they should take into account technical recommendations of the CNE, 
but for policy-making should be the rather the… 
 
<K> 
Is that the reason why the Ministry of Energy was established? 
 
Skoknick(S) No.  The idea was that the – I think 2008 or something like that, mainly the guy that 
was in the CNE, that now this is a very good guy, that now is the President of – General Manager of 
ENAP, Marcelo Tokman.  The government thought that there was the need of something strong, that 
this something that was secretary, a more political strong view of the minister, so that was created.  
That was really the beginning, but as everywhere in, in every other countries the energy commission 
was final Peru and Ecuador, everywhere you have a Ministry of Energy and that was the idea also, 
more stronger, political involvement. 
 
<K> 
Japan, doesn’t have it.  Japan still has, in Japan; the Ministry of Economy is still managing it. 
 
<M> 
CNE has the role of advising for new policy and new design for energy rather than the regulation of 
tariff or… 
 
Skoknick(S) No, formally they are mainly oriented to regulation of tariff and the technical regulation, 
that’s formal.  The orientation to new policy should be based on the Ministry of Energy.  But as they 
have strong group of people in the CNE it’s easier, it’s not as strong in the power sector, as in the 
ministry.  It’s easier for them to advise the ministry.  But not formally. 
 
<M> 
Is there any corruption or scandal in CNE? 
 
Skoknick(S) No, I have never heard something like that.  Yeah, no, there have not been any. 
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<M> 
There is CDEC for the regulation too.  Someone says there are two regulatory bodies in Chile, one is 
CNE and one is CDEC.  Their role can be, how to say, can be similar. 
 
Skoknick(S) Not at all. 
 
<M> 
No? 
 
Skoknick(S) No, not at all.  The CDEC apply the regulations to the market, to the spot market mainly 
and all the technical rules to operate the system.  All the regulation, they want to – they may define 
regulation for the operation of the system, but any of these regulations have to be approved by the 
CNE, so they really have not a regulatory role.  They have some regulatory in the sense that they 
apply all the regulation and some details – they create regulation detail, but it should be approved by 
the CNE. 
 
<K> 
I have one question about the, for me it’s the last question.  I think, to have better result policy power 
sector reform, I think, step-by-step approach or gradual approach would be sometimes necessary.  
For instance, in Chile, first the CNE tries to reorganize the state-owned company to improve the 
efficiency of state-owned companies and then moved on to privatization, unbundling of distribution, 
transmission and generation.  Another thing would be the, I think, more privatization, so like Colbún 
transmissions in 20 years.  After 20 years, now I think third phase, it’s I don’t know how to say that, 
kind of politicalization or something, the more democratization, I don’t know, the more political 
involvement or commitment to energy sector.  Firstly it started from the very… 
 
Skoknick(S) No, but I think you begin with the high level.  The conceptual idea of what you want to 
do, very, very, you want to – where you want to go and how you will organize the market.  That’s the 
highest, you begin from that. 
 
<K> 
From the highest level, the fundamental feature of the sector, but first… 
 
Skoknick(S) But there is not so many people involved, companies are not involved.  In that sense, 
this is lower level, but and really is the higher level.  You have to convince there – with that idea, you 
have to convince in a democratic country.  You have to convince all the parties, all the people, all the 
companies and you have a very clear rules to maybe to be discussed with the – that will be discussed 
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with the existing companies, or existing parties and you have to have very solid fundamental to 
convince them.  That’s the main – I think that is, you have to begin right there. 
 
There you can, apply this rule to the existing companies, even the state-owned or one company or 
two, because this was applied at the beginning with two companies, both state-owned.  But give the 
application of the rules and the fine tuning of that, and so then you bring into reform the other things, 
the property or the unbundling and things like that. 
 
<K> 
Yeah.  I thought that – she’s trying to get some insight from the comparison with the Filipino case.  I 
think in other countries after Chile, let’s say, the other countries tend to implement the many reforms 
at the same time, so the privatization, unbundling, regulation and so on, in one law, let’s say.  But in 
Chile, it started from some improvement of the state-owned companies and then privatization, 
unbundling, and then privatization, and so on.  That gradual change may have led to the better result 
or… 
Skoknick(S)I think so, yeah. 
 
<K> 
But anyway, you meant that the fundamental idea of power sector or the whole fundamental picture 
of the power sector reform was crucial. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah, that was the most important.  That is the most important.  In that process, there 
will be a lot of fight of the incumbents, I say incumbents, because they don’t want to lose their power.  
There will be a lot of pressure to modify that and to make it, suit on your own.  They want to be a rule 
that convince them, and that is the main problem and what you have to fight and convince them. 
 
<K> 
Probably, let’s say in Argentina. 
 
Skoknick(S) That happened in Argentina that tried to happen some ways in Panama also and… 
 
<K> 
Maybe Argentina also had good vision. 
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Skoknick(S) They had good vision, but they could not, when they had a crisis, and they had a 
problem, they were not able to cope.  That’s political interference that makes that when you have a 
problem, they want to solve it with no effect on the tariff, with no effect on the companies, and they 
have bad results.  Then you kill the regulation, because all the concept you make, you move, you 
shelter because of the crisis, you destroy and that happened in Argentina.  They destroyed because 
the price was going to increase and some companies were going to have bad results and so on and 
etcetera. 
 
It is difficult to maintain the vision, the wide vision you have and to convince the – for instance, one 
thing that happened here, but it’s not related only to the power sector.  In the ‘60s, when there was – 
even at the beginning of the ‘70s, ’71 there was an increase in the electricity tariff.  There was a big 
issue of increasing the tariff, but the result of the change in the economic policy of the Pinochet was 
that people began to thinking price something normal price could increase or decrease or change and 
then was a matter of fact, that the price to change because sometimes when you reduce the import 
tax, price is reduced, but if there is a crisis of oil, price should increase because oil is higher and then 
the tariff began to, to be not a big issue, not a big issue.  Of course, there are a lot of political 
comments, but something that everyone thinks that it should reflect the economic reality. 
 
That happened here in the ‘70s and that had been a big change in the price because of our crisis, but 
has not gone to destroy the fundamental of the prices.  You know that when oil increase in the world, 
our price increases and now when they decrease, they are decreasing.  With the oil, they are always 
talking about every week.  But anyway, people think that if it is high, we have to keep our part and 
not produce political so big issues that happen in other countries where you have a lot of subsidies 
and there is a pressure of politician to make question of that. 
 
<K> 
That’s true.  Do you have a question? 
 
<M> 
Yes. 
 
<K> 
Just, one small question, it’s about the current situation.  Is there any ongoing discussion about the 
possible, let’s say, smart city project in Chile, smart community? 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah, not too much.  There is – no, the CNE make a study in order to know what was 
happening in the world, 1 year ago more and Chilectra is maybe starting one area called – there is 
one area of Chilectra that they tried to something like a pilot, but has not been discussion about that. 
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<K> 
I thought that Chilean government is seeking for the increase of the ratio of renewable energy. 
Skoknick(S)Yeah. 
 
<K> 
Also, I think Chile doesn’t have the manufacturing industry because of the lack of materials, maybe.  
But I think in the future, the cars would be the electricity car, fuel-cell cars, would be much more 
simple than the conventional cars, because it’s more simple and light.  I thought that for Chile such 
new environment-friendly technology could be good for Chile, so I thought there would be some 
projects related to such fuel cell cars and smart transportation, smart city. 
 
Skoknick(S) The government has studies about that.  They are making projection and things but 
they are at the beginning I think. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, but I also know that the existing smart city projects in, let’s say, for instance, in Asia are not so 
successful so far, maybe successful in terms of the raising fund, but not successful in reality.  But I 
think Chile is a developed country so I think maybe good for the country. 
 
Skoknick(S) No. 
 
<K> 
Well, that’s a small question.  Okay, thank you very much for your time. 
 
Skoknick(S) You’re welcome. 
 
<M> 
I’ve learnt a lot from you.  Thank you very much. 
 
Skoknick(S) I suggest you to talk to that guy because they have a high level vision because they 
were Ministry of Finance two cases.  Lüders was at the ‘82 economic crisis and Büchi was at ‘85, when 
the crisis was recovered.  He was the guy that made change in ‘85 to recover the crisis.  They have a 
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vision of the power sector, especially Büchi because he was very tight, in connection with Bruno 
Philippi, when one was the Ministry of Finance and the other was the energy commission, they worked 
together a lot. 
 
I think that a lot of – because Büchi is a very, I would say, I don’t know the word, but very liberal, 
very Chicago.  Sorry, it’s not a – that doesn’t sound well, but I think he’s very liberal and he is in a 
sense Chilean leader, not.  For the market, nothing like that.  Maybe some of the ideas they discussed 
with Bruno were from Hernán Büchi. 
 
<K> 
Yeah, unfortunately, actually we are going to leave the country tomorrow evening, so it’s very difficult 
to make an appointment. 
 
Skoknick(S) But maybe you can contact by mail or phone, and… 
 
<K> 
By phone, it’s possible so you can call from Japan. 
 
Skoknick(S) Yeah, I think it’s. 
 
<M> 
Do you know the contact of…? 
 
Skoknick(S) Yes. 
 
<M> 
Oh, thank you. 
 
END 
 
 
